Defendant and another person were convicted of violent murders they committed at ages 19 and 18. Defendant was sentenced to 3 concurrent 60-year sentences and a concurrent 10-year sentence. Court erred in denying their motions for leave to file successive postconviction petition. Both have made prima facie showings in their pleadings that evolving understandings of the brain psychology of adolescents require that the holding in U.S. Supreme Court's 2012 Miller v. Alabama apply to them as young adults. Remanded for further postconviction proceedings during which they can develop their claims. If Defendant proves that Miller decision applies to him, then the trial court would consider a new sentencing hearing. (WALKER, concurring; PIERCE, dissenting.)
This case presents question as to whether special venue provision set forth in identity theft statute (720 ILCS 5/1-6(t)), which allows venue in county in which victim resides, is constitutional, where: (1) instant trial occurred in victim's county: and (2) defendant used victim's credit card in different county. While defendant argued that his conviction for identity theft must be reversed because trial occurred in county that was different from county in which offense occurred, Appellate Court, in affirming defendant's conviction, found that instant venue provision was constitutional, because offense of identify theft occurs both where physical acts giving rise to identity theft occur, as well as where intangible identification is located, i.e., in victim's residence.
This case presents question as to whether trial court properly denied defendant's motion to suppress images of child pornography found by police in copy of copy of defendant's hard-drive under circumstances where: (1) police had obtained warrant to search said hard-drive in prior criminal case and had obtained copy of said hard-drive; (2) on day after defendant was acquitted of charges in prior case, police initiated internal investigation of defendant that included examination of copy of copy of defendant's hard-drive; (3) defendant requested return of hard drive following his acquittal; and (4) defendant filed instant motion to suppress after his acquittal in prior case. Appellate Court, in reversing defendant's conviction, found that police had no authority to retain possession of copy of defendant's hard-drive after he had been acquitted in prior case and observed that: (1) no reasonably trained police officer would have concluded that he could perform warrantless search of mirrored hard-drive that he had no right to possess; (2) State conceded that search warrant issued in prior case had already been executed; and (3) had officer sought second search warrant to search copy of instant hard-drive, good-faith exception would likely have applied. (Dissent filed.)
This case presents question as to whether trial court properly denied defendant's motion to file second successive post-conviction petition, alleging that he was actually innocent of murder and aggravated battery charges based on affirmative defense of involuntary intoxication. Appellate Court, in affirming instant dismissal, found that allegations in defendant's motion did not show that alleged side effects of defendant's medication at time of offense rendered him intoxicated to degree that he lacked substantial capacity either to appreciate criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to requirement of law. Appellate Court further found that instant intoxication defense would not qualify as "newly discovered" for purposes of actual innocence claim, where facts comprising of defense were known to defendant at time of trial. (Dissent filed.)
Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of unlawful possession of cannabis with intent to deliver. State failed to prove that Defendant possessed cannabis with intent to deliver beyond a reasonable doubt or that he possessed more than 500 but less than 2000 grams of cannabis. State did not prove there was evidence of a common criminal plan to transport cannabis, or that Defendant was aware that there was cannabis in the trunk of co-Defendant's car. (LYTTON and HOLDRIDGE, concurring.)
Defendant was convicted, after bench trial, of 1 count of armed habitual criminal and 1 count of possession of a firearm by a felon. State admitted that it lost the squad car dash camera video exhibit shown at trial and relied upon by both parties in closing argument. Video footage is neither exculpatory nor material to any credibility determination and thus is not indispensable to a sufficiency of evidence challenge; testimony of State's 2 eyewitnesses supplies an adequate substitute.(LAVIN and COGHLAN, concurring.)
Defendant, pursuant to plea agreement as to aggravated battery, was sentenced to a 2-year term of conditional discharge. Contrary to the 604(d) certificate, counsel did not amend the motion to withdraw plea to adequately present defects in the entry of the plea. Counsel was obligated to advance the argument (as argued at the most recent hearing on the motion to withdraw), supported by affidavits, that evidence was insufficient to prove Defendant's guilty beyond a reasonable doubt and that interests of justice dictated that she be allowed to withdraw her plea. Denial of motion to withdraw is vacated, and remanded for counsel to file a new Rule 604(d) certificate and a new motion to withdraw plea, and for new hearing on motion. (McLAREN and HUDSON, concurring.)
Dist. Ct. did not err in revoking defendant's supervised release, even though it admitted during revocation hearing audio recording of defendant, during which defendant admitted to violation of one his terms of supervised release. While defendant argued that Dist. Ct. erred in failing to conduct explicit "interest of justice" analysis under Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.1(b)(2)(C) prior to admitting audio recording into evidence, no such analysis was required, since probative statements in audio recording were defendant's own non-hearsay statements. Also, defendant failed to identify any interest he had in cross-examining interviewing officer in instant audio recording about date of interview, where: (1) there was no actual dispute that recorded interview took place during defendant's term of supervised release; and (2) interviewing officer was not "adverse witness" for purposes of Rule 32.1(b)(2)(C). Defendant further failed to allege that recording did not accurately capture his voice.
Dist.Ct. did not err in sentencing defendant to 87-month term of incarceration on bank fraud charge, even though defendant argued that Dist. Ct. committed procedural error in failing to consider his mitigation argument concerning his recent incarceration in Saudi Arabia. Defendant failed to show how his incarceration in Saudi Arabia should have been considered in order to achieve sentencing goals set forth in section 3553(a)(2), especially where: (1) there was no link between his detention in Saudi Arabia and his punishment for instant offense; and (2) defendant's jail time in Saudi Arabia was based on his conduct in Saudi Arabia. Also, Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea, even though defendant argued that his attorney failed to inform him that govt. would have to prove amount of loss attributable to him by preponderance of evidence at sentencing hearing. Defendant failed to show any prejudice arising out of his counsel's advice, where: (1) he failed to establish that he would not have pleaded guilty but for counsel's advice; and (2) defendant did not dispute any facts generated at Rule 11 colloquy that established his guilt. Too, Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant's motion for recusal under sections 455(a) and 455(b)(1) made during sentencing hearing, even though defendant argued that Dist. Ct. was hostile to his counsel because of Dist. Ct.'s removal in prior, unrelated case involving defendant's counsel. Dist.Ct.'s removal in prior case had nothing to do with defendant's sentencing hearing, and defendant failed to show that Dist. Ct.'s frustration with defendant's counsel was sufficient reason for recusal.
Defendants were convicted, after joint jury trial, of attempted murders of victim and his his 15-year-old daughter, who they shot as victim was driving his daughter to school. Shooting left victim paralyzed from the waist down, and his daughter was not injured. State's evidence was sufficient such that a rational juror could have found that Defendant Thompson was one of the shooters beyond a reasonable doubt. Court did not abuse its discretion in admitting other-crimes evidence: statement from witness from prior shooting, and corroborating ballistics evidence showing that the same gun was used in a shooting 2 days earlier and 2 blocks away by 2 shooters, on a public street. Each Defendant was sentenced to 59 years, and Defendant Thompson's sentence was not excessive, as both defendants had similar criminal histories and similar backgrounds. (LAMPKIN and BURKE, concurring.)
