Defendant was convicted, after jury trial of aggravated criminal sexual assault, an offense committed when he was 15. Court did not abuse its discretion when it sentenced Defendant, who is bipolar, to 36 years, which was near middle of statutory range. The 3 acts of aggravated criminal sexual assault occurred in the course of 2-3 minutes. (PIERCE and GRIFFIN, concurring.)
Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of being an armed habitual criminal. Court made a legal finding that Defendant's 2 prior aggravated battery convictions were forcible felonies. State then presented redacted stipulation to the jury, and jury concluded in finding Defendant of being an armed habitual criminal and that Defendant had 2 qualifying predicate felony convictions. The parties' stipulation readily proved that Defendant had 2 prior aggravated battery convictions, which was an element of armed habitual criminal. (HOLDRIDGE and O'BRIEN, concurring.)
Defendant was charged with driving a motor vehicle with a revoked license. Officer described that Defendant was riding a bicycle with a "weed-eater motor". Circuit court erred in finding that Vehicle Code's definition of "low-speed gas bicycle" (which is not subject to statute charged, which applies only to operation of a motor vehicle) is unconstiuttionally vague. Vehicle Code's definition of "low-speed gas bicycle" satisfies requirements of due process of law, as it provides definite criteria to determine if a certain vehicle is a "motor vehicle".(KARMEIER, FREEMAN, THOMAS, KILBRIDE, BURKE, and THEIS, concurring.)
Court sentenced Defendant in absentia to 9 years imprisonment, for aggravated DUI. Eight years later, Defendant was arrested and filed motion to vacate or reconsider sentence. Defendant perfected his right to appeal 2015 motion to vacate by filing notice of appeal within 30 days of entry of denial of his motion to vacate. During sentencing proceedings, court sentenced Defendant without first receiving and then considering a written PSI (presentence report of investigation). Remanded for new sentencing proceedings after trial court receives a properly completed PSI. (HOLDRIDGE and LYTTON, concurring.)
Defendant was convicted of armed robbery, on an accountability theory. At posttrial hearing, defense counsel told court that Defendant alleged that counsel was ineffective for failing to move to suppressx his statement to police based on Miranda. Court did not ask any further questions of Defendant or his counsel to discern factual basis of claim.Remanded for adequate preliminary inquiry. Pepper spray used on store clerk was a "dangerous weapon" within meaning of armed robbery statute. (NEVILLE and MASON, concurring.)
In prosecution on sex trafficking charge, Dist. Ct. did not err in precluding defendant from presenting evidence of victims’ prior prostitution histories, even though defendant claimed that such evidence was relevant as to issue as to whether he was aware that force would be used to cause victims to prostitute for commercial sex. While defendant argued that he believed that victims were prostituting for him voluntarily, Rule 412(a) precludes defendant from offering evidence to prove that victims engaged in other sexual behavior, and under Carson, 870 F.3d 584, fact that victims had previously worked as prostitutes is irrelevant to defendant’s mens rea for sex trafficking crime. Fact that govt. elicited from one victim that she had never prostituted before meeting with defendant did not require different result, where defendant had opportunities to impeach said victim on other grounds. Record also showed that defendant knew that force, threats of force and coercion were used to cause victims to engage in commercial sex, such that any error instructing jury on definition of criminal recklessness did not require new trial under plain-error standard.
Defendant and a codefendant were tried jointly before separate juries. Co-defendant was acquitted of attempted murder of a peace officer, but convicted of lesser included offense of attempted murder. Defendant was convicted of attempted murder of a peace officer. Defense counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to prosecutor's statements during closing argument, as statements were fair comments on the evidence. Firearm enhancements may b e applied to a sentence for attempted murder of a peace officer. Indictment sufficiently placed Defendant on notice that he was being accused of carrying a firearm when offense took place.(HOFFMAN and CONNORS, concurring.)
Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of aggravated unlawful use of a weapon. Defendant failed to meet his burden of clearly establishing a constitutional violation as to his claim that the Firearm Concealed Carry Act is facially unconstitutional. Defendant presented no evidence that the Act’s licensing scheme charges more than is necessary for administration of licensing statute and maintenance of public order. Defendant failed to show that his defense was hindered or impacted by defense counsel’s failure to observe his videotaped admission of possession of the firearm. (STEIGMANN and TURNER, concurring.)
Defendant was convicted, after stipulated bench trial, of 1st degree murder. Defendant was not prejudiced by defense counsel’s failure to explain shoeprint evidence, as evidence would not have lent crucial weight to his defense that he was not involved in offense, but would have only shown that someone else’s shoeprint was found on the door to the victim’s residence. Thus, there is no reasonable probability that defendant would have not pleaded guilty had this evidence been explained to him prior to his entering guilty plea. Court explicitly admonished Defendant as to appointed counsel’s associate’s former involvement in his case, as former prosecutor, and her employment with his counsel’s law office. Failure to track verbatim language of preprinted certificate contained in Rule 604(d) did not render counsel’s certificate noncompliant. (McDADE and O’BRIEN, concurring.)
Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of aggravated criminal sexual abuse and sentenced to 5 years imprisonment and then 2 years mandatory supervised release (MSR). Court did not err by considering in aggravation the psychological harm or threat thereof suffered by the minor victim, his 9-year-old stepgranddaughter . Record supports a finding of, or a reasonable inference that minor suffered psychological harm. (MOORE and OVERSTREET, concurring.)