Federal Civil Practice

Dist. Ct. did not commit reversible error in removing plaintiff-committed sex offender from his trial on section 1983 claim, where: (1) Dist. Ct. stated that its customary practice was to remove all incarcerated parties for purposes of transporting said parties back to their facilities; (2) instant removal came after closing arguments were made and after jury was sent to deliberate on plaintiff’s case; and (3) any removal of plaintiff could not have affected jury deliberations. Ct. further noted that plaintiff was represented by law students who were present when jury returned verdict in defendants’ favor. Fact that instant removal took place off the record did not require different result. Moreover, plaintiff was not entitled to new trial, even though his removal deprived him of his right to poll jury, since: (1) plaintiff had legal representatives to make any polling request on his behalf; (2) Dist. Ct. had instructed jurors that they were to render unanimous verdict, and all jurors signed verdict form; and (3) jury did not submit any questions to parties after they were sent to deliberate on matter.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-City officials’ motion for summary judgment in plaintiff-African-American’s section 1983 action alleging that defendant’s placement of him in repeat violent offender program that called for increased surveillance while he was on probation violated his equal protection rights. Although African-Americans represented only 4.5% of City’s population while African-Americans represented 86% of participants in subject program, instant statistics did not establish that program had discriminatory effect or that defendants were motivated by discriminatory purpose, since: (1) instant statistics did not address whether African-Americans repeat violent offenders were treated differently from white repeat violent offenders; (2) while instant statistics showed existence of disparate impact on African-Americans participants, statistics alone rarely establish proof of discriminatory purpose; and (3) plaintiff failed to present evidence indicating either number of African-American repeat violent offenders who qualified for instant program, but were not chosen, or number of white repeat violent offenders chosen for program compared to number of white repeat violent offenders who could have been chosen. Plaintiff also could not establish any due process claim, since: (1) program’s requirement that he attend one notification meeting did not deprive him of his liberty as probationer without due process; and (2) surveillance conducted under program was authorized under terms of plaintiff’s probation.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-prosecutor and certain detectives’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s section 1983 action alleging that defendants’ decision to incarcerate her for period of 12 days violated her constitutional rights because police lacked probable cause to arrest her and because her continued incarceration was done for improper purpose of building criminal case against her. Record showed that plaintiff had been convicted of charges relating to hiding of murder victim’s body and had received two-year sentence that gave her credit for instant 12-day period at issue in her complaint. As such, receipt of instant sentencing credit on lawful sentence precluded plaintiff from obtaining any damages on her unlawful detention claim or claim that defendants had failed to provide her with prompt probable cause hearing. Also, defendants-detectives were entitled to qualified immunity on plaintiff’s false arrest claim, since said defendants could reasonably have believed that plaintiff had helped to hide murder victim’s body, where defendants knew at time of plaintiff’s arrest that: (1) video-tape indicated that plaintiff and another person had purchased shower curtain and hooks on day victim went missing; (2) witnesses had indicated that shower curtain in victim’s bathroom had been replaced after victim went missing; (3) defendant had access to victim’s home, and defendant admitted to being in victim’s home; and (4) police had discovered projectile from victim’s bathtub plumbing pipe.

Dist. Ct. erred in denying defendant-police officer’s motion for summary judgment in plaintiff’s section 1983 action, alleging that defendant used excessive force when handcuffing plaintiff during 30-minute period of time that defendant and other officers were investigating report from third-party that plaintiff had fired gun during road rage incident. After defendant had received third-party’s report, he encountered plaintiff’s car that matched description given by third-party and conducted “high risk traffic stop” that required that he place handcuffs on plaintiff during his investigation until other officers brought third-party to scene to make identification. As such, defendant was entitled to qualified immunity on instant excessive force claim, where: (1) third-party raised serious allegations that involved use of deadly force, which supported defendant‘s decision to place plaintiff in handcuffs; and (2) record showed that third-party affirmatively identified plaintiff as perpetrator, although plaintiff was eventually released when police could not locate firearm in plaintiff’s car. Moreover, plaintiff never told defendant during his detention that he was in pain or was actually suffering because of use of handcuffs.

