Criminal Law

Dist. Ct. did not err in sentencing defendant to 24-month term of incarceration following revocation of defendant's term of supervised release that was imposed as part of his sentence on conviction for possession of child pornography. Record showed that: (1) defendant was in possession of cell phone that contained pornographic websites and images of child pornography that violated conditions of his original term of supervised release; and (2) Dist. Ct. adequately explained instant, above-Guideline sentence, after noting that defendant was danger to community, and that maximum term was necessary to deter him. Moreover, defendant's repeated violations of his original conditions of his supervised release supported Dist. Ct.'s subsequent imposition of lifetime term of supervised release following revocation of original term of supervised release. However, remand was necessary  because Dist. Ct. had failed to explain necessity of imposing certain conditions of defendant's now lifetime term of supervised release, and because challenged conditions were neither included in revocation petition nor read aloud at hearing.

In prosecution on drug conspiracy charge, Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant's motion challenging prosecutor's use of two peremptory challenges to exclude two out of three African-American jurors, where prosecutor explained that said jurors were stricken because one juror's brother had been charged (and acquitted) of drug offense while other juror had been convicted of misdemeanor drug offense. While defendant argued that said explanations were pretextual because prosecutor had not used peremptory challenge on white juror whose brother had been convicted of narcotics trafficking offense, Dist. Ct. could properly find that prosecutor's explanation was credible, where: (1) all pertinent facts were developed and considered by Dist. Ct.; (2) prosecutor had used peremptory challenge on another white juror whose brother had pleaded guilty to drug charge; (3) prosecutor allowed one African-American juror to sit on jury, even though prosecutor had available peremptory challenge; and (4) racial makeup of resulting jury was consistent with demographics of Dist. Ct.'s territory where case was tried. Record also contained sufficient evidence to support jury's guilty verdict on charged conspiracy, even though defendant claimed that there was material variance between charged offense and conspiracy that was established at trial. While defendant insisted that record showed existence of two separate conspiracies based upon separate drugs sales to defendant's supervisor by other dealers, jury could conclude that only single, charged conspiracy existed, where record showed that defendant was aware of said sales to others, and that instant enterprise extended beyond his own dealings with his supervisor.

Dist. Ct. did not err in sentencing defendant to 105-month term of incarceration on felon in possession of firearm charge, where said sentence was based, in part, on finding that defendant had at least two prior felony convictions for "crimes of violence" under section 2K2.1(a)(2) of USSG. Defendant conceded that his California conviction for assault with deadly weapon qualified as crime of violence, and his Iowa conviction for aggravated assault qualified as "crime of violence" under categorical approach because it contained as element threatened use of physical force. Ct. rejected defendant's claim that mere displaying of weapon at issue in Iowa conviction did not necessarily imply or indicate its use, and defendant otherwise produced no case in which defendant was convicted for aggravated assault while accidentally displaying weapon.

Dist. Ct. did not err in sentencing defendant to 105-month term of incarceration on felon in possession of firearm charge, where said sentence was based, in part, on finding that defendant had at least two prior felony convictions for "crimes of violence" under section 2K2.1(a)(2) of USSG. Defendant conceded that his California conviction for assault with deadly weapon qualified as crime of violence, and his Iowa conviction for aggravated assault qualified as "crime of violence" under categorical approach because it contained as element threatened use of physical force. Ct. rejected defendant's claim that mere displaying of weapon at issue in Iowa conviction did not necessarily imply or indicate its use, and defendant otherwise produced no case in which defendant was convicted for aggravated assault while accidentally displaying weapon.