Criminal Law

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of various offenses related to a 2002 shooting in a bank parking lot. Court erred in dismissing his pro se postconviction petition, at 2nd stage, as untimely. Defendant's affirmation under penalty of perjury made clear that it applied to all documents that he filed, and explicitly stated that it applied to "everything contained herein". Address was substantially correct; even though street address was not provided, the P.O. Box was, and the mistake in zip code was very slight; thus, his petition was timely filed. Defendant failed to make a substantial showing of a violation of his right to counsel, as he cannot show prejudice. No ineffective assistance of counsel, as his allegation of physical coercion in making of his statements is rebutted by the record. (ZENOFF and HUDSON, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted of misdemeanor offense of being a child sex offender in a public park. The language of Section 11-9.4-1(b) is clear and does not conflict with Section 11-9.3(a-10) of Criminal Code. Although there is overlap between these 2 statutes, there are also clear differences in more than the penalty (misdeamenor vs. felony). Section 11-9.4-1(b) specifically exempts "Romeo and Juliet" offenders from the definition of "child sex offender", which Section 11-9l.3(d) does not. No error occurred in the application of Section 11-9.41-(b) to the undisputed facts of this case. (O'BRIEN  and WRIGHT, concurring.)

Defendant, age 19 years and 2 months at time of offense, was convicted of 2 counts of 1st degree murder and 2 counts of aggravated kidnapping, and sentenced to 2 consecutive life sentences, and 2 terms of 30 years to run consecutive to the life sentences. Defendant was not present at scene of murder but merely acted as a lookout near the railroad tracks; there was no evidence that he helped to plan the commission but took orders from higher ranking gang members.His mandatory life sentence was same as that applicable to the shooter; and a codefendant with similar culpability as Defendant, age 17 at time of offense, was released after resentencing. The designation that after age 18 a person is a mater adult is arbitrary, especially in this case; and recent trends give persons under age 21 consideration for their age and maturity level. Because life sentence was mandatory, court was not able to take any mitigating factors into consideration, nor the goal of rehabilitation. Defendant's mandatory life sentence shocks the moral sense of the community. Remanded for new sentencing  hearing. (GORDON and REYES, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of 2 counts of criminal sexual assault and 1 counts of home invasion. One conviction for criminal sexual assault should be vacated as it is a lesser-included offense of home invasion. Home invasion consists of 2 separate physical acts. The unauthorized entry alone is not a crime under 720 ILCS 5/12-11(a)(6) if a sex offense does not occur.There is no clear legislative intent for separate punishments based on separate criminal purposes. (KNECHT, concurring; DeARMOND, dissenting.)

Defendant, age 16 at time of offense and subject to an automatic transfer to adult court, was convicted of 1st degree murder and armed robbery, and sentenced to concurrent terms of 52 and 30 years. The 52-year sentence constitutes a de facto life sentence. Court failed to consider Defendant's youth and its attendant characteristics in imposing that sentence. The court's mere awareness of a defendant's age and consideration of a PSI (presentence investigation) does not provide evidence that the court specifically considered Defendant's youth and its attendant characteristics. Defendant's sentence violates the 8th amendment. Remanded for a new sentencing hearing. (REYES and BURKE, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of 1 count of methamphetamine possession and 1 count of methamphetamine delivery. Court sentenced Defendant to 10 years and 18 years, and found the possession charge merged with the delivery charge. Defendant was compensated for his role in the delivery outside of what is inherent in the offense. Thus, court did not err by considering compensation as an aggravating factor under the circumstances.Even if court improperly noted threat of serious harm as an aggravating factor, Defendant did not establish plain error. As amount of methamphetamine was less than 100 grams, Defendant was not subject to the 75% truth-in-sentencing statute. (HOLDER WHITE and CAVANAGH, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after bench trial, of being a child sex offender in a public park., pursuant to Section 11-9.4-1 of Criminal Code. No additional legal consequences were attached to Defendant based solely on his prior conviction of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child. His status as a child sex offender was an element of a separate crime, which required that he commit an additional act. His presence in a park occurred after the enactment of Section 11-9.4-1, and thus, his present conviction cannot be retroactive. Thus the law does not violate the ex post facto clauses of the U.S. and Illinois Constitutions. (JORGENSEN and SCHOSTOK, concurring.)