Criminal Law

(Correcting court designation.) An objectively reasonable, though mistaken, belief as to the meaning of a law may form basis for costitutionally valid vehicle stop under Illinois constitution. It was objectively reasonable for officers to believe that trailer hitch, on vehicle in which Defendant was a passenger, violated Section 3-413(b) of Vehicle Code. Thus, traffic stop was constitutionally valid under state and federal constitutions. Section 3-413(b) is ambiguous and, applying rule of lenity, it prohibits only materials which are attached to a license plate, and thus a trailer hitch does not violate that section. (GARMAN, FREEMAN, THOMAS, KILBRIDE, KARMEIER, and THEIS, concurring.)

(Correcting court designation.) Circuit court erred in granting appointed postconviction counsel's motion to withdraw and dismissing Defendant's postconviction petition. Where a pro se postconviction petition advances to second stage on basis of affirmative judicial determination that petition is neither frivolous nor patently without merit, appointed counsel's motion to withdraw must contain at least some explanation as to why all claims set forth in petition are so lacking in legal and factual support as to compel withdrawal. (GARMAN, FREEMAN, KILBRIDE, KARMEIER, BURKE, and THEIS, concurring.)

Defendant, who was convicted of aggravated robbery, robbery, and burglary, had filed pretrial motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence, arguing that police improperly used a GPS device without a warrant to track movements of a vehicle he used. Even where a fourth amendment violation has occurred, evidence that resulted will not be suppressed when good-faith exception to exclusionary rule applies. In this case, good-faith exception to exclusionary rule applies, and evidence obtained against Defendant should not be excluded. At time when detective placed GPS on vehicle in April 2009, U.S. Supreme Court's decisions were "binding appellate precedent" that detective could have reasonably relied upon. In the alternative, it would have been objectively reasonable for police to rely upon legal landscape and constitutional norm in existence at time of search that allowed warrantless attachment and use of GPS technology. (GARMAN, KILBRIDE, and KARMEIER, concurring; BURKE, FREEMAN, and THEIS, dissenting.)

Defendant filed pro se postconviction petition, alleging actual innocence and raising related constitutional issues that State suborned perjury and coerced confessions, and attached unnotarized statement, styled as affidavit, wherein author took responsibility for victim's murder and stated that Defendant had no involvement in murder. Statement qualifies as other evidence for first-stage postconviction review. Circuit court's consideration that statement lacked "conclusive character" essentially weighed credibility of Defendant's petition and statement against Defendant's prior grand jury testimony, and testimony of detective and prosecutor. This analysis is more probing inquiry than is proper on first-stage review, where dismissal is proper only if petition has no arguable basis either in law or in fact. (FREEMAN, KILBRIDE, BURKE, and THEIS, concurring; THOMAS and KARMEIER, dissenting.)

Defendant was convicted, after bench trial, of possession of controlled substance with intent to deliver 50 grams or more of substance containing synthetic cannabis. Police confidential source purchased commercially packaged product from convenience store Defendant owned. Source asked Defendant for a product which Defendant replied he did not have, but offered a similar product, "Bulldog Potpourri", which was stored underneath counter and was not displayed. Defendant denied that he knew product contained controlled substance, and said that his supplier described it as natural incense. Extent of State's proof was that Defendant knowingly possessed something that could be ingested for its intoxicating effects. Defendant's actions did not show conscious or willful ignorance as to product's legality. Evidence was insufficient to establish beyod a reasonable doubt that Defendant knew product contained synthetic cannabis. (KNECHT and HOLDER WHITE, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of aggravated unlawful use of a weapon (AUUW) and unlawful use of a weapon by a felon (UUWF), and sentenced to concurrent terms of nine years. Officer stopped Defendant for running stop sign, and while approaching his vehicle officer observed Defendant making a "furtive movement" toward rear of passenger seat. Officer then searched car and found handgun and live ammunition. Officer offered no specific facts to support his belief that he asked Defendant and passenger to step out of the vehicle because he feared for his safety. Based on Defendant's movement in the car, there was no reasonable basis for officer to engage in search of vehicle, and thus court erred in denying Defendant's motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence. (PALMER and REYES, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after bench trial, of attempted first-degree murder. after his girlfriend told him he had to move out, as she believed he had resumed drinking, Defendant inflicted 4 cuts on her back, though lacerations were superficial and not life-threatening. Character of attack and circumstances leading up to it do not justify inference that Defendant intendent to kill her; no evidence of struggle or that Defendant threatened girlfriend. (LAMPKIN and ROCHFORD, concurring.)

Defendant was tried and sentenced as an adult for shooting incident at age 15. After automatic transfer from juvenile court to adult court, court found him unfit to stand trial but later determined he had been restored to fitness. Court found Defendant guilty of attempted first-degree murder of two persons, aggravated battery with a firearm and aggravated discharge of a firearm. As applied to Defendant, cumulative sentence of 52 years does not constitute a natural life sentence without possibility of parole, and thus Illinois' transfer and sentencing scheme does not violate eighth amendment. Defendant's sentence is so wholly disproportionate that it shocks the moral sense of the community and, as applied, automatic transfer statute in conjunction with sentencing scheme violates proportionate penalties clause. Reversed and remanded for retroactive fitness hearing.(PUCINSKI and MASON, concurring.)