Criminal Law

People v. Braddy

Illinois Appellate Court
Criminal Court
Sexual Abuse
Citation
Case Number: 
2015 IL App (5th) 130354
Decision Date: 
Wednesday, May 20, 2015
District: 
5th Dist.
Division/County: 
Marion Co.
Holding: 
Affirmed.
Justice: 
CHAPMAN
Defendant was charged with criminal sexual assault and aggravated criminal sexual abuse as to his minor daughter and his girlfriend's minor daughter. Court did not err in admitting testimony of Defendant's sister that, 20 years prior, Defendant had sexually abused her. Factual differences between abuse alleged by sister and charged crimes were not significant, and involved Defendant abusing children living in his household with whom he had familiar relationship. Court properly considered statutory factors in finding that sister's testimony was more probative than prejudicial. (CATES and GOLDENHERSH, concurring.)

U.S. v. Dobek

Federal 7th Circuit Court
Criminal Court
Jury Instructions
Citation
Case Number: 
No. 14-3073
Decision Date: 
May 19, 2015
Federal District: 
E.D. Wisc.
Holding: 
Affirmed
In prosecution on charge of exporting munitions illegally under 22 USC sections 2778(b)(2) and (c), Dist. Ct. erred in giving jury instruction on definition of “willfulness” that did not require jury to find that defendant knew that articles that he was actually exporting were on list of prohibited items for export. However, error was harmless where: (1) record overwhelmingly showed that defendant had exported certain part for military plane that he knew was embargoed; and (2) issue of defendant’s knowledge of illegality of his conduct was squarely placed with jury.

People v. Marion

Illinois Appellate Court
Criminal Court
Witnesses
Citation
Case Number: 
2015 IL App (1st) 131011
Decision Date: 
Tuesday, May 12, 2015
District: 
1st Dist.
Division/County: 
Cook Co., 2d Div.
Holding: 
Reversed.
Justice: 
NEVILLE
(Modified upon denial of rehearing 5/12/15.) State failed to offer any credible rebuttal to Defendant's credible testimony, and Defendant thus sufficiently proved that he produced guns in response to police officer's promise not to arrest him in exchange for getting guns off the street. Police have authority to agree not to arrest a suspect in exchange for cooperation with police work, and officer's agreement with Defendant was thus enforceable.(SIMON and LIU, concurring.)

People v. Pettis

Illinois Appellate Court
Criminal Court
Search & Seizure
Citation
Case Number: 
2015 IL App (4th) 140176
Decision Date: 
Thursday, May 14, 2015
District: 
4th Dist.
Division/County: 
Champaign Co.
Holding: 
Reversed and remanded.
Justice: 
HOLDER WHITE
Defendant was charged by information with armed habitual criminal, aggravated unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon, and reckless discharge of a firearm. Judge issuing search warrant had substantial basis to conclude probable cause existed. Officers responded to "shots fired" call in early morning, and suspect had fled scene, and officers had information on suspect, incident, and vehicle from an identified witness, and judge drew reasonable inference from affidavits that Defendant violated law and that evidence of crime committed could be found inside his residence. Good-faith exception arises only after court determines that search warrant was improperly issued for lack of probable cause. (HARRIS, concurring; APPLETON, dissenting.)

People v. Sebby

Illinois Appellate Court
Criminal Court
Voir Dire
Citation
Case Number: 
2015 IL App (3d) 130214
Decision Date: 
Monday, April 27, 2015
District: 
3d Dist.
Division/County: 
LaSalle Co.
Holding: 
Affirmed.
Justice: 
SCHMIDT
(Court opinion corrected 5/18/15.) Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of resisting a peace officer. Court's question to potential jurors whether they had any "problems" with the Zehr principles of law failed to sufficiently comply with Rule 431(b), and constituted clear error. Evidence was not so closely balanced that court's error warrants reversal under plain-error doctrine. Prosecutor's statement, "There are no statements made by any defense witnesses to any law enforcement about what happened that day.", is within bounds of acceptable argument, and was not a comment on Defendant's postarrest silence. (HOLDRIDGE, specially concurring; O'BRIEN, dissenting.)

