Federal Civil Practice

Dist. Ct. did not err in entering judgment in plaintiff’s favor in ERISA action against defendant seeking delinquent contributions to plaintiff’s multi-employer health and welfare fund, where: (1) Magistrate Judge entered default judgment due to defendant’s failure to file answer to complaint; (2) defendant failed to file Rule 55(c) motion to vacate default judgment; and (3) defendant filed untimely motion for extension of time to file answer and subsequently filed motion to stay proceedings in favor of conducting arbitration. Entry of judgment was appropriate, where at time Dist. Ct. considered damages issue, defendant had not answered complaint, filed any Rule 55(c) motion or contested plaintiff’s evidentiary submission for relief, and once Dist. Ct. entered its judgment, time to seek relief for good cause under Rule 55(c) had expired. Fact that defendant conducted settlement negotiations during course of instant litigation did not require different result, since defendant could have filed answer and asked Dist. Ct. to stay matter for purpose of conducting settlement negotiations.

Dist. Ct. erred in refusing to approve settlement of personal injury claim involving minor, where basis of refusal was terms of plaintiff’s contingent fee agreement calling for counsel’s receipt of one-third of gross settlement, while all litigation expenses would be covered by plaintiff’s share of agreement, and where terms of contingency agreement resulted in plaintiff receiving only 42 percent of gross settlement. While Dist. Ct. indicated that it would only approve settlement if litigation expenses were deducted from gross settlement and plaintiff’s attorneys received one-third of net settlement and if computerized-research fees were removed as compensable litigation expense, Ct. of Appeals observed that: (1) amount of fees produced by agreement did not exceed market value of attorneys’ services or violate reasonableness test set forth in Rule 1.5 of Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct; and (2) Dist. Ct. made no finding that amount plaintiff received under contingency-fee contract was inadequate to address minor’s future needs. Moreover, Dist. Ct.’s belief that instant fee agreement was contract of adhesion was not supported by record, where there was no evidence of coercion or overreaching. Dist. Ct., though, did not err in excluding computerized-research costs as recoverable expense in instant contingent-fee setting.

Dist. Ct. erred in dismissing on collateral estoppel grounds plaintiff’s ADA action alleging that defendants-state court officials failed to accommodate plaintiff’s tardive dyskinesia, which, according to plaintiff, prevented her from effectively proceeding in her state-court lawsuit against third-party due to its effect on her ability to communicate within courtroom. Record showed that plaintiff raised her ADA claim in post-trial motion in her state-court action, and that state court had denied plaintiff’s request for such relief, and that appellate court had affirmed jury’s verdict. Moreover, while Ct. of Appeals found that all elements of collateral estoppel had been technically satisfied, Dist. Ct. should not have applied it because: (1) state trial court had unfairly denied certain requested accommodations; and (2) plaintiff’s disability prevented her from participating in oral argument on her post-trial motion, which, in turn, prevented her from having full and fair opportunity to litigate her accommodation issue in state-court proceeding. (Dissent filed.)

Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant-detective’s motion for summary judgment alleging qualified immunity in section 1983 action asserting that defendant’s installation of hidden surveillance camera in female changing area in plaintiff’s workplace constituted violation of her 4th Amendment rights as unlawful search. Scope of employee’s 4th Amendment rights to be free from unreasonable searches in workplace was clearly established at time of installation of hidden camera. Moreover, reasonable official would have known that installation of hidden camera in changing area was unreasonable. Ct. further rejected defendant’s claim that instant section 1983 claim was precluded by either Civil Service Reform Act and/or Federal Employee’s Compensation Act.

Dist. Ct. did not err in denying plaintiffs’ request for issuance of preliminary injunction in action under ADA and section 504 of Rehabilitation Act seeking to bar defendant from: (1) assessing disabled residents living in state-operated developmental center (SODC) in Centralia for purpose of potential placement of said individuals in community-based facilities; and (2) closing Centralia SODC during pendency of underlying lawsuit, under circumstances where underlying lawsuit essentially challenged defendant’s decision to close Centralia SODC. Plaintiff failed to show existence of irreparable harm during pendency of lawsuit so as to support issuance of preliminary injunction, where: (1) guardians of instant residents had ability to block any transfer to community-based facility; (2) plaintiffs conceded that they had no right to placement at Centralia SODC; and (3) said residents could be placed in other SODCs, should Centralia facility ever close. Ct. further noted that: (1) plaintiffs had failed to establish that residents of community-based facilities are treated on average worse than residents living in SODCs; and (2) grant of preliminary injunction would impose costs on defendant that could not be recouped.

