Criminal Law

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of attempted 1st degree murder of his girlfriend. Voluminous direct and circumstantial evidence of Defendant's intent to kill her would render it wholly irrational for jury to infer that his postattack assistance showed that he never intended to kill her. Thus, court did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendant's request for aggravated battery instruction. Court did not err in admitting letters written by Defendant, which victim found, stating in a letter to victim's boss that he was not sorry for what he did at all, and in a letter to victim's family that he was sorry for what has happened. Substance of letters shows their relevance to the case, as to a plan to kill victim. Prosecutor's comments in closing argument were not improper and not inflammatory, bur references and replies to Defendant's own testimony.(LYTTON and O'BRIEN, concurring.)

Court entered order rescinding statutory summary suspension (SSS) of Defendant's driver's license. Court erred in finding the warning to motorist inadequate when read to the Defendant in English. Record contains no evidence that warnings given were improper, confusing, or inadequate.Defendant admitted that he signed the documents the officer read. Although Defendant alleges that he did not understand the warnings officer read to him, he did not ask officer any questions. Legislature has created no exception in the implied-consent law for motorists who do not speak English. Defendant had no right to have the warning read to him in a language other than English. The presence of officers who could speak Spanish was for the purpose of collecting evidence against Defendant (administering field sobriety tests and breath test) and did not constitute an additional afforded right to Defendant not required by law. (CARTER, concurring; LYTTON, specially concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after bench trial, of escape. Officers, who were responding to a complaint of barking dogs (and who learned of outstanding warrant for Defendant's arrest for an unrelated felony offense while en route), were allowed in to Defendant's residence by his girlfriend. Officer saw Defendant inside and told him that he was under arrest, then escorted him downstairs and held on to his arm. Defendant then went outside and ran away, but officer caught him. Defendant was in "lawful custody" within the meaning of the escape statute. (STEIGMANN and KNECHT, concurring.)

Defendant (age 19 at time of offense) and a codefendant were convicted of murder in the shooting death of a taxi driver. Evidence was sufficient to convict Defendant of 1st degree murder. Defendant and his codefendant confronted the victim together, and codefendant shot victim but Defendant did nothing to stop the shooting and did not dissociate himself from the shooting after the fact. Evidence supported inference that Defendant was acting pursuant to a common criminal design with codefendant.Sentence of 38 years was not excessive. (LAVIN and PUCINSKI, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, pursuant to a negotiated guilty plea, of criminal damage to property and theft and sentenced to concurrent prison terms of 6 years with fines and fees imposed. Defendant's sole argument, raised for the first time on appeal, is that certain of his fees are actually fines for which he should receive3 credit for his presentencing custody.Pursuant to Rule 472(e), Defendant must first file a motion in circuit court requesting correction of any sentencing errors specified in Rule 472(a). (MIKVA and WALKER, concurring.)

Defendant entered a blind guilty plea to attempted 1st degree murder, and was sentenced to 22 years. Defense counsel filed a motion to reconsider sentence which was denied in March 2015. The appellate court held that the March 2016 amendment to Rule 604(d) applied retroactively to defense counsel's certificate, and was thus deficient as it did not state that counsel examined the report of proceedings for sentencing hearing, as the amended rule required.In order to adequately consider all potential errors in the sentence, defense counsel needed to examine the report of proceedings for the sentencing hearing. The certificate did not indicate that counsel had done so, and thus the certificate does not serve as a guarantee of compliance with Rule 604(d)'s imperatives. Thus, remanded for new postplea proceedings. (O'BRIEN, concurring; SCHMIDT, specially concurring.)