Criminal Law

Defendant appealed from the dismissal of his amended post-conviction petition at the second stage of post-conviction proceedings for want of prosecution, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion when it dismissed the petition on those grounds. The appellate court affirmed, finding that a petition may be dismissed for want of prosecution and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion where defendant, who was on supervised release, failed to appear in court for an extended period of time and that a reasonable person could conclude from the lack of participation that defendant abandoned his petition through inaction. (SCHOSTOK and MULLEN, concurring)

Defendant appealed from a trial court order requiring that he be detained pending trial under the dangerousness standard set out in section 110-6.1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, arguing that the State’s petition was not timely. The appellate court disagreed and affirmed, finding that the State’s petition was timely where defendant, not the State, initiated proceedings through a petition to re-open a hearing on the conditions of his release and that the code contemplates that one possible result of such a hearing is that no conditions will satisfy the requirements of the statute for release. (ODEN JOHNSON, specially concurring and MITCHELL, specially concurring)

Defendant was committed under the Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act. Several years later, the circuit court found probable cause to believe that defendant no longer met the criteria for SVP and the matter proceeded to a jury. The jury concluded that he remained an SVP and defendant appealed. The appellate court reversed, finding that the State did not prove that he was “substantially probable” to re-offend as is required by the SVP Act. (TAILOR and C.A. WALKER, concurring)

The Illinois Supreme Court considered the question of whether the circuit court properly dismissed, with prejudice, a grand jury indictment against the defendant based on the State having presented misleading testimony to the grand jury. The appellate court affirmed, but the supreme court reversed and remanded for further proceedings on the grand jury’s bill of indictment. The supreme court explained that the record did not establish a due process violation with “unequivocally clarity” and, as a result, defendant did not meet the burden of clarity and certainty required to justify dismissal of an indictment on the basis of a due process violation. The court also explained that even if the requisite clarity were present, the defendant could not demonstrate actual and substantial prejudice. (THEIS, HOLDER WHITE, and ROCHFORD, concurring and O’BRIEN, NEVILLE, and CUNNINGHAM, dissenting)

Defendant was found guilty of driving under the influence of alcohol after a stipulated bench trial. On appeal, defendant argued that the trial court erred when it denied her motion to suppress evidence because the officer lacked a reasonable suspicion to stop her vehicle where a citizen’s tip that defendant was driving while intoxicated was not sufficiently detailed to be reliable and where the arresting officer's own observations of defendant’s driving did not give rise to a reasonable suspicion that defendant had committed a traffic violation. The appellate court disagreed and affirmed, finding that under the facts of the case the tip was sufficient because it was based on contemporaneous eyewitness observations of ongoing traffic violations and that the eyewitness reports were corroborated by the officer’s own observations of the defendant driving in an “odd” manner. (HARRIS and DOHERTY, concurring)

Defendant was convicted of unlawful use of a weapon by a felon based on a finding that he knowingly possessed a Taser after previously being convicted of a felony. Defendant appealed his conviction, arguing that it was void because the statute governing the offense is facially unconstitutional under the second amended and/or the Illinois constitution. The appellate court affirmed, finding that the State met its burden of showing that the applicable statute was consistent with the nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation and that the prohibition of possession of a firearm by citizens was a proper exercise of the state’s police power. (WELCH, concurring and CATES, specially concurring)