Criminal Law

Defendant was indicted for two counts of aggravated unlawful use of a weapon, possession of a firearm-not eligible for a FOID card, and unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon. The matter went to trial on the UPWF charge and a jury found defendant not guilty. Defendant then moved to bar prosecution on the remaining counts based on collateral estoppel/issue preclusion and double jeopardy. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss in part, dismissing the charge related to the FOID card but denying it as to the AUUW count and defendant appealed. The appellate court reversed, finding that the issue of whether defendant knowingly carried a firearm was rejected by the jury at the first trial, the State is precluded from prosecuting defendant on the theory that he knowingly carried a firearm and, as a result, that the trial court erred in denying defendant’s motion to bar prosecution of the AUUW count. (BIRKETT and KENNEDY, concurring)

Defendant was found guilty of one count of home invasion and two counts of first degree murder and was sentenced to life in prison. On appeal, defendant argued that he was denied a fair trial because the trial court incorrectly admitted hearsay statements made by the victim under the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine, that a conflict existed between the trial judge and the prosecutor, and that during closing arguments the prosecutor discussed matters that were not in evidence. The appellate court disagreed and affirmed, finding that defendant was not denied a fair trial. (DeARMOND and GRISCHOW, concurring)

Defendant appealed from his convictions for unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon and aggravated unlawful use of a weapon. On appeal, defendant argued that his sentence violated the one-act, one-crime doctrine, that the evidence was not sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he was a felon, and that the statute prohibiting the possession of a firearm by a felon was unconstitutional as applied. The appellate court concluded that the trial court’s sentence violated the one-act, one-crime doctrine and remanded so that the circuit court could amend the sentencing order and affirmed on the remaining arguments. (MIKVA, concurring and ODEN JOHNSON, concurring in part and dissenting in part)

Defendant was convicted of two counts of first degree murder and was sentenced to a total of 50 years in prison. On appeal, defendant argued that the trial court erred in allowing the State to introduce a music video created by defendant two months after the homicides, trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the unauthenticated and inaccurate transcription added by the State to the video, that the trial court erred in allowing the State to introduce photographs of the deceased victims, and that trial court erred in sentencing when it allowed the State to present disciplinary records from a juvenile temporary detention center without a live witness and relied on allegedly improper evidence in aggravation. The appellate court affirmed defendant’s convictions and sentence, finding that the trial court did not err in its admission of evidence based on the facts of the case, that any error was harmless, and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion during sentencing. (VAN TINE and ELLIS, concurring)

Defendant, who entered a blind plea to one count of first-degree murder, appealed from her sentence, arguing that the trial court should have construed her pro se notice of appeal as a post-plea motion. The appellate court dismissed the appeal, noting that it was the proper outcome where the defendant did not file a post-plea motion pursuant to SCR 604(d) and instead filed a notice of appeal. (BRENNAN and PETERSON, concurring)

Defendant appealed from the trial court dismissal of his petition for relief from judgment filed pursuant to section 2-1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure in which he argued that the aggravated criminal sexual assault under which he was sentenced violated due process and was void ab initio. The appellate court vacated defendant’s sentence and remanded for resentencing, finding that the 10-year sentencing enhancement applied to defendant’s sentence was unconstitutional and void because the statute punished a non-firearm version of the offense more harshly than a firearm version of the offense in contradiction to legislative intent. (STEIGMANN and KNECHT, concurring)