Criminal Law

Defendant sought a certificate of innocence after his conviction for possession of a controlled substance was vacated by the circuit court. Defendant died before the trial court ruled on the petition and his estate moved to substituted in the proceedings. The trial court denied the motion and dismissed the petition. The estate appealed, arguing that the certificate of innocence action survived under the Illinois Survival Act. The appellate court affirmed, finding that the Survival Act does not cover certificate of innocence actions because they are not proceeding to recover damages noting that recovery of damages requires separate proceedings in the court of claims where the certificate of innocence is used as evidence. (VAN TINE and McBRIDE, concurring)

Defendant appealed from his conviction for first-degree murder and aggravated battery with a firearm under a theory of accountability, arguing that the trial court erred when it failed to suppress certain statements that defendant made after detectives falsely promised him blanket confidentiality. The appellate court agreed and reversed for a new trial, finding that the trial court should have suppressed statements defendant made after the detectives made a promise of blanket confidentiality and that the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. (ELLIS and COBBS, concurring)

Defendant appealed from his conviction for unlawful use of a weapon by a felon on the grounds that the statute under which he was charged was unconstitutional, that the search that led to the discovery of the firearm was unconstitutional, and that insufficient evidence was presented to establish defendant’s knowledge of the weapon found in a hidden compartment in the interior paneling of his vehicle. The appellate court reversed defendant’s conviction outright, finding the circuit court erred in denying defendant’s motion to suppress because the search was neither justifiable by probable course or a search incident to arrest. The court did not consider the merits of defendant’s remaining arguments. (LAMPKIN and REYES, concurring)

Defendant, who pleaded guilty of aggravated unlawful use of a weapon, filed a petition for relief from judgment pursuant to section 2-1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure claiming that the AUUW statute was unconstitutional and his conviction was void. The circuit court dismissed the petition as frivolous and patently without merit and defendant appealed, arguing that the AUUW violates the second amendment and that his due process rights were violated when the circuit court dismissed his petition without allowing him to respond to the State’s oral motion to dismiss. The appellate court affirmed, finding that the portion of the AUUW statute challenged by defendant was constitutional and that the circuit court’s denial of the petition in defendant’s absence was harmless error. (LAMPKIN and D.B. WALKER, concurring)

Plaintiff, who entered into a blind plea on one count of reckless homicide while operating a vehicle and refusing to comply with the lawful order of police officers, appealed from his sentence arguing that the trial court committed plain error by considering a factor inherent in the offense in aggravation and that the trial court imposed an excessive term of imprisonment. The appellate court affirmed, finding that the trial court properly highlighted the defendant’s many intentional acts, even if he did not intend the specific harm, and that the trial court properly considered conduct reasonably within its discretion and that nothing in the sentencing record indicated that the trial court failed to consider all relevant mitigating factors. (ODEN JOHNSON, concurring and TAILOR, dissenting)

Defendant, who was charged with aggravated battery of a police officer and obstructing a police officer, appealed from a trial court order denying her pretrial release, arguing that the State did not charge her with a detainable offense and that pretrial release could not be revoked because she had not yet been released on any of the charges in the current case. The appellate court, applying a plain error standard, affirmed the trial court. The appellate court explained that any alleged error in the detention proceedings did not rise to the level of structural error. (ZENOFF and LANNERD, concurring)

Defendant appealed from the trial court’s dismissal of his petition for relief pursuant to section 2-1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure in which he argued that his sentence of mandatory life was unconstitutional as applied to him. The appellate court affirmed, finding that defendant failed to sufficiently plead and prove how his mental illness rendered him less culpable of his crime or that treatment would allow him to achieve rehabilitation and that he had ample opportunity to develop this evidence. (CATES and McHANEY, concurring)

Defendant appealed from an order entered by the circuit court finding him unfit, determining that he was in need of inpatient mental health treatment, and ordering that he be placed in a secure setting because he constituted a serious threat to public safety. Defendant argued that the court misinterpreted section 104-25 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and that this led to his improper commitment and that the court’s determination that he required inpatient mental health treatment was against the manifest weight of the evidence. The appellate court affirmed, finding that the trial court did not err in its implementation of the statute and that its findings were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. (HUTCHINSON and KENNEDY, concurring)

Defendant appealed from his conviction for unlawful use of weapons, arguing that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant constructively possessed a firearm. The appellate court reversed, explaining that while it did not set aside the jury’s verdict lightly there was nonetheless insufficient evidence to connect the defendant to the gun where there was no direct evidence that defendant knew about the gun, there were multiple people in the vehicle where the gun was found, and where the officers’ view of the defendant was obstructed by the car’s seats and its other passengers. (MIKVA and NAVARRO, concurring)