Criminal Law

Court entered order finding a bona fide doubt as to Defendant's fitness, and after hearing, court found Defendant unfit to stand trial. Defendant appealed that order. Three months later, circuit court found Defendant was restored to fitness, and a bench trial was held 3 weeks later. Defendant was convicted of 2 counts of harassment through electronic communication. Order of unfitness for not a final order for purposes of revesting the trial court with jurisdiction because the cause was pending in the appellate court and thus was not a final judgment of which all appellate review was exhausted. Despite Defendant's consent to, and participation in, his trial, the trial court did not have jurisdiction to proceed with the trial, and his convictions are void. (McLAREN and BRIDGES, concurring.)

State charged Defendant with unlawful delivery of a controlled substance, stemming from a drug transaction that a confidential informant surreptitiously recorded with an audio and video recording device hidden on his person. Audio recording was inadmissible, as recording constituted illegal eavesdropping because the recording did not fall within the scope of the authorized overhear as it did not name Defendant as the target. The prohibition does not extend to the video portion of the recording or the informant's personal knowledge of the drug transaction. Informant did not eavesdrop, but acted as a party to the conversation, and informant's in-person testimony is admissible. (HOLDRIDGE, concurring; LYTTON, dissenting.)

Court did not err in granting Defendant's amended postconviction petition, after a 3rd-stage evidentiary hearing, related to his convictions (after stipulated bench trial) of armed violence, unlawful possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver, and unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon. Appellate court had previously concluded that Defendant was arguably prejudiced by counsel's failure to challenge denial of motion to suppress on direct appeal. Circuit court failed to make factual findings during the suppression hearing. State asserts now that Defendant violated the law by walking in the street, and that this served as a valid basis for a stop. Postconviction court heard no new evidence as to the condition of the sidewalks. To violate the law, Defendant had to do more than merely walk in the street. State did not present any argument as to what was "practicable" use of sidewalks, but there is evidence (as shown on video) that accumulation of snow and ice made use of the sidewalks impracticable. Thus, there was a prima facie case that police lacked probable cause, and that Defendant made substantial showing of ineffective assistance of counsel. (HUDSON and BRIDGES, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after bench trial, of 1 felony count and 1 misdemeanor count of public indecency arising from an incident when he allegedly masturbated in the presence of a female jogger, within 500 feet of a junior high school when children were present on the school grounds. Defendant was also charged with misdemeanor public indecency regarding a separate incident. The term "school grounds", as used in section 11-30(c) of Criminal Code, includes the interior of a school building. MIsdemeanor conviction is vacated under the 1-act, 1-crime analysis.(BIRKETT and HUDSON, concurring.)

After jury trial, Defendant, age 46 at time of offenses, and who is intellectually disabled, was convicted of sexual assault and abuse for conduct committed against a 6-year-old victim. As he had a prior conviction for aggravated criminal sexual assault on a 9-year-old victim, court had no discretion but to sentence Defendant to mandatory natural life in prison. The original sentence of natural life imprisonment did not violate proportionate penalties clause, and was constitutional as applied to Defendant. After appeal, court sentenced Defendant, who was then age 52, to a 50-year de facto life sentence. Appellate court's decision is reversed, but the de facto life sentence is allowed to stand. (A. BURKE, KILBRIDE, GARMAN, THEIS, NEVILLE, and M. BURKE, concurring.)

A trial court's order granting a defendant leave to file a successive postconviction petition is not an interlocutory order that may be reversed once the State has filed a motion to dismiss the successive petition. The State should not be allowed to participate in the trial court's determination whether to grant or deny a defendant's request for leave to file a successive postconviction petition; instead, whether to grant leave is to be determined as a matter of law based on pleadings and supporting documentation provided to the court by the defendant. Remanded for 2nd-stage proceedings, and court is to appoint new counsel for Defendant. (CAVANAGH and HOLDER WHITE, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after bench trial, of unlawful use of a weapon by a felon, possession of a controlled substance, possession of cocaine, and possession of cannabis, and sentenced to 7 years. Defendant was a parolee out on MSR (Mandatory Supervised Release) at the time of the search, and thus was not afforded the usual protections from warrantless and suspicionless searches. Totality of circumstantial evidence establishes that the room searched was Defendant's room, and thus the gun, ammunition, and drugs found inside the room were properly ascribed to Defendant. Court thus did not err in denying Defendant's motion to suppress evidence. By stipulating that hydrocodone found inside the locked bedroom weighed 103.7 grams, State failed to prove Defendant guilty of possession of 200 grams of hydrocodone.Thus, Defendant's conviction for possession of a controlled substance is reduced to the lesser-included offense of possession of a controlled substance pursuant to section 402(c). Remanded for resentencing. (MIKVA and HARRIS, concurring.)

Defendant and another person were convicted of violent murders they committed at ages 18 and 19. Defendant was also convicted of aggravated discharge of a firearm as to the victim's child. Defendant was sentenced to 40 years and concurrent 15 years.  Court erred in denying their motions for leave to file successive postconviction petition. Both have made prima facie showings in their pleadings that evolving understandings of the brain psychology of adolescents require that the holding in U.S. Supreme Court's 2012 Miller v. Alabama apply to them as young adults. Remanded for further postconviction proceedings during which they can develop their claims. As Defendant was 18 at time of offense, juvenile sentencing provisions apply to him as a legal matter. Defendant failed to show cause for failing to raise ineffective assistance of counsel claim in his initial postconviction petition, and thus court properly denied him leave to file that claim in a successive petition. Because Defendant knew the information in one affidavit at the time of trial, and because the jury was exposed to that information through Defendant's statement, the evidence is not "newly discovered", despite that witness's former reluctance to testify. Thus, Defendant's claim of actual innocence fails as a matter of law, and court properly denied leave to file this claim.(WALKER, concurring; PIERCE, dissenting.)