Criminal Law

Defendant was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder and was sentenced to a mandatory term of life in prison. Defendant filed a petition for leave to file a successive post-conviction petition alleging newly discovered evidence establishing actual innocence. The circuit court denied the motion and the appellate court affirmed. The supreme court reversed, finding that defendant presented newly discovered evidence that could not have been discovered before trial and that the evidence made a colorable showing of actual innocence. The court remanded for second-stage post-conviction proceedings. (THEIS, NEVILLE, OVERSTREET, CUNNINGHAM, ROCHFORD, and O’BRIEN, concurring)

Defendant was found guilty of first-degree murder. During trial defendant, who claimed self-defense, requested a jury instruction on the duty to retreat and the trial court denied the request. Defendant appealed and the appellate court reversed. The supreme court granted petition for leave to appeal to consider whether the duty to retreat jury instruction was applicable under the facts of the case and, if it was, whether the trial court’s refusal was an abuse of discretion. The supreme court held that the instruction was not proper under the facts of the case and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it rejected the jury instruction. (THEIS, NEVILLE, HOLDER WHITE, CUNNINGHAM, and ROCHFORD, concurring. OVERSTREET took no part in the decision.)

Defendant appealed from his 10-year sentence for aggravated domestic battery, arguing that the trial court considered improper factors in aggravation when imposing the sentence. The appellate court affirmed, finding that defendant had forfeited his issue on appeal and that defendant did not establish that he was entitled to relief under plain error review. The supreme court also affirmed, explaining that the alleged error in sentencing was subject to the first prong plain error analysis, but that the arguments made by defendant correlated solely to the second prong of the plain error rule and, as a result, defendant did not invoke first prong plain error in his appeal. (THEIS, NEVILLE, HOLDER WHITE, CUNNINGHAM, ROCHFORD, and O’BRIEN, concurring)

Defendant was convicted of armed robbery with a dangerous weapon other than a firearm and was sentenced to life in prison. Defendant subsequently filed a petition for relief from judgment pursuant to section 2-1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure, arguing that his sentence violated the proportionate penalties clause because the offense of armed robbery with a weapon other than a firearm and armed violence with a Category III weapon contained identical elements, but the penalty for armed robbery is greater. The circuit court dismissed defendant’s petition as untimely. The appellate court held that the petition was timely, but affirmed by finding defendant’s sentence did not violate the proportionate penalties clause. The supreme court also affirmed, finding that armed robbery and armed violence predicated on robbery with a Category III weapon are not identical offenses. (THEIS, NEVILLE, OVERSTREET, HOLDER WHITE, ROCHFORD, and O’BRIEN, concurring)

Defendant appealed from a trial court order denying his motion to suppress evidence that police collected during an inventory search of defendant’s vehicle. The search was conducted after a law enforcement database showed defendant had an outstanding warrant, but the warrant had been withdrawn several months before, a fact that the police were not aware of. The appellate court affirmed, finding that the trial court properly denied the motion to dismiss where the record demonstrated that the police properly inquired as to the validity of the warrant at the time of the search and could not have known that the warrant was still active in the system due to a clerical error. The appellate court further explained that the exclusionary rule does not apply where there is an absence of police misconduct. (DOHERTY and LANNERD, concurring)

Defendant appealed from a circuit court order finding him a sexually dangerous person and committing him to the Department of Corrections. On appeal, defendant argued that the circuit court applied the incorrect standard when deciding his motion for a directed verdict and in finding that he had demonstrated propensities to commit sexual assault or sexual molestation of a child. The appellate court affirmed, rejecting defendant’s argument that the term “child” only applied to individuals under the age of 13 and instead concluding that the term includes anyone under the age of 18 years old and finding that the State had presented sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s order, including multiple past offenses that demonstrated the required propensity. (McDADE and PETERSON, concurring)

Defendant appealed from a trial court order denying his petition to expunge and impound criminal records relating to a negotiated guilty plea for domestic battery. The appellate court vacated the order and remanded for a new hearing, explaining that the trial court improperly allowed the State to be involved in the proceedings despite having struck the State’s objections for not being timely. (BIRKETT and MULLEN, concurring)

Defendant was found guilty of driving while license revoked and was sentenced to 180 days in jail and 12 months’ conditional discharge. On appeal, defendant argued that the penalty for driving while licensed revoked in both its base and enhanced forms violated the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution. The appellate court affirmed, rejecting defendant’s argument that two sections of the Vehicle Code were separate violations as is necessary for the court to perform a proportionate penalties analysis. (McDADE and DAVENPORT, concurring)

Defendant pleaded guilty to driving while license revoked and, based on his criminal history, was sentenced to nine years in prison as a Class X offender. Defendant argued on appeal that he was entitled to elect the benefit of a Class X recidivism provision that took effect after sentencing but before the circuit court ruled on his post-plea motion and that defense counsel failed to comply with the requirements of SCR 604(d). The supreme court affirmed, finding that defendant was not entitled to be sentenced under the newer version of the statute where it was not yet in effect when he was sentenced and that strict compliance with Rule 604(d) was not required where the record showed that defendant was afforded a full and fair opportunity to present his post-plea claims. (THEIS, NEVILLE, OVERSTREET, ROCHFORD, and O’BRIEN, concurring and CUNNINGHAM, specially concurring)

Defendant entered into an open plea to one count of robbery and was sentenced to 15 years in prison. On appeal, he argued that the trial court committed reversible error when it failed to comply with SCR 401(a) before accepting his waiver of counsel. The appellate court affirmed the defendant’s conviction and sentence. The supreme court vacated the judgment of the appellate court and affirmed the judgment of the circuit court, explaining that the appellate court did not have jurisdiction over the Rule 401(a) claim but that defendant waived any claim under Rule 401(a) when he pleaded guilty and again when he failed to raise that issue in his post-plea motions and that the trial court’s Rule 401(a) violation was not second-prong error. (HOLDER WHITE and ROCHFORD, concurring, CUNNINGHAM, specially concurring, O’BRIEN and CUNNING, specially concurring, OVERSTREET, concurring in part and dissenting in part, and NEVILLE, dissenting)