Criminal Law

Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant's section 2241 habeas petition that sought his release on bail. Defendant had previously sought release on bail under Bail Reform Act, where Dist. Ct. had denied such request, after finding that defendant had failed to show that he was not danger to community. Moreover, defendant had filed appeal of said denial five months later, which was dismissed as untimely by Ct. of Appeals. As such, Dist. Ct. could properly dismiss instant habeas petition, since defendant's only avenue for seeking release on bail is through Bail Reform Act, and defendant could not use section 2241 habeas petition to seek bail, where he had missed deadline to appeal initial bail denial under Bail Reform Act.

In prosecution on drug distribution charge, Dist. Ct. did not err in sentencing defendant to 130-month term of incarceration, even though defendant had argued that she qualified for reduced sentence under safety-valve treatment set forth in section 3B1.1(c) of USSG. Dist. Ct. could properly find that defendant was not entitled to such treatment, since record showed that defendant had acted as organizer/manager of methamphetamine distribution operation. Fact that defendant had not engaged in "criminal enterprise" did not require different result. Dist. Ct. erred, though, in sentencing second defendant to 36-month term of incarceration on charge of use of telephone to facilitate single drug sale, where: (1) said sentence was based, in part, on purchase of 28.6 grams of "ice," which was subject of dismissed indictment and which Dist. Ct. had found was relevant conduct for sentencing purposes; and (2) Dist. Ct. had failed to make necessary finding that purchase of 28.6 grams of "ice" was part of common scheme at issue in instant charged offense that concerned 2-gram street sale of methamphetamine. Fact that defendant had participated in both transactions that occurred within week and a half did not require different result.

In prosecution on drug and firearms charges, Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant's motion to suppress evidence seized from his home pursuant to search warrant. Record showed that: (1) prior to police street encounter with defendant that formed basis of motion to suppress, defendant's wife met with DEA agents to tell them about presence of methamphetamine inside their home; (2) local law enforcement used information that defendant's wife had provided to obtain search warrant; (3) Magistrate Judge found that wife's statements were sufficiently attenuated from any Fourth Amendment violation of police stop of defendant so as to support issuance of search warrant; and (4) defendant did not file any objections as to this finding by Magistrate Judge. As such, defendant waived any issue with respect to said finding by Magistrate Judge, and Ct. of Appeals held that Magistrate Judge's finding, that wife's statement to authorities was independently sufficient to sustain finding of probable cause to support issuance of search warrant, was conclusively established under this record.

Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant's habeas petition, alleging that he was actually innocent on murder charges that resulted in his conviction, based upon fact that witness who identified him as shooter at trial had submitted subsequent affidavit, indicating that someone else was shooter, and that he had identified defendant as shooter at trial only because he was afraid of actual shooter. State court, in denying defendant's post-conviction petition raising same issue, conducted hearing and found that witness' recanted testimony lacked credibility because it was inconsistent and implausible. As such, Dist. Ct. could properly deny habeas petition, where defendant failed to show by clear and convincing evidence that instant recantation, which was made 15 years after trial, was true. Also, defendant failed to establish any due process violation arising out of prosecutor's use of witness' testimony at trial, since prosecutor had no reason to know or suspect that witness' trial testimony was anything other than truth.

In prosecution on unlawful possession of firearm charge, Dist. Ct. erred in denying defendant's motion to suppress gun seized from defendant during street encounter. Record showed that: (1) police received anonymous 911 tip reporting that Hispanic man in black sweater, black hat and bag was climbing under warehouse fence; (2) officers reported to scene and found someone matching 911 description, but determined that he had not been engaged in any criminal activity; (3) defendant, who is white and was wearing black jacket and dark hat, but no bag, was across street; (4) officer approached defendant and asked what was going on; (5) defendant did not answer officer, looked panicked and put his hands in his pockets; and (6) officer reacted by patting down defendant and found gun in his jacket. While facts supported officer's decision to stop defendant and ask question, where defendant roughly matched physical description of tip and was in area of warehouse, instant frisk was unreasonable, where: (1) tip was anonymous and defendant only roughly matched physical description given by tipster; (2) police did not observe any criminal activity; (3) reported offense did not suggest violence or emergency; and (4) there was no suggestion that defendant was armed. Fact that defendant appeared to be panicked or had refused to answer officer's question did not require different result. Moreover, while officer provided additional details during trial that might have supported instant frisk, record showed that Dist. Ct. based its decision on facts presented by parties prior to trial, such that, although defendant made additional motion to suppress gun at close of trial, it was not error for Dist. Ct. to base ruling on known pre-trial facts only.

In prosecution on charges of receipt and possession of child pornography, Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant's motion to suppress child pornography discovered in defendant's computer pursuant to search warrants, even though defendant argued that said warrants lacked probable cause, and that officers could not rely on said warrants in good faith. Seventeen-page affidavit supplied by officer supplied sufficient probable cause to support issuance of instant warrants, where: (1) affidavit contained background information regarding peer-to-peer file-sharing networks, as well as office's experience with them and his ability to recover data, even after files had been deleted from peer-to-peer network; and (2) officer explained how he tracked computer activity on network to I.P address of computer that was linked to defendant. Fact that anyone in defendant's apartment could have downloaded child pornography, that officer did not actually open downloaded files or that one download occurred six months prior to warrant application did not require different result. Moreover, information about six-month old download was not stale, where child pornography collections tend to be kept for long period of time, and officer could have good-faith reliance on validity of warrants, since indicia of probable cause was not so lacking that officer's belief in its existence was not unreasonable.