Federal Civil Practice

Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant-detective’s motion for summary judgment alleging qualified immunity in section 1983 action asserting that defendant’s installation of hidden surveillance camera in female changing area in plaintiff’s workplace constituted violation of her 4th Amendment rights as unlawful search. Scope of employee’s 4th Amendment rights to be free from unreasonable searches in workplace was clearly established at time of installation of hidden camera. Moreover, reasonable official would have known that installation of hidden camera in changing area was unreasonable. Ct. further rejected defendant’s claim that instant section 1983 claim was precluded by either Civil Service Reform Act and/or Federal Employee’s Compensation Act.

Dist. Ct. did not err in denying plaintiffs’ request for issuance of preliminary injunction in action under ADA and section 504 of Rehabilitation Act seeking to bar defendant from: (1) assessing disabled residents living in state-operated developmental center (SODC) in Centralia for purpose of potential placement of said individuals in community-based facilities; and (2) closing Centralia SODC during pendency of underlying lawsuit, under circumstances where underlying lawsuit essentially challenged defendant’s decision to close Centralia SODC. Plaintiff failed to show existence of irreparable harm during pendency of lawsuit so as to support issuance of preliminary injunction, where: (1) guardians of instant residents had ability to block any transfer to community-based facility; (2) plaintiffs conceded that they had no right to placement at Centralia SODC; and (3) said residents could be placed in other SODCs, should Centralia facility ever close. Ct. further noted that: (1) plaintiffs had failed to establish that residents of community-based facilities are treated on average worse than residents living in SODCs; and (2) grant of preliminary injunction would impose costs on defendant that could not be recouped.

Ct. of Appeal lacked jurisdiction to consider petitioner’s appeal of order of NTSB that denied petitioner’s request to rescind Factual Report issued by NTSB regarding information it had gathered during investigation of helicopter crash, where petitioner argued that Factual Report had omitted significant information that prevented NTSB from making accurate determination of probable cause of said crash. Petitioner could not base instant appeal on 49 USC section 1153, where said section required existence of final order, and instant Factual Report was not final order, where: (1) there was no legal consequence of any kind that stemmed from issuance of said Report, which was otherwise used by NTSB to make recommendations to prevent similar accident in future; and (2) no part of said Report could be admitted into evidence or used in any civil proceeding for damages resulting from matters mentioned in said Report. Fact that petitioner claimed that it would receive reputational harm if Report were published was immaterial and could not transform instant Report into final agency order.

Dist. Ct. erred in denying defendants’ motion for summary judgment alleging qualified immunity and failure to state claim in plaintiff-prisoner’s section 1983 action alleging that defendants violated plaintiff’s 8th Amendment rights by withholding certain prescribed drugs that caused him unnecessary pain and by failing to accommodate his need for second mattress in his cell, as well as his need for physical therapy. Instant two-day delay in giving plaintiff his drugs was insufficient to establish constitutional violation, and any failure of defendants to contact plaintiff’s primary physician for new prescription for narcotic drug to treat plaintiff’s pain did not amount to deliberate indifference where medical defendants’ refusal to prescribe said drug in favor of non-narcotic substitute was nothing more than difference of medical opinion. Also failure to provide plaintiff with second mattress/physical therapy did not amount to cruel or unusual punishment where plaintiff’s treating physician concluded that second mattress was unnecessary, and defendants actually followed physician’s recommendations for plaintiff’s physical therapy.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendant-police officer’s motion for summary judgment in section 1983 action alleging that defendant used excessive force when tackling plaintiff during incident in which defendant and another police officer were attempting to arrest plaintiff’s son, who was actively resisting other officer. Reasonable inference from various versions of incident indicated that: (1) defendant tackled plaintiff as plaintiff was approaching other officer who was struggling with plaintiff’s son or within seconds after plaintiff had approached said officer; and (2) plaintiff had previously communicated that he was afraid that other officer was going to kill his son. Moreover, instant tackle of plaintiff could not be viewed as excessive force, where it was reasonable for defendant to believe that plaintiff, who was within four feet of other officer, was attempting to interfere with lawful arrest.

