Criminal Law

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of 2 counts of 1st degree murder. Court should have granted Defendant's request for fees so that he could hire expert to analyze cell phone records prosecution used at trial. Cell phone records formed a critical part of evidence against Defendant. Defense needed an expert to educate defense counsel about technicalities of the field and to assist with preparation of effective cross-examination, and lack of expert prejudiced Defendant. State sufficiently showed that in 36 hours of detention, Defendant voluntarily answered questions about his acts around time that a fire started in a building inhabited by members of rival gang. Court properly denied Defendant's motion to suppress statements he made to police. (HYMAN, concurring; MASON, concurring in part and dissenting in part.)

Defendant was convicted, after bench trial, of failing to register as a sex offender within 90 days of his last registration, as required by Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA). Defendant admitted that he knew he was required to appear at police department every days, and admitted that he failed to do so prior to expiration of 90-day period because he mistakenly believed he had a 10-day grace period. SORA provision prohibiting presence of child sex offenders and sexual predators from being present or loitering near a park is unconstitutional. Remaining provisions of SORA do not violate Defendant's due process rights. (McDADE, specially concurring; O'BRIEN, concurring in part and dissenting in part.)

(Modified upon denial of rehearing 9/12/17.) Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of delivery of cocaine within 1000 feet of a high school. Prior to trial of this case, a different jury, before the same judge, had acquitted Defendant  of delivering controlled substance to police investigator. State was allowed to present evidence that Defendant had sold drugs on that date, but Defendant was not allowed to present evidence of his acquittal. Court abused its discretion in improperly admitting evidence of prior drug sale as other-crimes evidence, and in not allowing Defendant to inform jury of his acquittal.(NEVILLE and MASON, concurring.)

Defendant, age 16 at time of offense, was convicted, after bench trial, of 1st-degree murder of his longtime friend, age 17 during verbal argument, and was sentenced to 52 years. Evidence at trial does not support Defendant's argument that he had an actual but unreasonable belief in need for self-defense. Defendant suffered no injuries,and the only witness corroborating Defendant was inconsistent in his testimony. Sentence does not violate 8th amendment or proportionate penalties clause of Illinois Constitution. Even if Defendant serves 100% of his sentence, he would be released at age 68, and sentence is not the functional equivalent of life without possibility of parole.  (SIMON and MIKVA, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after bench trial, of felony theft. Defendant was property manager for condo association and had tenants make money orders and checks for rent, totaling more than $80,000, payable to Defendant. Evidence clearly showed that Defendant had no legal authority to receive and retain control of proceeds from rental of condo units. The only other proof required of State was that someone else had a greater interest in the property than Defendant. Evidence showed that condo associations, which were named victims of Defendant's theft, had at least a contingent interest in proceeds. (HUDSON and BIRKETT, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted of 1st-degree murder and sentenced to 44 years. Eight years later, Defendant filed a pro se motion for leave to file successive postconviction petition alleging 2 claims of actual innocence based on newly discovered evidence. Court properly denied that motion and later motion to reconsider. Affidavit offered by Defendant is neither a recantation of trial testimony nor admission of guilt on the part of the culpable party. Affidavit does not raise probability that it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted Defendant. (REYES, concurring; GORDON, dissenting.)

Defendant, age 25 at time of offense, was charged with 1st-degree murder of 2-year-old daughter of his girlfriend, for bending child backward, causing injuries resulting in her death. Defendant entered guilty plea during 2nd day of jury trial. Court properly denied Defendant's petition after 3rd-stage evidentiary hearing. Trial counsel, who was court-appointed, filed a motion to withdraw during post plea proceedings, stating that she could no longer represent Defendant because she found his allegations as to her performance, in his pro se posttrial motions, to be so repugnant that her continued representation would violate Rule 6.2(c ) of Rules of Professional Conduct. Postconviction counsel was not ineffective, as trial counsel did not have conflict of interest. Court properly dismissed Defendant's section 2-1401 petition for relief from judgment. Letter from trial counsel does not show existence of meritorious claim or defense, but only comments on counsel's expectation that judge would fashion sentence to allow Defendant to resume a positive life. (LYTTON and SCHMIDT, concurring.)