Dist. Ct. erred in granting defendants-prison officials’ motion for summary judgment in plaintiff-prisoner’s section 1983 action alleging that defendants had failed to prevent assault by his cellmate or properly treat his broken ankle, where basis for ruling was Dist. Ct.’s finding that plaintiff had failed to exhaust prison’s internal remedies prior to filing instant lawsuit. Dismissal was premature, where, although plaintiff had failed to file amended grievance within applicable time frame and had failed to appeal adverse ruling on his second administrative complaint regarding plaintiff’s broken ankle, record showed that any administrative remedies were unavailable to plaintiff, since plaintiff lacked access to necessary forms to prosecute said internal claims, where plaintiff had been transferred to different facility to treat his mental illness at time when plaintiff was to file said internal grievances. Moreover, plaintiff was under influence of psychotropic drugs at all relevant times and was otherwise unaware of rejection of his second administrative complaint.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendant’s motion for summary judgment in plaintiff’s action alleging that defendant committed fraud by tricking plaintiff into believing that they were validly married, when, in fact, although they participated in marriage ceremony, they had failed to file marriage license within statutory time frame for doing so as required under California law. Record showed that defendant had informed plaintiff at some point after ceremony that she suspected that they were not validly married and insisted that they obtain another marriage license, and although plaintiff asserted that defendant had falsely reassured him that they were legally married in effort to obtain interest in condominium from plaintiff, any reliance on defendant’s alleged statements was not reasonable, where plaintiff learned from county recorder shortly after marriage ceremony that original marriage license had not been filed as required under California law.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting motion by two foreign banks, who had branches in Chicago, Illinois, to quash subpoenas served on them by plaintiffs, who had previously received $67 million default judgment against defendant-Iran, where plaintiffs sought information as to whether said banks had any Iranian assets located in banks’ overseas branch banks. Record showed that instant banks’ 17 branch banks in U.S. did not have any Iranian assets, and Ct. of Appeals agreed with banks that Dist. Ct. lacked personal jurisdiction over banks’ foreign home offices or over banks' approximately 7,500 branch banks located overseas so as to have overseas branch banks be subject to instant subpoena. As such, plaintiffs will be required to go overseas to seek information about Iranian assets from said overseas branch banks. Ct. further questioned why plaintiffs filed suit to enforce their judgment in instant Dist. Ct., where plaintiffs were not residents of Illinois.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing under Rooker-Feldman Doctrine series of federal actions, including actions under RESPA, RICO and FDCPA, filed by plaintiff-homeowner that essentially alleged that defendant-bank committed fraud when foreclosing on plaintiff’s home. Record showed that state court had previously granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment that was filed in foreclosure action, and thus Dist. Ct. lacked jurisdiction to consider plaintiff’s actions to extent they would overturn state-court foreclosure order if said actions were resolved in plaintiff’s favor. Ct. further found that notions of issue preclusion similarly precluded plaintiff from proceeding on his RESPA, TILA and FDCPA actions, since said claims relied on issues that were already decided in state foreclosure action. Dist. Ct. erred, though, in dismissing plaintiff’s actions with prejudice, since any dismissal pursuant to Rooker-Feldman doctrine must be without prejudice.

Dist. Ct. erred in granting defendants-prison officials’ motion to dismiss plaintiff-former prisoner’s section 1983 action, alleging that defendants violated plaintiff’s First Amendment rights by retaliating against him when they revoked his good-time credits in three separate prison disciplinary proceedings. While Dist. Ct. believed that plaintiff’s lawsuit was barred by Heck, 512 U.S. 477, because plaintiff had not exhausted all potential collateral relief regarding said revocations while he was still in custody, Ct. of Appeals found that Heck did not apply, since: (1) plaintiff was not making procedural challenge to prison disciplinary hearings; (2) section 1983 contained no exhaustion element that required plaintiff to seek all potential collateral relief prior to his release from prison; and (3) record showed that plaintiff had attempted to seek habeas relief with respect to instant revocations prior to his release from prison.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-prison medical officials’ motion for summary judgment in section 1983 action alleging that defendants were deliberately indifferent to his symptoms of alcohol withdrawal. While plaintiff experienced on and off symptoms of alcohol withdrawal that included bouts of delusion and paranoia, as well as eventual dehydration, sepsis and acute respiratory failure, plaintiff failed to present evidence suggesting that orders given by defendant-prison doctor were medically deficient, especially where said defendant received reports from others about plaintiff’s condition and sent plaintiff to hospital on two occasions. Moreover, record suggested that plaintiff’s alcohol withdrawal symptoms progressed even though said symptoms had been managed appropriately.