Criminal Law

Record contained sufficient evidence to support Dist. Ct.’s entry of forfeiture order with respect to three pieces of defendants’ property, even though third-party claimed superior interest in said properties. Instant properties were used by defendants to support their criminal racketeering activities on behalf of Outlaw gang, and third-party could cite to only equitable interests in said properties pertaining to his care-taking duties that arose after commission of acts giving right to underlying RICO charges. In this respect, third-party failed to show that he had legal right, title or interest to said properties and that such interests arose prior to commission of acts giving right to RICO charges.

In prosecution on drug distribution charge, Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant’s motion to suppress drugs found in two hidden compartments of defendant’s car, after: (1) police had initially stopped defendant, unsuccessfully searched his car for ten minutes, and waited additional 20 minutes for arrival of canine unit; and (2) when canine unit failed to arrive, defendant drove his car to police station and eventually showed police location of hidden compartments. Police had reasonable suspicion to stop defendant to investigate presence of drugs where: (1) police had previously observed defendant interacting with two individuals who were subject of ongoing drug-trafficking investigation; and (2) after said interaction, police observed defendant enter his car and engage in certain maneuvers indicating existence of trap compartments in his car. Moreover, length of time following initial stop to time of drug discovery did not transform initial stop into de facto arrest, where officers detained defendant for less than 20 minutes prior to defendant giving officers consent to search his car. Also, defendant’s encounter with officers was not custodial in nature so as to require immediate giving of Miranda warning, where encounter took place in public view and officers allowed defendant to drive his car to police station.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing defendant’s section 2254 habeas petition, after finding that defendant had procedurally defaulted on claims in said petition because he had failed to present claims in petition for review with Wisc. Supreme Ct. While defendant argued that such default should have been excused because his failure to file petition for review with Wisc. Supreme Ct. was because prison Business Office had improperly denied his request for loan to cover expenses associated with said petition, Dist. Ct. could properly find that defendant failed to show that denial of his loan request was objective impediment to his ability to comply with state court’s procedural rules or that said denial actually prevented him from filing state-court petition for review. Also, Ct. of Appeals found that defendant was not entitled to seek habeas relief to resolve state-law question as to whether prison officials had improperly denied his loan request, where defendant failed to show that state court had ruled on said question, and where it would be improper for federal court to rule on said issue based solely on its own interpretation of state prison policy.

Dist. Ct. erred in sentencing defendant to 10 years of supervised release, after finding that defendant had violated terms of his probation on drug offense, where Dist. Ct. had failed to either determine guideline range for term of supervised release applicable to defendant’s case or decide whether instant 3-year minimum statutory term of supervised release was appropriate in light of sentencing factors contained in 18 USC section 3553(a). Ct. further directed Dist. Ct. to revisit its imposition of 21 conditions of supervised release and to draft more clear conditions with respect to requirements that defendant provide financial support for his dependents, refrain from use of excessive alcohol, and refrain from associating with persons engaged in criminal activity.