Criminal Law

(Court opinion corrected 4/27/18.) Defendant, age 17 at time of offense, was convicted, after jury trial, of intentional 1st degree murder and personally discharging a firearm during commission of offense. It was not unreasonable for jury to rely on testimony of State's witness, or to accept that witness' version of events over defense witness' version of events, as key part of defense witness' testimony was contracted by photos entered into evidence. State properly impeached defense witness with his prior inconsistent statement. Sentence of 53 years was not excessive. (PIERCE and MIKVA, concurring.)

Shortly before completion of Defendant's prison term for conviction of rape and deviate sexual  assault, State filed sexually violent person petition. Court properly denied Defendant's motion seeking appointment of a 2nd expert witness. A respondent is not entitled to the same number of expert witnesses as the State. Although Defendant conceded that he was convicted of a sexually violent offense, State could still discuss underlying facts of convictions during opening statements. Jury, rather than appellate court, had authority to resolve conflicts in evidence and to weigh credibility of witnesses. A reasonable jury could find the elements of the Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act beyond a reasonable doubt.  (DeARMOND and HOLDER WHITE, concurring.)

State's reference to Defendant's using of a false identification to evade prosecution, in the information, qualifies as an exception to the limitations period applicable when a criminal defendant is not usually and publicly resident within Illinois, under section 3-7(a) of the Criminal Code of 2012. Thus, information set forth circumstances that ultimately, if proven, would toll limitations period under section 3-7(a), namely, that Defendant was living under a false identity from July 1998 to April 2014, which was clear enough to provide required notice to Defendant that State would rely on those circumstances to toll limitations period.(HUDSON and SPENCE, concurring.)

At hearing, Defendant's postconviction counsel informed court that Defendant wished to proceed pro se on his petition, and Defendant confirmed that he wanted to represent himself on his claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel because his trial attorney was postconviction counsel's boss. Court announced it would allow Defendant to proceed pro se. Faretta-type admonishments need not be given every time a postconviction petitioner chooses to represent himself in postconviction proceedings. Defendant had already been convicted and sentenced, and thus knew all that Rule 401(a) admonishments would have told him.(HOLDRIDGE and LYTTON, concurring.)

A criminal defendant's right to a public trial is inapplicable to a portion of proceedings in which circuit court must answer jury's questions raised during deliberations. Court erred in allowing State, during hearing on defendant's pro se claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, to present arguments against defendant's claims and in support of defense counsel. Krankel inquiry had turned into an adversarial proceeding, undermining possibility of creating a neutral, objective record for review. (SCHMIDT, concurring; McDADE, specially concurring.)

Defendant, age 15 at time of offense, was convicted, after 2004 bench trial, of 1st degree murder of his cousin, in front of her infant daughter, and sentenced to 40 years. Court properly denied Defendant's 2015 motion for leave to file a successive postconviction petition. Defendant could not raise a claim under the 2012 Miller decision, until Illinois Supreme Court held in Davis decision that Miller applies retroactively to cases on collateral review. Davis decision preceded Defendant's 2015 motion to file successive petition. Whether Defendant's sentence is a de facto life sentence is in dispute. Court sufficiently addressed Holman factors in his sentencing hearing. (HOWSE and LAVIN, concurring.)