Criminal Law

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of numerous sex offenses against 3 children, ages 11, 12, and 14. Victims testified by videoconferencing from chambers outside presence of Defendant and the jury. Court did not abuse its discretion by allowing children to testify by use of videoconference, and did not err by allowing support persons to be present with children while they testified. Judge's comments expressing hope to finish trial did not interefere with jury's deliberations or coerce a guilty verdict, as comments were so far removed from deliberations that there is no evidence that jury remembered the commensts. No ineffective assistance of counsel by counsel failing to "persuade" Defendant not to testify at trial. Court did not err in its application of the rape shield statute in refusing to allow evidence that all victims were previous victims of sexual assault by a parental figure. (KNECHT and TURNER, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted of 2 counts of 1st degree murder. Defendant filed postconviction petition alleging that his trial counsel labored under a per se conflict of interest as he had previously represented the intended victim of the murder, and Defendant neither knew about nor waived the conflict. Circuit court denied petition after 3rd-stage evidentiary hearing. There is no allegation that defense attorney ever represented the actual victim, because he did not represent both the Defendant and the victim of the charged crime. Thus, court properly denied postconviction petition. A per se conflict exists only: 1) where defense counsel has a prior or contemporaneous association with the victim, the prosecution, or an entity assisting the prosecution; or 2) where defense counsel contemporaneously represents a prosecution witness; or 3) where defense counsel was a former prosecutor who had been personally involved with prosecution of Defendant, and none of those 3 situations existed here. (A. BURKE, KILBRIDE, GARMAN, KARMEIER, THEIS, and NEVILLE, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of 2 counts of 1st degree murder. Given the strength of the identification testimony, minor discrepancies and lack of physical evidence do not raise a reasonable doubt that Defendant shot the victim; Defendants' eyewitnesses were not reliable. Evidence was sufficient to convict Defendant of 1st degree murder beyond a reasonable doubt. Court did not err in denying Defendant's motion to continue trial based on unavailability of one witness, as the absence of that testimony at trial did not prejudice Defendant, but substantially corroborated the accounts given by 3 State witnesses who positively identified Defendant as the shooter. Court interrupted defense counsel 4 times during her closing argument, but no indication that she was unable to fully present Defendant's theory of the case, and court's statements did not reflect opposition to those arguments. (MIKVA and CUNNINGHAM, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of aggravated domestic battery. State presented sufficient evidence, through testimony and photographs, to establish severity of the attack on Defendant's mother and the nature and extent of her injuries. Court properly admitted victim's statements made when she called 911, as call was close in time to the attack, her intent was to seek help and medical treatment, and her demeanor on the call and as observed by witnesses showed that she remained affected by the startling event at time of call, so statements were excited utterances. Statements were not testimonial, as record shows that there was an ongoing emergency at time of 911 call. Court's questioning of potential jurors complied with Rule 431(b) and Illinois Supreme Court's 2010 Thompson decision. Court admonished all jurors as to each Rule 431(b) principle and then immediately questioned them in smaller groups, giving each juror the opportunity to respond.Court is not requried to address each principle separately. (STEIGMANN and HOLDER WHITE, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after bench trial, of attempted 1st degree murder, aggravated battery with a firearm, and unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon. Court erred in dismissing Defendant's postconviction petition at 2nd stage, as Defendant's pleadings made a substantial showing of actual innocence. Taking allegations in a witness affidavit as true, the sole eyewitness to the shooting had motivation to falsely identify Defendant as the shooter, and is thus material to determination of Defendant's innocence.This affidavit directly calls eyewitness's identification into question, as affiant states that eyewitness had lied about shooting to obtain a favorable plea deal in his pending case. (LYTTON, concurring; SCHMIDT, specially concurring.)

Court did not err in denying Defendant leave to file succcessive postconviction petition. Because Defendant was no longer serving any portion of his sentence when he file motion for leave to file a successive postconviction petition, he had no standing to seek postconviction relief. Any restrictions on Defendant based on his status as a sex offender are not part of his sentence or otherwise an actual restraint arising from his conviction, but are instead collateral consequences of his conviction. (MIKVA and CUNNINGHAM, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of 1st degree murder and aggravated battery. Court did not err in instructing jury that voluntary intoxication is not a defense, as it has generally not been, under Illinois law, since 2002. Court did not exclude trial evidence or argument as to Defendant's consumption of alcohol and marijuana, and it did not instruct jury to disregard evidence as to intoxication. A reasonable jury could find Defendant guilty of 1st degree murder rather than 2nd degree murder.(CONNORS, concurring; MIKVA, concurring in part and dissenting in part.)