Criminal Law

In a proceeding brought pursuant to the Drug Asset Forfeiture Procedure Act, the State appealed after the trial court granted the claimant’s motion for directed finding and ordered that currency seized during a traffic stop be returned to claimant. The appellate court reversed and remanded, finding that the trial court erred in granting the motion for directed finding because the State presented sufficient circumstantial evidence to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the property was subject to forfeiture where the claimant was in possession of a large amount of currency in a vacuum-sealed bag, claimant initially denied the presence of the money, and the was a strong odor of cannabis coming from the vehicle. (STEIGMAN, concurring and DOHERTY, dissenting)

Defendant, who was convicted of first-degree murder solely on witness testimony that was recanted during trial, appealed from the trial court’s denial of his petition for relief from judgment under section 2-1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which was filed after the State’s Conviction Integrity Unit reviewed his case and concluded that the conviction lacked sufficient integrity. The appellate court reversed and remanded, concluding that any reasonable review of the record demonstrated by the preponderance of the evidence that there were facts, if known at the time of trial, that would have prevented the conviction. (ODEN JOHNSON, concurring in part and dissenting in part and MITCHELL, concurring in part and dissenting in part)

Defendant was found guilty of misdemeanor unlawful use of a weapon for possessing a firearm on a public street without a concealed carry license. On appeal, defendant argued that the State failed to establish the corpus delicti of the offense because the only evidence that he lacked a concealed carry license came from his own out-of-court statements made to police officers. The appellate court rejected this argument and affirmed. The Supreme Court also affirmed, explaining that independent corroborating evidence was not required under the corpus delicti rule where defendant did not “confess” that he had committed the offense of UUW, but only admitted to one element of the offense. (THEIS, OVERSTREET, and HOLDER WHITE, concurring, and NEVILLE and ROCHFORD, specially concurring, and O’BRIEN, specially concurring)

Defendant was found guilty but mentally ill of first-degree murder and was sentenced to 100 years in prison. On appeal, defendant argued that the trial court erred when it denied his request for a continuance to obtain a third sanity evaluation, when it allowed the State to access the sanity report of an expert originally retained by defendant and permitting the State to call that expert as a rebuttal witness, and when it re-read the implicit bias jury instruction to the jury. The appellate court reversed and remanded, finding that the trial court erred when it allowed the State to elicit the opinions and notes of a defense expert who was not called by the defendant to testify at trial because the opinions were protected by attorney-client privilege. (BRENNAN and PETERSON, concurring)

Defendant, who was charged with two counts of aggravated battery and one count of armed robbery, appealed from a trial court order denying him pretrial release. The appellate court dismissed the appeal, finding that defendant waived his arguments by failing to comply with the recently-revised SCR 604(h)(2) and that defendant’s attempts to circumvent waiver by arguing ineffective assistance of counsel and plain error lacked merit. (KNECHT and VANCIL, concurring)

Defendant was found guilty of driving under the influence of alcohol and obstructing a police officer. On appeal, defendant argued that the State failed to prove her guilty beyond a reasonable double, that the complaint charging obstruction was defective, that the State made improper comments during closing, that the court erred in its instruction to the jury, that she was denied the effective assistance of counsel, and that the trial court erred by denying her request to file an amended post-trial motion. The appellate court affirmed, finding that the trial court did not err in its orders and, even if there was error, that defendant was not prejudiced and that defendant was not denied the effective assistance of counsel. (HOFFMAN and LYLE, concurring)

The State appealed from the trial court's decision to grant defendant’s third-state petition for post-conviction relief by finding that defendant’s actual innocence claim demonstrated evidence that was new, material and so conclusive that it would probably change the result on retrial. The appellate court affirmed, finding that the trial court did not commit manifest error in granting the petition where defendant presented evidence of inconsistent testimony that undermined confidence in the outcome of the defendant’s trial. (REYES and D.B. WALKER, concurring)