When ‘Or’ Means ‘And’: A Trap for Criminal Appeals

By Timothy J. Ting
June
2015
Article
, Page 40
Criminal defense lawyers who appeal judgments entered after guilty pleas must certify that they have consulted their client about claims of error in both the guilty plea and sentence.

U.S. v. Boatman

Federal 7th Circuit Court
Criminal Court
Sentencing
Citation
Case Number: 
No. 14-2081
Decision Date: 
May 15, 2015
Federal District: 
N.D. Ill., E. Div.
Holding: 
Affirmed
Dist. Ct. did not err in imposing 76-month, below-Guidelines, term of incarceration on bank robbery charge, even though defendant maintained that Dist. Ct. had failed to seriously consider his argument that more appropriate sentence of time served (i.e., 24 months) with community-based drug treatment was more appropriate sentence. While Dist. Ct. did not review on record extensive evidence regarding drug-treatment programs submitted by defendant in support of his sentence recommendation, Dist. Ct. provided sufficient explanation for rationale of instant sentence, where Dist. Ct. indicated that he had considered “significant focus” of defendant’s evidence submissions, which led to decision to impose below-Guidelines sentence. Moreover, Dist. Ct. was entitled to find that need for retribution and to incapacitate defendant required longer term of incarceration than what defendant had recommended.

Pidgeon v. Smith

Federal 7th Circuit Court
Criminal Court
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Citation
Case Number: 
No. 14-3158
Decision Date: 
May 13, 2015
Federal District: 
W.D. Wisc.
Holding: 
Affirmed
Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendant’s habeas petition challenging his guilty plea to sexual assault charge, where defendant alleged that his trial counsel was ineffective for erroneously advising him that his prior aggravated battery conviction was “serious felony” under Wisc. law so as to make him eligible for mandatory life sentence for instant sexual assault charge. Record showed that counsel’s performance was unconstitutionally ineffective, where defendant’s prior aggravated battery conviction did not qualify as “serious felony,” and Dist. Ct. could properly accept defendant’s unrebutted testimony that he would not have entered into guilty plea had he been given accurate advice about status of his prior aggravated battery conviction. Fact that defendant’s trial counsel did not testify at habeas hearing did not require different result, even though Wisc. law required trial counsel to testify at said hearing had hearing been held in Wisc. state court.

People v. Ross

Illinois Appellate Court
Criminal Court
Postconviction Petitions
Citation
Case Number: 
2015 IL App (1st) 120089
Decision Date: 
Friday, May 8, 2015
District: 
1st Dist.
Division/County: 
Cook Co., 5th Div.
Holding: 
Reversed and remanded with instructions.
Justice: 
GORDON
Defendant was convicted, after bench trial, of being an armed habitual criminal and sentenced to 80 months imprisonment. Court erred when it summarily dismissed Defendant's pro se postconviction petition in the first stage because affidavit of Defendant's teenage son is newly discovered evidence, and Defendant's due process rights were not violated as Defendant's term of MSR was imposed by operation of law. (McBRIDE, concurring; PALMER, specially concurring.)

People v. Walker

Illinois Appellate Court
Criminal Court
Jury Instructions
Citation
Case Number: 
2015 IL App (1st) 130500
Decision Date: 
Monday, May 11, 2015
District: 
1st Dist.
Division/County: 
Cook Co.,1st Div.
Holding: 
Affirmed.
Justice: 
CUNNINGHAM
Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of first degree murder and sentenced to 42 years. Whether Defendant was armed with a firearm was not submitted to jury as aggravating factor for felony murder, and thus court erred in imposing 15-year firearm enhancement. Error was harmless, as evidence that Defendant was armed with a firearm at time he committed felony murder was uncontested and overwhelming. Court had statutory authority to impose firearm enhancement. (DELORT and HARRIS, concurring.)