Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of 2 counts of disorderly conduct (1 felony and 1 misdemeanor), allegedly for making a false complaint and reporting information when at the time call was made, there was no reasonable grounds for making call. Defendant had called 911 to request officer to facilitate custody exchange, when there was already a deputy present to do so. Deputy had informed Defendant that it would be unlawful for him to make 911 call to make that complaint. Rational trier of fact could have found Defendant's conduct was unreasonable and threatening to child's mother and her fiance, and invaded their right to not be mentally harassed. (ZENOFF and SCHOSTOK, concurring.)
Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of aggravated battery, allegedly for making contact of an insulting and provoking nature with a person who she knew to be a peace officer performing his official duties. Court explicitly asked potential jurors whether they understood and accepted each of the Rule 431(b) principles, and twice gave them each an opportunity to respond individually. Thus, court did not commit error under Rule 431(b). (WRIGHT, concurring; McDADE, dissenting.)
Defendant after having been convicted in 2014 of criminal sexual abuse and aggravated criminal sexual abuse, challenged various conditions of his probation. Appellate court had previously, on remand, directed trial court to sentence Defendant again without engaging in any improper delegation to court services department. Trial court then properly resentenced Defendant and imposed proper and reasonable probation conditions. (DeARMOND and TURNER, concurring.)
In prosecution on drug and firearm charges, Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant’s motion to suppress location and traffic data that had been obtained pursuant to search warrant issued under 18 USC section 2703(d), which provides that judge may issue warrant to seize cell-phone information, as well as allows police to use pen register, trap-and-trace devices, historical cell-call records and cell-simulator to capture signals emitted by subject cell-phones. Dist.Ct. found that application for warrant was supported by probable cause, and record contained no evidence that agents monitored contents of cell-phone calls that would have required separate wiretap warrant. Ct. also rejected defendant’s contention that warrant improperly authorized general search for evidence of any crime, and that instant warrant failed to particularly describe place to be searched and person/things to be seized, where warrant merely allowed agents to follow particular cell-phone to see where it went and discover what calls it made.
Dist. Ct. did not err in sentencing defendant to 264-month term of incarceration on drug conspiracy charge, even though said sentence was above applicable 240-month guideline. While defendant argued that Dist. Ct. improperly failed to grant him two-level acceptance of responsibility reduction in offense level based on entry of his guilty plea, Dist. Ct. could properly deny said reduction based on fact that defendant had not voluntarily surrendered to authorities for nearly one year after his arrest warrant had been issued. Moreover, defendant is not entitled to acceptance of responsibility reduction simply because he had entered timely guilty plea and truthfully admitted to offense of conviction. Also, Dist. Ct. gave adequate reason, i.e, defendant’s criminal history, violence, gun possession, and recidivism, to support imposition of above-guideline sentence.
Dist. Ct. erred in denying defendant’s habeas petition that challenged defendant-Federal Bureau of Prison’s decision regarding effective start date of his federal sentence. Defendant’s petition was not moot even though defendant was released from prison at some point during the instant proceedings, since favorable finding on instant petition would carry great weight in any section 3583(e) motion to reduce his term of supervised release. Moreover, Bureau erred in finding that defendant’s federal sentence began on date state authorities transferred defendant to federal authorities upon completion of his state sentence that concerned same incident that formed basis of his federal conviction, since record showed that, after defendant had been sentenced on his federal charge, state authorities had relinquished “primary custody” of defendant by transferring him to federal facility for period of time during defendant’s service of his state sentence. As such, defendant should have been given credit on his federal sentence for time he had spent in federal facility prior to completion of his state sentence. Also, Bureau had misapplied 18 USC section 3584(a), where it denied defendant’s request for retroactive designation of state facility as his place of imprisonment for his federal sentence, since Bureau drew unwarranted inference through silence by Dist. Ct. on whether defendant’s federal sentence should run consecutively or concurrently with his state sentence.
In prosecution on drug distribution charge, Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant’s motion to suppress statement following his arrest, as well as evidence obtained from search of his cell phone. Dist. Ct. could properly find that defendant had voluntarily waived his 4th and 5th Amendment rights, even though defendant had failed to sign any waiver form, since Dist. Ct. could properly credit examining officers’ testimonies that defendant had given verbal consent to said questioning, as well as to search of cell phone, and defendant’s appeal would improperly require Ct. of Appeals to re-evaluate said credibility findings. Moreover, defendant’s refusal to sign consent forms is not enough to defeat evidence of implied waiver, and record otherwise showed that defendant had assisted officers in identifying particular names and numbers in his cell phone. Also, defendant had failed to show that any consent had been coerced. Too, Dist. Ct. did not err in sentencing defendant to 72-month term of incarceration that was based, in part, on finding that defendant was responsible for between 700 grams and 1 kilogram of heroin, even though jury convicted defendant of distributing only 100 grams of heroin, since record supported finding that defendant was responsible for larger amount of heroin based on preponderance of evidence standard.
Defendant was charged with violation of bail bond. State's reference in charge to Defendant's use of a false identification in the information qualified as an exception to limitations period applicable when a criminal defendant "is not usually and publicly resident within this State" under Section 3-7(a) of Criminal Code. Superseding information set forth circumstances that, if proven, would toll limitations period: that Defendant was living under a false identity from 7/9/98 to 4/5/14, and gave Defendant sufficient notice to invoke tolling provision in section 3-7(a). (HUDSON and SPENCE, concurring.)
(Court opinion corrected 5/3/18.) Defendant, age 17 at time of offense, was convicted, after jury trial, of felony murder, and sentenced to natural life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Defendant had shot cab driver in the back of the head, at point-blank range in cab, with a sawed-off shotgun. Defendant's PSI and counsel clearly informed court that Defendant was 17 at time of offense, and court found Defendant showed no potential for rehabilitation. Defendant presented no mitigating evidence to dispute that he was susceptible to peer pressure or unintelligent.(LYTTON, concurring; WRIGHT, concurring in part and dissenting in part.)
Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of 2 counts of burglary. Because record does not contain any evidence of the time Defendant spent in custody for his prior convictions, circuit court erred in finding Defendant to be eligible for extended-term sentencing. Defendant's 2008 convictions are Class 3 felonies, and they do not qualify as convictions "of the same or similar class felony or greater class felony" for extended-term sentencing.(WRIGHT, concurring; SCHMIDT, dissenting.)