Criminal Law

Defendant was charged with DUI. Court granted Defendant's motion to suppress evidence. Even if officer's confiscation of Defendant's keys could be deemed reasonable based on interest in officer safety, officer then used those keys to unlock Defendant's vehicle so that he could conduct a search. Officer did not testify that he observed an open can that he knew to be one of an alcoholic beverage. Thus, it was not immediately apparent to either officer that vehicle contained any contraband.Totality of officers' observations did not rise ot level of probable cause allowing them to enter vehicle without a warrant. (McDADE and O'BRIEN, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of aggravated domestic battery and resisting a peace officer. Court sentenced Defendant to 6 years imprisonment and 30 days incarceration. Court denied Defendant's pro se posttrial motion for a reduction of sentence, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. Appellate court had previously remanded matter for trial court to conduct a preliminary Krankel inquiry. Court erred in failing to determine whether new counsel should be appointed and failing to inquire into factual basis of all of Defendant's complaints about his trial counsel's performance. Remanded with directions for trial court to appoint Defendant new counsel, and then allow appointed counsel opportunity to investigate Defendant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel and take whatever action deemed appropriate. (HOLDER WHITE and TURNER, concurring.)

(Modified upon denial of rehearing 5/6/19.) Defendant was convicted of aggravated discharge of a firearm. Court erred in allowing State to present the conclusions of one firearms identification expert through the testimony of another expert, who did not do the testing that led to those conclusions. Defense counsel failed to object. Testimony of officers and the uncontested physical evidence was not closely balanced, so that the introduction of expert's testimony did not prejudice him. Thus, ineffective assistance of counsel claim fails. (PIERCE and GRIFFIN, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of battery; charges arose from physical altercation in hospital parking lot over parking space dispute.  Court did not err in excluding victim's 1962 conviction of aggravated battery. Evidence was sufficient for a jury to conclude that Defendant knowingly struck victim and also stabbed him in the forehead with his pen that had been in his shirt pocket. Court was within its discretion in sentencing Defendant to conditional discharge rather than supervision, given that victim was age 74 and attack occurred in public parking lot. (McLAREN and HUDSON, concurring.)

Defendant was involved in auto collision on bridge spanning the Ohio River between Illinois and Kentucky, on Illinois side of bridge along a curve over dry land in Illinois. Defendant was initially charged in Kentucky with offenses stemming from the incident, but charges were later dismissed on grounds that accident had actually occurred in Illinois. Curve in bridge where accident occurred had, for 21 years, historically been considered Kentucky's jurisdiction. Responding officers' belief that Kentucky had jurisdiction over any incident occurring on the bridge was objectively reasonable. They were not responsible to detemine whether U.S. Supreme Court's 1991 decision in Illinois v. Kentucky case might have changed the legal landscape that had been governed by agreement as to jurisdiction over accidents on the bridge. As exclusion of evidence is a court's "last resort", court should not have ignored State's good-faith argument and should have denied Defendant's motion to suppress in its entirety. (WELCH and MOORE, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after bench trial, of aggravated battery.  Court's comment that "most parents don't pick up report cards" may have been only a response to defense counsel's statement that other people would pick up report cards at the same time, to explain why defense counsel's presumption is not necessarily true. Strength of State's evidence of altercation did not depend on court's statement as to report cards. Court's statement that Defendant struck victim with a key was not a misstatement of fact but a reasonable inference supported by evidence. Court did not abuse its discretion in making sua sponte objection during defense counsel's cross-examination of victim.(LAVIN and PUCINSKI, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after bench trial, of 1 count of delivery of a substance containing heroin and 1 count of delivery of a substance containing cocaine. State adequately showed a chain of custody for the narcotics. Because the cocaine and heroin were blended into a single substance and State presented no evidence that Defendant had any idea that the substance contained both illegal drugs, convictions violate the one-act, one-crime rule.(GRIFFIN and WALKER, concurring.)