Criminal Law

This case presents question as to whether trial court properly denied defendant’s post-conviction petition challenging his natural life sentence on 1994 first degree murder charge, where trial court had denied his request for separate jury verdict forms to account for various murder theories, as required under Smith, 223 Ill.2d 1 (2009). Appellate Court, in reversing trial court, found that rule announce in Smith was substantive matter that required that it be applied retroactively to defendant’s 1997 trial. As such, Appellate Court held that defendant was entitled to vacatur of his natural life sentence on general first degree murder charge in favor of new sentence on defendant’s felony murder charge, which represented least culpable form of murder that had been charged in case. In its petition for leave to appeal, State argued that Smith could not be applied retroactively.

This case presents question as to whether trial court properly suppressed drugs seized from defendant’s apartment pursuant to search warrant, where, prior to warrant’s issuance, police had used drug detection dog in hallway outside defendant’s apartment, and where said dog’s alert to presence of drugs while situated outside defendant’s door formed part of information used to support issuance of warrant. Appellate Court, in affirming trial court, found that warrantless use of drug dog in apartment hallway violated defendant’s 4th Amendment rights under Jardines, 133 S.Ct. 1409. It further rejected State’s claim that Jardines was limited to individuals living in single-family residences, as opposed to individuals living in multi-unit dwellings, where, according to State, such residents do not have expectation of privacy in common areas of apartment buildings.

This case presents question as to whether defendant asserted gist of viable constitutional claim in his post-conviction petition, alleging that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to argue that trial court erred in excluding testimony regarding minor’s conversation with chaplain that arguably contained minor’s confession to underlying murder charge, where chaplain had indicated willingness to reveal substance of said conversations. Appellate Court, in reversing trial court’s first-stage dismissal of post-conviction petition, found that defendant adequately stated gist of constitutional claim, and that trial court in underlying murder trial had erred in barring testimony regarding minor’s conversation with chaplain on grounds that said conversations were privileged where: (1) although minor attempted to assert privilege by objecting to chaplain testifying to substance of his conversations with chaplain, chaplain indicated willingness to give such testimony; (2) under section 8-803 of Code of Civil Procedure, burden then shifted to minor to show that chaplain’s disclosure was prohibited by rules of his religion; and (3) chaplain testified that rules of his religion did not prohibit disclosure of contents of minor’s conversation, and minor did not offer any contrary evidence on said topic.

This case presents question in instant prosecution (that resulted in guilty finding on first degree murder charge) as to whether trial court properly refused defendant’s request to instruct jury on provocation theory of second degree murder or involuntary manslaughter offenses. Appellate Court, in affirming trial court, found that defendant’s stabbing of unarmed victim precluded jury from finding existence of “mutual combat” that is required for purposes of instructing jury on any second degree murder offense. Ct. further found that defendant's intentional act of stabbing victim also precluded trial court from giving jury involuntary manslaughter instruction, since such instruction would be appropriate only if record showed that defendant was reckless, and since defendant’s intentional act rendered his conduct more than “reckless.”

This case presents question as to whether trial court properly denied defendant’s post-conviction petition, where defendant alleged that his privately-retained, post-conviction counsel was ineffective for failing to contest State’s assertion that untimely filing of instant post-conviction petition was due to defendant’s culpable negligence. Appellate Court, in affirming instant dismissal, found that Post-Conviction Hearing Act does not require/guarantee reasonable assistance of privately-retained counsel, and thus defendant had failed to state cognizable claim. (Dissent filed.)