Criminal Law

Dist. Ct. erred in denying defendants’ habeas petitions challenging their enhanced sentences that were imposed upon finding that defendants were career offenders under residual clause contained in section 4B1.2(a)(2) of USSG based on their prior convictions qualifying as crimes of violence. Record showed that defendants’ sentences were imposed at time prior to holding in Booker when sentencing guidelines were deemed mandatory, and thus defendants were entitled to new sentencing hearing, where: (1) Court in Johnson, 135 S.Ct. 2551, found that identical language in residual clause contained in Armed Career Criminal Act was unconstitutionally vague because it inadequately defined covered convictions; and (2) reasoning in Johnson supported finding that residual clause that defined career offender under section 4B1.2(a)(2) was also unconstitutionally vague insofar as it determined mandatory sentencing ranges for pre-Booker defendants. Also, defendants filed timely habeas petitions, where they were filed within one year of Johnson decision that constituted substantial change in law, and that elimination of residual clause under section 4B1.2(a)(2) qualified as retroactive substantive rule.

In prosecution on bankruptcy fraud charges arising out of defendant’s efforts to avoid eviction by condominium association through filing of five Chapter 13 bankruptcy petitions in bad faith, Dist. Ct. did not err in limiting defendant from cross-examining three witnesses regarding their knowledge of class action lawsuit defendant had filed against said association, as well as association’s treatment of defendant relative to other tenants. While defendant argued that said limitations violated Confrontation Clause because, according to defendant, they prevented her from establishing bias on part of said witnesses, no violation occurred since: (1) defendant was allowed to ask witnesses about their knowledge of class action and association’s treatment of defendant; (2) any limitations with respect to validity of defendant’s debt to association had only marginal relevance on instant bankruptcy fraud charges that concerned defendant’s efforts to prevent association and other creditors from collecting on defendant’s debts. Also, Dist. Ct. could properly calculate loss based on increase of defendant's debt that arose following dismissal of first bankruptcy petition to dismissal of fifth petition and could count as victims not only association but other creditors who could not collect on defendant’s debts to them because of defendant’s filing of bankruptcy petitions as well.

Dist. Ct. did not err in sentencing defendant to 84-month term of incarceration after defendant had pleaded guilty to wire fraud charge stemming from scheme in which co-defendant-former CEO of Chicago Public School Board steered two lucrative contracts to defendant’s firm in exchange for kickbacks that were generated from revenue associated with said contracts. While defendant argued that record did not support Dist. Ct.’s finding that second, $20.5 million contract was part of instant scheme so as to support increase in defendant’s offense level, Dist. Ct. could look to email from CEO five days after award of $20.5 million contract requesting “anything u can provide to me or designated person relative to future college and weddings for [CEO’s] boys might be helpful,” as well as evidence that CEO forced out co-worker who questioned instant procurement process, and that defendant had deleted emails about $20.5 million contract to find that instant scheme included said contract for sentencing purposes. Also, Dist. Ct. could impose instant sentence, even though Dist. Ct. had subsequently given CEO only 54-month sentence, since Dist. Ct. could properly find that CEO had given prosecution more meaningful cooperation so as to justify instant disparity in sentences.