Criminal Law

(Court opinion corrected 4/29/19.) Defendant, age 19 at time of offense, was convicted of 1st degree murder of 2 men: owner of car which Defendant had damaged, and an evidence technician. State did not violate corpus delicti rule. Beyond Defendant's statement, his guilt was corroborated by pone records, his fingerprint on item taken from the scene, the presence of his cell phone near scene, and witness' testimony that Defendant had told her he wanted to take speakers from car. Sufficient evidence for rational trier of fact to find that Defendant committed the crime. Victim's statements to friends and family that his car had been burgled and that he was going to wait for police and for burglar to return were properly admitted under "state-of-mind" exception to hearsay rule.  The 911 tape of 911 call by victim's mother to police was properly admitted under excited utterance or spontaneous declaration exception to hearsay rule. State disclosed entire video of interrogation, and was not required to preview trial strategy by disclosing that it would play only 15 minutes of the 27-hour-long video. Mandatory life sentence did not violate 8th amendment. (MASON and PUCINSKI, concurring.) 

Jury found that Defendant remained a sexually dangerous person. Defendant was not prejudiced by court's ruling not allowing him to impeach State's expert with an article that concludes in-custody treatment has no statistical effect on recidivism rates. This article does not counter State's position, and defense counsel was allowed to get this information into case by questioning expert about a 2005 study that showed that institutional treatment did not have a statistically significant effect on recidivism.Defendant was not prejudiced by State's comments about Defendant's conduct toward 2 minor girls. State's expert testified that Defendant had not recovered from being a sexually dangerous person as he failed to accept full responsibility. Jury's decision was not against manifest weight of the evidence. (STEIGMANN and HARRIS, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after bench trial, of Class 1 attempted identity theft, related to his attempt to use a social security number to lease a vehicle. Circumstantial evidence shows that Defendant may have, with knowledge, improperly used the CPN (credit profile number) in place of his social security number for credit purposes. The offense of identity theft does not punish a defendant's mere use of a number that he knows is not his own, but requires proof that defendant used the number, knowing it belonged to another person, and that knowledge is a required element of the offense. Remanded for sentencing hearing on forgery convictions, which court merged into the attempted identity theft conviction and thus court did not impose a sentence on those convictions. (CUNNINGHAM, concurring; CONNORS, concurring in part and dissenting in part.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of 3 counts of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child and 9 counts of aggravated criminal sexual abuse. Victims were the 3 daughters of Defendant's girlfriend. State presented evidence upon which a rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crimes beyond a reasonable doubt. Delay in victims' reporting did not render their testimony less credible, as Defendant threatened to harm them if they told and as abuse was traumatic. Defendant's life sentences for predatory criminal sexual assault of a child do not necessarily eliminate the need for consecutive sentences for the less serious offenses, as court found that offenses would be likely to reoccur.(BIRKETT and HUDSON, concurring.)

Court revoked Defendant's court supervision for DUI. Although Defendant was represented by counsel when he pled guilty to DUI, he was pro se when he appeared on petition to revoke supervision, which was a distinct proceeding. Court's failure to admonish Defendant of his right to counsel for revocation petition and failure to obtain a knowing waiver of counsel was plain error. Remanded, as DUI involves a clear danger to the public, and remand for new hearing on petition to revoke is equitable and productive.(McLAREN and JORGENSEN, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted of 1st degree murder and aggravated criminal sexual assault of a 15-year-old girl. Court properly granted State's motion to dismiss Defendant's pro se petition for relief from judgment which was filed 16 years after entry of judgment. Any error in failing to allow Defendant to respond to State's motion to dismiss petition does not rise ot level of structural error. All issues raised in petition could have been raised on one of his previous 6 appeals. No ineffective assistance of counsel, as counsel could not have cured the defects in petition, and all issues raised were barred by res judicata. (CARTER, concurring; LYTTON, dissenting.)

Defendant suffered overdose, and upon 911 call from his companion, sheriff's deputies performed CPR on him .Defendant asked them to bring his wallet and house keys, when he was about to be transported to hospital. Deputy observed a rolled-up dollar bill sticking out of wallet, and inside was substance which tested positive for heroin. Controlled Substances Act provides broad and unconditional protection from law enforcement present at the scene of an overdose, regardless whether location is a personal residence, vehicle, or business. Thus, court correctly found that Defendant was entitled to immunities granted under Section 414(c) of the Act, because heroin was discovered "as a result" of law enforcement entering the residence to provide emergency medical assistance as needed to prevent death by overdose.(LYTTON and McDADE, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted of aggravated domestic battery of his former girlfriend, after he choked her to the point of unconsciousness, and then choked her again. Court did not err in refusing to allow victim to withdraw her written victim impact statement. Court allowed victim to speak freely at 2nd sentencing hearing and to explain the changes from prior written statement, and court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to withdraw statement given impassioned tone of her earlier statement and her mother's testimony that she changed her mind only after being pressured by Defendant's mother. Court revoked Defendant's probation, as he had contacted victim at 1 a.m., and failed 2 drug tests; he was sentenced him to 6 years.Court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing; court  considered victim's wishes about sentence but found those concerns outweighed by many aggravating factors.  (JORGENSEN and HUDSON, concurring.)