Criminal Law

Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant’s motion to enforce prior conditional writ of habeas corpus, where: (1) Ct. of Appeals granted defendant’s initial habeas petition and directed that defendant either be released, or that govt. initiate re-trial proceedings on charge of murder within 90 days; (2) state initiated re-trial proceedings within 90 days; and (3) state court subsequently concluded that out-of-court statements at issue in first habeas petition could be introduced at second trial and ultimately granted govt. motion to reinstate defendant’s original conviction. Ct. of Appeals rejected defendant’s argument that state did not comply with terms of conditional writ since: (1) govt. had actually initiated re-trial proceedings within applicable time frame; and (2) conditional writ did not require new trial without use of disputed statements. Also, defendant can file new habeas petition once his direct appeal from trial court’s ruling in second proceeding regarding use of said statements has been resolved.

Dist. Ct. did not err in sentencing defendant to drug distribution offense, after finding that defendant did not qualify for “safety-valve” provision in 18 USC section 3553(f)(5), even though defendant attempted to qualify for such treatment by providing truthful statements about his charged offense or offenses that were part of same course of conduct. Dist. Ct. could properly find that defendant was not truthful with respect to his intentions regarding $40K in cash that was found on him at time of his arrest, where defendant failed to indicate that he intended to use said money to purchase more drugs, as opposed to purchase new car. Moreover, defendant had burden in establishing eligibility for safety-valve treatment, and that Dist. Ct. could deny said treatment based on finding that defendant’s statements were either inconsistent, suspicious or implausible.

In prosecution on unlawful possession of firearm by felon charge, Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant’s motion to suppress warrantless seizure of gun that officer discovered on doorstep to defendant’s home that had been lodged between screen door and front door during encounter with defendant. Record showed that: (1) officers observed defendant on street known for crime with large object contained in pocket of his t-shirt; (2) officers' experience led them to believe that object was gun; (3) after officers passed defendant, defendant changed directions, quickened his pace, crossed lawn and moved towards stairs leading to his front porch; (4) as officers exited squad car, one officer observed defendant place dark object between screen door and front door; (5) after questioning defendant about presence of weapon, one officer opened screen door to find presence of gun; and (6) defendant was placed under arrest after having admitted that he was convicted felon. No 4^th Amendment violation occurred, where: (1) officers had reasonable suspicion that criminal activity either had or was occurring given defendant’s actions at time of their encounter with him; (2) under Terry, officers can conduct protective searches of defendant and areas within his reach to neutralized threat that either he or individuals inside of home could gain access to gun; and (3) officers could open screen door without warrant since they had immediate interest in assuring themselves that they were safe during encounter with defendant. (Dissent filed.)

Defendant entered into plea agreement that called for him to forfeit approximately $13 million in assets, but required govt. to apply proceeds of forfeited property to $12,376,310 restitution order. As such, govt. erred in failing to credit towards restitution order $225,000 in interest earned on bank funds during time that said funds had been seized by govt., where funds were already in interest bearing accounts. However, Dist. Ct. did not err in valuing real estate owned by defendant from 2010 estimate on property, as opposed to value of property in 2011 when transfer of property occurred, since: (1) defendant failed to raise said argument in Dist. Ct. and only raised argument that property should have been valued for restitution credit at property’s sales price in 2015; and (2) defendant failed to present evidence of property’s value in 2011.

Record contained sufficient evidence to support defendant’s conviction on charge of transportation of minor across state lines (from Illinois to Indiana) with intent that minor engage in prostitution, and where minor engaged in prostitution two days later. Fact that no prostitution occurred during first two days following minor’s return to Indiana did not require different result, where: (1) defendant was arranging for minor to engage in prostitution both before and after minor had crossed state lines; and (2) record showed that only relationship defendant had with minor was one of pimp to prostitute. Also, Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant’s motion for mistrial based on govt. expert’s misstatement that she had no involvement in case. There was no evidence that expert deliberately lied, and Dist. Ct. allowed govt. to recall expert to address misstatement.