Criminal Law

Dist. Ct. lacked jurisdiction to act on request by defendant’s counsel to vacate $14,142.90 default judgment entered against defendant’s counsel in state-court, breach of contract action filed by expert witness who claimed that defendant’s counsel had failed to pay him for opinion services rendered on behalf of defendant in defendant’s criminal trial. Record showed that: (1) defendant’s counsel, who had been appointed to represent defendant under Criminal Justice Act (CJA), initially retained expert without seeking Dist. Ct.’s pre-approval; and (2) instant bill, which had been submitted to Dist. Ct. for payment under CJA six months after defendant had been sentenced, was denied by Dist. Ct. Rooker-Feldman doctrine precluded defendant’s counsel from asking Dist. Ct. to vacate state-court judgment, since only U.S. Supreme Ct. could do so under 28 USC section 1257. Moreover, Anti-Injunction Act also precluded defendant’s counsel from seeking stay of state-court proceedings, where none of Anti-Injunction Act’s three exceptions applied to instant factual setting.

Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant’s habeas petition alleging that his trial counsel was ineffective during defendant’s trial on charges of production and possession of child pornography, where trial counsel failed to advise defendant that involuntary intoxication was available defense. Defendant failed to establish any prejudice, where defendant failed to allege any facts that would support viable defense of involuntary intoxication such as facts showing he was intoxicated at time of charged offenses. Fact that defendant’s physician had been convicted of illegally dispensing narcotics to drug-seeking addicts did not require different result, where: (1) defendant’s medical records did not establish that defendant had any active prescriptions for relevant drugs at time of charged offenses; and (2) defendant’s confession that he knew what he was doing when generating child pornography defeated any possible involuntary intoxication defense. Also, trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to develop diminished capacity as mitigating sentencing factor, where such factor would have undermined defense strategy of showing acceptance of responsibility.

In prosecution on unlawful possession of firearm charge, Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant’s motion to suppress seizure of handgun found in pocket of defendant’s jacket during frisk of defendant following traffic stop of car in which defendant was passenger. Officer observed two open beer cans in subject vehicle, and thus officer had probable cause to arrest and frisk defendant based on violation of open container law. Also, outside of open container violation, police had reasonable suspicion to frisk defendant, where: (1) officer had received email 9.5 hours earlier from police in neighboring city that warned that defendant and his two companions in instant vehicle might retaliate against third-party for third-party’s recent shooting of one of defendant’s companions; (2) defendant and his two companions had been drinking, which would have given officer greater reason to worry that defendant might to something unpredictable and dangerous; and (3) officer was aware that defendant and his two companions had extensive criminal histories. Also, officer’s touching of small hard object from outside of defendant’s jacket pocket gave officer reasonable suspicion to believe that said object was weapon.

Record contained sufficient evidence to support jury’s guilty verdict on charge of possessing firearm in furtherance of drug trafficking crime, based on incident in which defendant sought to purchase firearm from undercover agent in which drugs were used by defendant to effectuate said purchase. Record established that defendant had constructively possessed said firearm, where: (1) defendant informed undercover agent on multiple occasions that he wanted to acquire said firearm in exchange for quantity of drugs; and (2) defendant exercised control over said firearm through his direction to third-party to effectuate said purchase with drugs and cash supplied by defendant. Moreover, said purchase was “in furtherance of” drug trafficking crime, where drugs were exchanged during purchase. Also, Dist. Ct. properly denied defendant’s motion to suppress witness’ identification of defendant as shooter during incident in which defendant mistakenly believed that witness was confidential informant, even though witness did not identify defendant as shooter during first viewing of six-person photo array, but identified him as shooter during second viewing of same photo array that occurred two months later. Fact that police used same photo array at second viewing was not unduly suggestive that defendant was culprit, and defendant’s photo was not more prominently displayed than two other prominent photos in array.

Dist. Ct. erred in imposing concurrent sentences on charges of conspiracy to distribute child pornography and conspiracy to sexually exploit child, where Dist. Ct. also imposed sentence on charge of engaging in child-exploitation enterprise. Instant conspiracy charges were predicate offenses for instant enterprise charge, and thus imposing any sentences for conspiracy offenses would violate Double Jeopardy Clause, since sentences on conspiracy charges constitute separate sentences for same enterprise offense.