Ct. of Appeal lacked jurisdiction to consider petitioner’s appeal of order of NTSB that denied petitioner’s request to rescind Factual Report issued by NTSB regarding information it had gathered during investigation of helicopter crash, where petitioner argued that Factual Report had omitted significant information that prevented NTSB from making accurate determination of probable cause of said crash. Petitioner could not base instant appeal on 49 USC section 1153, where said section required existence of final order, and instant Factual Report was not final order, where: (1) there was no legal consequence of any kind that stemmed from issuance of said Report, which was otherwise used by NTSB to make recommendations to prevent similar accident in future; and (2) no part of said Report could be admitted into evidence or used in any civil proceeding for damages resulting from matters mentioned in said Report. Fact that petitioner claimed that it would receive reputational harm if Report were published was immaterial and could not transform instant Report into final agency order.

Dist. Ct. erred in denying defendants’ motion for summary judgment alleging qualified immunity and failure to state claim in plaintiff-prisoner’s section 1983 action alleging that defendants violated plaintiff’s 8th Amendment rights by withholding certain prescribed drugs that caused him unnecessary pain and by failing to accommodate his need for second mattress in his cell, as well as his need for physical therapy. Instant two-day delay in giving plaintiff his drugs was insufficient to establish constitutional violation, and any failure of defendants to contact plaintiff’s primary physician for new prescription for narcotic drug to treat plaintiff’s pain did not amount to deliberate indifference where medical defendants’ refusal to prescribe said drug in favor of non-narcotic substitute was nothing more than difference of medical opinion. Also failure to provide plaintiff with second mattress/physical therapy did not amount to cruel or unusual punishment where plaintiff’s treating physician concluded that second mattress was unnecessary, and defendants actually followed physician’s recommendations for plaintiff’s physical therapy.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendant-police officer’s motion for summary judgment in section 1983 action alleging that defendant used excessive force when tackling plaintiff during incident in which defendant and another police officer were attempting to arrest plaintiff’s son, who was actively resisting other officer. Reasonable inference from various versions of incident indicated that: (1) defendant tackled plaintiff as plaintiff was approaching other officer who was struggling with plaintiff’s son or within seconds after plaintiff had approached said officer; and (2) plaintiff had previously communicated that he was afraid that other officer was going to kill his son. Moreover, instant tackle of plaintiff could not be viewed as excessive force, where it was reasonable for defendant to believe that plaintiff, who was within four feet of other officer, was attempting to interfere with lawful arrest.

Dist. Ct. erred in dismissing section 1983 action by plaintiff-civilly detained individual under Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act, where plaintiff alleged that defendants-prison officials fired him from his job in prison’s dietary services dept. in retaliation for having previously filed lawsuit against members of prison’s staff. While Dist. Ct., in screening plaintiff’s action pursuant to 28 USC section 1915(e)(2), found that said action failed to state viable claim, Dist. Ct. did so only after conducting private telephone call with plaintiff without recording said call so as to allow Ct. of Appeals ability to review said telephone call to determine whether Dist. Ct. had properly asked questions to clarify essence of plaintiff’s complaint or whether Dist. Ct. had improperly elicited from plaintiff responses that would enable Dist. Ct. to resolve what would otherwise be contestable factual issues.

Dist. Ct. erred in dismissing plaintiff-prisoner’s section 1983 action alleging that defendants-prison officials inflicted cruel and unusual punishment by verbally harassing him when directing comments at him that suggested that he was homosexual and by urinating in his presence, where Dist. Ct. based dismissal on erroneous belief that verbal harassment by itself was insufficient to establish 8th Amendment violation. Plaintiff’s allegations were sufficient to establish viable claim, where plaintiff argued that calling him homosexual increased likelihood that other inmates would sexually assault him, and where he alleged that he sought psychological assistance to address harm incurred as result of harassment. Ct. further observed that Dist. Ct. should have sought clarification of instant allegations from plaintiff prior to dismissing complaint.