Criminal Law

Defendant was arrested and charged with unlawful possession of cannabis after a warrantless search of his vehicle pursuant to a traffic stop. At issue in the case was whether the smell of cannabis gave officers probable cause to search the vehicle. The Illinois Supreme Court held that the odor of burnt cannabis alone was insufficient to provide probable cause for police officers to perform a warrantless search of a vehicle and that officers must instead rely on a totality of the facts and circumstances. (THEIS, OVERSTREET, CUNNINGHAM, ROCHFORD, and O’BRIEN, concurring. HOLDER WHITE took no part in the decision.)

The supreme court considered an appeal brought regarding the language of the Pretrial Fairness Act after the appellate court reversed a circuit court order detaining defendant by finding that the State’s petition was not timely because it was filed after the first appearance. The supreme court reversed the judgment of the appellate court, finding that the State’s petition to deny pretrial release, which was filed on the same day as defendant’s first appearance, complied with the timing requirements of the Act. (THEIS, NEVILLE, OVERSTREET, HOLDER WHITE, CUNNINGHAM, and ROCHFORD, concurring)

Defendant was found guilty of first-degree murder, aggravated discharge of a firearm, conspiracy to commit aggravated discharge of a firearm, and two counts of perjury. The appellate court vacated his conspiracy conviction and one of his perjury convictions but otherwise affirmed and defendant filed a petition for leave to appeal, which was granted. The supreme court affirmed the appellate court’s judgment, finding that the appellate court did not err when it upheld the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress items of his clothing that police took from his trauma room in a hospital emergency department because defendant did not meet his burden of establishing that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy. (THEIS, NEVILLE, OVERSTREET, HOLDER WHITE, CUNNINGHAM, and O’BRIEN, concurring)

Defendant was convicted of several offenses arising out of a routine traffic stop during which he assaulted an Illinois State Police trooper. On appeal, defendant argued that his conviction for disarming a peace officer should be reversed because the pepper spray he took from the officer was not a “weapon” for the purposes of the statute and that his aggregate 44-year sentence was excessive. The appellate court affirmed, finding that the generalized nature of the relevant statue encompassed pepper spray and that the trial court did not err in sentencing because it considered the appropriate factors in mitigation and aggravation. (CAVANAGH and ZENOFF, concurring)

Defendant was found guilty pursuant to a negotiated guilty plea of one count of being an armed habitual criminal. After defendant’s conviction, one of his qualifying convictions for aggravated unlawful use of a weapon was found unconstitutional and the trial court ultimately vacated the conviction for AHC and entered a conviction for the lesser-included offense of unlawful use of a weapon by a felon and re-sentenced defendant. Defendant appealed, arguing that because the AUUW statute was found void, this voided the conviction for AHC so that no further proceedings were permitted, including reduction to a lesser-included offense and that because the statute of limitations had expired, the trial court could not grant leave to amend the count in the information to a UUWF charge. The appellate court affirmed, finding that the trial court did not err when it revised the defendant’s conviction to the lesser included offense and that defendant either waived or invited any error with regard to the statute of limitations. The appellate court, however, did agree with defendant that the trial court’s use of an order nunc pro tunc was not proper but explained that the error was harmless. (McBRIDE and ELLIS, concurring)

Defendant appealed from a trial court order requiring that defendant be detained pending trial, arguing that the State’s petition for pretrial detention should have been denied as untimely. The appellate court disagreed and affirmed, finding that the petition was timely where it was filed subsequent to defendant’s decision to reopen a hearing on the conditions of pretrial release because the statute contemplated that one potential outcome of that hearing was a finding that no set of conditions would be sufficient. (JOHNSON, concurring and MITCHELL, specially concurring)

Defendant, who was charged with aggravated discharge of a firearm and unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon, appealed from a trial court order denying him pretrial release. The appellate court affirmed, finding that no clear and obvious error occurred with regard to the timing of the detention hearing because defendant waived the required timeline by requesting a continuance and that defendant could not establish the prejudice prong for his claim that the request for a continuance constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. (BARBERIS and BOIE, concurring)

Defendant, who was charged with criminal sexual assault and criminal sexual abuse, appealed from a trial court order denying him pretrial release, arguing that the State failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that he committed the charged offense or that he posed a real and present threat to the safety of any person or the community and that the trial court erred in finding that no conditions could mitigate the danger to the community. The appellate court affirmed, finding that the trial court’s determination that the State met its burden on the offense charged was not against the manifest weight of the evidence, that the trial court’s finding that defendant posed a risk was not unreasonable or arbitrary based on the evidence, including the nature of the charges and the age of the victim, and that the trial court properly considered whether any conditions could mitigate that risk. (LAMPKIN, concurring and VAN TINE, specially concurring)