Criminal Law

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of four counts of armed robbery while armed with a firearm. Court's pretrial admonishments failed to substantially comply with Rule 401(a) prior to accepting Defendant's waiver of counsel, as court never gave accurate statement of maximum punishment prior to waiver of counsel, and no evidence that Defendant was aware of penalty. At hearing on record outside presence of jury, with codefendant present, codefendant invoked his right not to testify under fifth amendment, and he was thus unavailable to testify for purposes of Rule 804(b)(3). However, Defendant failed to establish conditions for admissibility under Rule 804(b)(3) and thus court properly excluded codefendant's statement. Evidence was sufficient to find Defendant guilty of armed robbery with a firearm beyond a reasonable doubt. Even though witnesses viewed only the handle of the gun, their testimonies as to their having viewed guns before, and ample opportunity to view weapon at close distance, was sufficient identification.(FITZGERALD SMITH and ELLIS, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after second jury trial, of first-degree murder. Witness' prior inconsistent statements contained in his written statement and grand jury testimony were properly admitted as substantive evidence. Written statement, signed by witness, described events of shooting to which he was eyewitness. Statements that phrase "you stretched buddy" meant that Defendant killed the victim, in witness' prior written statement and grand jury testimony, met requirements of Rule 701, and thus were properly admitted. Other statements, which did not describe any misconduct or criminal acts committed by Defendant but only witness' observations that he had seen Defendant in possession of some guns at some unknown time, were not other-crimes evidence.(DELORT and HARRIS, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after bench trial, of home invasion while armed with a dangerous weapon, robbery, attempted robbery, and unlawful restraint. As information charging Defendant with home invasion "while armed with a firearm" did not state a "broad foundation" or "main outline" of home invasion while armed with a dangerous weapon other than a firearm, court erred in convicting Defendant of uncharged offense of home invasion with a dangerous weapon other than a firearm. Home invasion with a dangerous weapon is not a lesser-included offense of home invasion with a firearm.(SIMON and PIERCE, concurring.)

Defendant, age 17 at time of offenses, was convicted, after stipulated bench trial, of first-degree murder and attempted murder. Defendant was sentenced to 50 years on murder charge, which exceeded statutory minimum by 5 years; and 40 years on attempted murder charge, which exceeded statutory minimum by 9 years. Defendant argues, on appeal, that mandatory minimum sentences are unconstitutional under U.S. Supreme Court decision prohibiting offenders under age 18 from receiving mandatory life sentences, but Defendant cannot argue that a sentence he did not actually receive is unconstitutional. Juvenile confession should not be suppressed simply because juvenile was denied opportunity to confer with concerned adult; and conflicting accounts as to whether he requested to speak with his mother.(HOLDRIDGE, concurring; WRIGHT, concurring in part and dissenting in part.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of armed robbery and unlawful vehicular invasion. Jury instructions properly identified standard of reasonable doubt, and cured any possible error in court's comments prior to instructions.Extradition proceedings were procedural, aimed at transferring Defendant to Illinois pursuant to arrest warrant, and thus there was no judicial involvement in adversary proceedings against him, and no sixth amendment right to counsel yet attached. Court properly denied defendant's motion to suppress identification, and no plain error. Defense counsel's analogy, in closing argument, comparing reasonable doubt standard to a football game fell below objective standard of reasonableness, but Defendant suffered no prejudice as jury instructions after closing arguments cured any potential confusion as to reasonable doubt.(SIMON and LIU, concurring.)

(Court opinion corrected 5/19/15.) Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of aggravated robbery, and was found extended-term eligible based, in part, on prior adjudication of juvenile delinquency referenced in presentence investigation report (PSI). Prior juvenile petition alleged three counts of residential burglary. Prior adjudication of delinquency is sufficiently analogous to prior conviction so as to fall under exception to Apprendi v. New Jersey rule that except for prior convictions, any fact that increases penalty for crime beyond statutory maximum must be submitted to jury. Thus, fact of prior adjudication may be determined by sentencing court through reference to PSI. (HOLDRIDGE and LYTTON, concurring.)

In June 2013, Defendant was indicted on criminal sexual assault and criminal sexual abuse charges for acts he allegedly committed when he was age 17. In July 2013, Governor approved legislation, which became effective January 1, 2014, which amended exclusive jurisdiction provision of Juvenile Court Act to apply to minors under age 18. Amendment included saving clause stating that amendment applies to violations committed on or after its effective date. Amendment's saving clause does not violate equal protection, as it is rationally related to its purpose of including 17-year-olds within jurisdiction of Juvenile Court Act in manner to avoid confusion and delay and to preserve judicial resources. (GARMAN, THOMAS, KILBRIDE, KARMEIER, BURKE, and THEIS, concurring.)