Criminal Law

Defendant was convicted, after bench trial, of 1^st degree murder of his 3-year-old son and attempted 1^st degree murder, aggravated criminal sexual assault, and aggravated domestic battery of son’s mother. At time of his videotaped statement, Defendant had received 3 doses of morphine and 1 dose of Dilaudid for pain from broken ankle, and Defendant was not in a position to voluntarily confess. Thus, court erred in denying Defendant’s motion to suppress statement, but error was harmless given overwhelming evidence of Defendant’s guilt. Conviction for aggravated domestic battery must be vacated under the one-act, one-crime rule as that conviction and his attempted murder conviction are both based on same single physical act of Defendant stabbing son’s mother with a knife.  No abuse of discretion in sentence of natural life imprisonment; court properly considered appropriate factors and circumstances of murder. (BURKE and  GORDON, concurring.)

Court properly denied Defendant's amended postconviction petition after a 3rd-stage evidentiary hearing. Defendant failed to show his counsel's trial strategy, to not perfect impeachment of shooting victim, was a complete failure to conduct any meaningful adversarial testing.Defendant failed to show evidence existed to complete impeachment of this witness.Court properly found that prosecutor's redirect was sufficient to satisfy her duty to correct testimony of witness as to whether agreement existed between him and State. Court did not abuse its discretion in attributing trial delays to Defendant. Thus, Defendant failed to show he was provided ineffective assistance by his appellate counsel's failure to raise this claim. (STEIGMANN and APPLETON, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after bench trial, of armed robbery with a firearm and aggravated vehicular hijacking. There was a meeting of the minds as to State's intention in extending offer with a requirement that Defendant serve 17.85 years (21 years served at 85%). Defendant cannot show outcome would have changed as a result of counsel's lack of knowledge about percentage of time served under statute. Defense counsel's failure to advise of collateral consequences of guilty plea is not ineffective assistance of counsel. For a defendant to make a "clear claim" of ineffective assistance of counsel, Defendant must at least mention his attorney, or he is not entitled to a Krankel inquiry. (TURNER and KNECHT, concurring.)

Defendant, who was 19 at time of offense, was convicted, after bench trial, of 1st degree murder and aggravated battery of a 4-month-old infant. At his 3rd and most recent sentencing in 2015, Defendant was sentenced to a total of 29 years. Appellate court's 2009 order (that consecutive, not concurrent, sentences were statutorily required) was valid when issued and conformed to then-existing supreme court precedent. Appellate court vacated Defendant's 2nd sentencing (of 2010) at Defendant's request. Illinois Supreme Court's 2016 Price decision, that primary purpose of 2015 Castleberry decision was to preserve finality of judgments, controls. Court's failure to offer Defendant opportunity to speak before pronouncing sentence does not require remand. Trial court considered mitigating factors, as it discussed them in great detail. No basis to vacate Defendant's 29-year sentence. (BURKE and McBRIDE, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after bench trial, of residential burglary and unlawful use of a weapon by a felon. State failed to establish the intent element of the obstruction of justice count. Defendant's conviction for residential burglary fails as a matter of law as it was predicated on underlying felony of obstructing justice. Defendant's confession to police officer established that Defendant had knowledge and control over weapon when he possessed it, and then placed gun in freezer. Confession was corroborated by circumstantial evidence and, along with Defendant's stipulated other 2 convictions, established that Defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon. Ineffective assistance of counsel claim fails, as Defendant failed to establish that counsel's failure to file a motion in limine was no more than trial strategy. Although court erred in admitting hearsay statement, evidence at trial was not closely balanced and error was inconsequential to conviction.(PIERCE and MIKVA, concurring.)

Respondent filed a petition to terminate his sexual offender registration under Section 3-5 of Sex Offender Registration Act. Section 3-5(d) of the Act requires a person to prove he or she poses "no risk" to community by a preponderance of evidence to permit court to terminate sexual offender registration. Respondent had, when a minor, been adjudicated delinquent on 2 counts of aggravated criminal sexual abuse of 2 minors under age 8. Court's denial of Respondent's petition was not against manifest weight of evidence. Court weighed conflicting testimony and evidence before denying Respondent's petition.  (BARBERIS and OVERSTREET, concurring.)

(Court opinion corrected 12/4/17.) Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of aggravated domestic battery for beating his brother-in-law. No denial of fair trial in court not instructing jury that victim's prior convictions of home invasion and armed robbery could be used to assess his credibility, as it was up to Defendant to tender the instruction (IPI Criminal 3.12) if he sought to undermine victim's credibility, but he failed to do so. Court satisfied inquiry requirement as to Defendant's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. Court gave Defendant ample opportunity to explain each allegation, questioned Defendant and trial counsel, and adequately inquired into and considered allegations stated in court filings. Court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Defendant,a Class X offender who committed offense while on parole, to 15 years. (TURNER and STEIGMANN, concurring).

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of 1st-degree murder. Court committed reversible error when it allowed jury to observe audio and video evidence in courtroom during deliberations in presence of a representative of State's Attorney's office and a court bailiff, and without prior notice to Defendant. Judge, Defendant, and defense counsel were not present to oversee interaction and to observe any impropriety. Procedure rendered trial fundamentally unfair and an unreliable means of determining guilt.(CARTER and O'BRIEN, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after bench trial, of 1st-degree murder in shooting death of one person and of attempted 1st-degree murder in shooting of one other person. Victim Defendant shot had been driving his Maserati, with other shooting victim, his girlfriend, in front passenger seat, when they collided with Defendant's car. Court properly found that Defendant did not act in self-defense, and concluded that after fighting between Defendant and driver ceased, Defendant no longer faced imminent harm when he shot driver. A rational trier of fact could have concluded that Defendant did not act based on a serious provocation resulting from a substantial physical injury or substantial physical assault, and that Defendant's actions were deliberate, and that he was not acting under a sudden and intense passion.(SIMON and MIKVA, concurring.)

Court dismissed Defendant's 3 pro se motions, which the trial court recharacterized as, collectively, a postconviction petition. Court should have given Defendant admonitions of Illinois Supreme Court's 2005 Shellstrom decision, before recharacterizing the motions. Because Defendant was pro se at the time the court first explicitly recharacterized his motions, the rationale of Shellstrom applies, as Defendant had no attorney to warn him of the looming danger of procedural forfeiture when court did recharacterization. FInes imposed by circuit clerk are void and are ordered vacated.(HOLDER WHITE, concurring; TURNER, concurring in part and dissenting in part.)