Criminal Law

Defendant, age 19 at time of offense, was convicted, after jury trial, of armed robbery and 1st degree murder and sentenced to consecutive terms of 28 and 43 years. Defendant and 2 codefendants planned to steal guns from the home of Defendant's father. While committing the robbery, one codefendant shot and killed Defendant's stepmother. Defendant claims an as-applied challenge under U.S. Supreme Court's 2012 decision in Miller v. Alabama, contending that his 71-year sentence violates 8th amendment of the U.S. Constitution and proportionate penalties clause of Illinois Constitution. In his pro se petition for leave to file postconviction petition, Defendant alleged that he was found guilty under theory of accountability and had been diagnosed with an antisocial personality disorder that exhibited symptoms similar to characteristics of juveniles, and referenced juvenile studies cited in 2015 People v. House decision. Defendant pled enough facts to warrant further proceedings on his claim that tenets of Miller decision apply to him. No evidence in record indicates that court considered Defendant's youth and its attendant characteristics.  (CARTER and WRIGHT, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after bench trial, of being an armed habitual criminal and possessing a defaced firearm. Police team of 7 plainclothes officers plus FBI Special Agent, rushed into Defendant's house when, after officers tried to pry open the steel security gate on the door, Defendant opened the door. Defendant directed officer to a handgun under a dresser; the gun's serial number was defaced. Defendant was not being subjected to interrogation when he directed officer to gun in his bedroom, and thus officers were not required to give Miranda warnings at that time. Thus, no ineffective assistance of counsel in counsel's decision not to file a motion to suppress.  (FITZGERALD SMITH and LAVIN, concurring.)

Defendant, age 19 at time of offenses, was arrested after he ran from police, through residential back yards, carrying a gun. He was convicted of unlawful use of a weapon by a felon and possession of a controlled substance. Enough information was known to the officers to support Defendant's arrest, and thus he cannot have been prejudiced by counsel's failure to litigate motion to suppress. Defendant made general assertion that a 19-year-old's brain is more similar to a 17-year-old adolescent's brain rather than a fully mature adult's, but failed to provide any evidence indicating how his own immaturity or individual circumstances would provide a compelling reason to allow him to file a successive postconviction petition. Discrepancies in officers' testimony do not reach severity to conclude that State failed to prove Defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Officer's testimony is enough to prove the gun he saw Defendant holding met the statutory definition of a firearm. (WALKER and GRIFFIN, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of unlawful delivery of a controlled substance within 1000 feet of a school and sentenced to 14 years. Court sufficiently inquired into Defendant's pro se posttrial claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Although it was improper for court to consider the conduct of posttrial counsel in other cases, any error was harmless as court correctly found that basis of ineffective assistance claim lacked any merit. Court granted Defendant's request to proceed pro se at trial, but denied his request to appoint new standby counsel to assist him after current standby counsel was allowed to withdraw. Court admonished Defendant several times about self-representation and each time chose to proceed pro se, and court commented that Defendant was able to argue his points, including his entrapment defense, coherently; the evidence was not complicated. Any error in court refusing to allow jurors to take notes during trial was harmless, as evidence of Defendant's guilt was overwhelming. (HOLDRIDGE, concurring; McDADE, dissenting.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of aggravated battery and aggravated fleeing and eluding. During deliberations, jury sent a note asking "Does 'knowingly discharged a firearm' mean he intended to discharge the gun on purpose or he knew a gun was discharged?" Court and parties decided not to give jury instruction IPI 5.01B, and court responded to jury by saying that "I am not giving you further instructions on this issue. The instructions you received are sufficient." Defendant was prejudiced by his counsel's ineffective representation in agreeing with court's incorrect response to the jury's question and in failing to offer IPI 5.01B which defined "knowingly". Reversed and remanded for a new trial. (ZENOFF and HUDSON, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of aggravated kidnapping of his former roommate's 10-year-old daughter, and sentenced to 7 years. Child had been waiting for her school bus; Defendant approached her and told her that she missed the bus and then kept her with him all day, including taking her to his girlfriend's apartment. When Defendant returned the child's father's phone call asking where the child was, he lied to the child about where she was. Police found the Defendant walking with the child a few blocks from her apartment.  Evidence was sufficient to convict Defendant, as he isolated the child from meaningful contact with the public.(McLAREN and BRIDGES, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after bench trial, of aggravated unlawful use of a weapon, unlawful use of a weapon by a felon, and being an armed habitual criminal (AHC) and  sentenced to 11 years. After hearing testimony of Defendant's mother and "reopening" Krankel hearings, court wanted more evidence as to merits of Defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Thus, appointment of new counsel for Defendant was not required at that point. Defendant was not prejudiced by court's denial to appoint counsel for the first 2 hearings. Court made significant effort to explore Defendant's claim and gave him ample opportunity to present factual basis of his claim. Evidence supports court's finding that Defendant possessed a firearm. Defendant's conviction of aggravated robbery cannot be considered a forcible felony conviction under section 2-8 without evidence of the facts underlying his conviction. Court erred in finding Defendant guilty of AHC beyond a reasonable doubt, based only on his conviction of aggravated robbery. (MIKVA and CUNNINGHAM, concurring.)

Court denied Defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea to 1st-degree murder. Court did not make a finding that a bona fide doubt of Defendant's fitness was raised. Defense counsel and the court remarked that a psychologist had found Defendant fit, but there was no suggestion that court was itself making an affirmative finding of fitness as if to satisfy a prior doubt of fitness. Thus, court did not err in not holding a fitness hearing.  (BIRKETT and BRENNAN, concurring.)