Dist. Ct. erred in dismissing section 1983 action by plaintiff-civilly detained individual under Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act, where plaintiff alleged that defendants-prison officials fired him from his job in prison’s dietary services dept. in retaliation for having previously filed lawsuit against members of prison’s staff. While Dist. Ct., in screening plaintiff’s action pursuant to 28 USC section 1915(e)(2), found that said action failed to state viable claim, Dist. Ct. did so only after conducting private telephone call with plaintiff without recording said call so as to allow Ct. of Appeals ability to review said telephone call to determine whether Dist. Ct. had properly asked questions to clarify essence of plaintiff’s complaint or whether Dist. Ct. had improperly elicited from plaintiff responses that would enable Dist. Ct. to resolve what would otherwise be contestable factual issues.

Dist. Ct. erred in dismissing plaintiff-prisoner’s section 1983 action alleging that defendants-prison officials inflicted cruel and unusual punishment by verbally harassing him when directing comments at him that suggested that he was homosexual and by urinating in his presence, where Dist. Ct. based dismissal on erroneous belief that verbal harassment by itself was insufficient to establish 8th Amendment violation. Plaintiff’s allegations were sufficient to establish viable claim, where plaintiff argued that calling him homosexual increased likelihood that other inmates would sexually assault him, and where he alleged that he sought psychological assistance to address harm incurred as result of harassment. Ct. further observed that Dist. Ct. should have sought clarification of instant allegations from plaintiff prior to dismissing complaint.

Dist. Ct. erred in dismissing portion of plaintiff-pre-trial detainee’s section 1983 action alleging that defendants-prison officials subjected him to inhumane conditions of confinement that included insufficient food portions, presence of rodents and filthy water. As pre-trial detainee, plaintiff was entitled to be free from conditions that amounted to punishment, and Dist. Ct. erred in failing to consider two letters submitted by pro se plaintiff that provided factual assertions regarding his conditions of confinement. Moreover, plaintiff’s claims that prison food was well below nutritional values, and that prison water was contaminated with cyanide and lead were sufficient to state cause of action. However, Dist. Ct. properly dismissed portion of instant complaint alleging that plaintiff’s $3 per-day wage for working in prison violated Fair Labor Standards Act (FSLA), since plaintiff was not “employee” of prison for purpose of coverage under FSLA. (Partial dissent filed.)

In breach of contract action alleging that defendants-Korean citizens unlawfully retained equipment that plaintiff had sent to defendants, Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants’ motion to vacate issuance of default judgment and to dismiss instant action after finding that it lacked personal jurisdiction over defendants. Fact that defendants formed contract with Illinois plaintiff was insufficient, by itself, to establish personal jurisdiction over defendants, and trips to Illinois by one defendant were also insufficient to establish personal jurisdiction where said trips were either irrelevant to formation of contract or were not taken for purpose of negotiating instant contract with plaintiff. Ct. further observed that instant contract was strictly Korean business deal, where defendants did not solicit plaintiff to enter into any agreement, and where original agreements were executed in Korea.

Dist. Ct. erred in dismissing for want of prosecution plaintiff-prisoner’s lawsuit alleging that defendants-prison officials failed to protect him from physical attack by other prisoners, where defendants filed motion to dismiss to address plaintiff’s refusal to sign medical release that would have allowed defendants unlimited access and use of all of plaintiff’s medical records, regardless of whether said records pertained to injuries sustained in instant attack. Dist. Ct. could not use Rule 41(b) to support instant dismissal, since plaintiff had not failed to comply with any rule or court order, and since defendants, if anything, should have filed motion to compel to address medical release issue. Moreover, defendants’ demand for instant unlimited access and use of plaintiff’s medical records was improper.