Criminal Law

This case presents question as to whether govt. presented sufficient evidence to establish that defendant was member of “street gang” for purposes of Ill. Streetgang Terrorism Omnibus Act (Act) in order to prove him guilty of unlawful possession of firearm by street gang member. While Appellate Court held that govt. satisfied its burden of showing that “Latin Kings” was street gang based on detective’s opinion that said gang sold drugs and used guns to protect their drugs, cash and members from rival gangs, defendant argued that govt. failed to show that “Latin Kings” was street gang, since govt. failed to show existence of course or pattern of criminal activity by gang that consisted of at least two criminal offenses that were committed by gang within five years of each other.

This case presents question as to whether trial court properly denied plaintiff’s motion seeking leave to file successive pro se post-conviction petition challenging his murder conviction, even though defendant asserted that he set forth colorable claim of actual innocence based on affidavits indicating that someone else was actual shooter. Appellate Court, in affirming trial court’s denial of defendant’s motion, held that instant affidavits did not raise probability that it was more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have found defendant guilty of murder. Ct. further rejected defendant’s claim that trial court was required to take all allegations in his post-conviction petition as true, and that trial court was required to grant motion to file successive post-conviction petition because he had presented some evidence in affidavits tending to show that he was innocent of crime. Moreover, Appellate Court found that it was required to consider character of defendant’s proposed evidence and noted that defendant failed to meet required showing to grant filing of successive post-conviction proceeding since: (1) proffered evidence came from two affiants who did not see actual shooting and whose statements came long after offense at issue had occurred; and (2) proffered evidence was directly rebutted by evidence submitted at trial. (Dissent filed.)

This case presents question as to whether trial court properly granted govt.’s motion for directed verdict in action by defendant seeking to rescind statutory summary suspension of his driver’s license following his arrest for DUI, where defendant argued that summary suspension statute did not apply because his arrest occurred on private parking lot of Walgreen’s drug store. Appellate Court, in affirming trial court’s grant of directed verdict in govt.’s favor, found that burden rested on defendant to present evidence that subject parking lot was privately owned and maintained property, which defendant had failed to do. In his petition for leave to appeal, defendant argued that Appellate Court’s decision conflicted with other Illinois decisions requiring govt. to present evidence establishing that subject parking lots were publicly owned or maintained by governmental entity, and that defendant needed to show only that he was operating or in control of vehicle in parking lot of private business to establish prima facie case for rescission of statutory summary suspension. (Dissent filed)

This case presents question as to whether govt. proved defendant guilty of burglary beyond reasonable doubt under circumstances, where defendant entered retail store, stole some items, left store and placed items in backpack that defendant placed outside of store just prior to entering store. Appellate Court, in reversing defendant’s burglary conviction, found that govt. had failed to show that defendant had entered or remained in store without authority and with intent to commit theft, since defendant had entered store “with authority” because he entered store during normal business hours and remained in designated public areas of store. In its petition for leave to appeal, govt. argued that defendant’s entry of store with intent to commit theft, even during business hours, was entry without authority under Weaver, 41 Ill.2d 434.