Federal Civil Practice

Dist. Ct. did not err in entering order turning Syrian assets over to plaintiffs-victims of state terrorism under Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), even though other claimants, who also were victims of state terrorism, believed they were entitled to said assets, where: (1) Dist. Ct. had entered judgment in plaintiff’s favor against Syria; (2) plaintiffs had registered their judgment and served citation to discover assets on December 8, 2011; and (3) plaintiffs had priority to said assets under Illinois law where claimants had not registered their judgment against Syria and served any citation to discover assets until approximately three years after plaintiffs had done so. Fact that plaintiffs had not complied with section 1608(e) of FSIA by serving copy of default judgment on Syria did not require different result since plaintiffs, as victims of state terrorism, had obtained their judgment under section 1605(a) of FSIA and complied with provisions contained in section 1610(g), but did not need to comply with section 1608(e).

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing plaintiff’s section 1983 action as sanction for plaintiff’s failure to attend her own deposition on two occasions. Dist. Ct. had warned plaintiff after she missed first deposition that he would dismiss her case if she missed second deposition, and plaintiff thereafter missed second deposition. Moreover, Dist. Ct. could properly reject plaintiff’s contention that she was unaware of second deposition, where her own attorney had emailed her details of said deposition, and where plaintiff left note at her attorney’s office indicating that she was aware of date of second deposition.

In action seeking recovery based on plaintiff-children’s exposure to vinyl cloride that had seeped into plaintiffs’ underground drinking water, Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing plaintiff’s action after granting defendant’s motion in limine to exclude all three of plaintiff’s proposed expert witnesses, who claimed existence of causal link between seepage of vinyl cloride and plaintiffs’ illnesses. Dist. Ct. could properly find that methodologies used by plaintiff’s experts were unreliable, where: (1) plaintiffs’ experts improperly linked plaintiffs’ illnesses on bare fact that plaintiffs were exposed to vinyl cloride at levels that exceeded applicable regulations; (2) articles relied upon by experts concerned levels of vinyl cloride that were greater than levels at issue in instant case; and (3) no expert established as initial matter why vinyl cloride should have been considered as possible cause of plaintiffs’ illnesses. Fact that there were no available studies that had examined impact of vinyl cloride on children did not require different result.

Dist. Ct. erred in denying defendants-police official and two odontologists’ motion for summary judgment in plaintiff’s section 1983 action alleging that defendants fabricated their medical opinions that linked plaintiff to bite marks on murder victim that resulted in plaintiff being wrongfully found guilty on murder charge and then suppressed evidence of said fabrication. Defendants were entitled to qualified immunity since plaintiff had established, at best, that defendants were mistaken in their opinions (and not that they knew that their opinions were wrong), and that said mistake was not actionable as violation of due process. Moreover, plaintiff could not establish any suppression of evidence claim since: (1) said claim was wholly dependent on allegation of fabrication; and (2) record showed that prosecution supplied plaintiff with defendants’ opinions and gave plaintiff list of other experts, and that one of said experts had actually agreed with defendants’ opinion that plaintiff was source of bite marks.

Dist. Ct. erred in dismissing plaintiff-prisoner’s section 1983 action alleging that defendants-prison officials were deliberately indifferent to plaintiff’s diabetic condition by failing to warn him that results of certain blood tests over period of years indicated that he was either diabetic or pre-diabetic, where basis of dismissal was Dist. Ct.’s belief that plaintiff’s complaint was filed beyond applicable two-year limitations period. Plaintiff alleged that he did not learn that his blood glucose counts were dangerously high until late 2010, and instant 2013 complaint was timely since relevant two-year limitations period was tolled during plaintiff’s efforts to pursue required internal prison administrative remedies.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendant-school district’s motion for summary judgment in section 1983 action by plaintiff-middle school student alleging that defendant failed to protect her from bullying allegedly committed by plaintiff’s classmates, and that various teachers and coaches were complicit in said bullying. Due Process Clause generally does not impose duty upon state to protect individuals from harm by private actors, and record failed to show that plaintiff’s teachers/coaches either instigated, created or increased bullying that plaintiff experienced at school. Also, plaintiff failed to establish class-of-one equal protection claim against different school district’s denial of her request to enroll in said school district, where plaintiff’s “tester” who claimed that enrollment was still open (although plaintiff had been told it was closed) did not actually attempt to enroll his child in said school district.

Dist. Ct. erred in granting defendants-prison officials' motion for judgment as matter of law at conclusion of plaintiff-prisoner’s case in chief in section 1983 action alleging that defendants violated plaintiff’s 8th Amendment rights by failing to protect him from stabbing attack by cellmate. By time plaintiff concluded his testimony at trial, jury could have found that, shortly before instant attack, plaintiff had expressly alerted three prison officials as to cellmate’s threats to stab him. As such, Dist. Ct. could not support instant grant of defendants’ motion on finding that prison officials were not subjectively aware of serious risk of harm to plaintiff. Ct. further rejected defendants’ argument that plaintiff could have reasonably avoided instant attack by violating prison rule by refusing to go to his cell and thereby subjecting himself to disciplinary segregation in order to obtain separation from cellmate.

Dist. Ct. did not err in finding in favor of defendants-prison officials in plaintiff-prisoner’s section 1983 action alleging that defendants’ failure to supply plaintiff with gloves and hat when plaintiff exercised outdoors in cold weather constituted 8th Amendment violation where plaintiff’s inability to exercise at such times resulted in exacerbation of his back condition. While plaintiff’s allegations held potential for 8th Amendment violation, record showed that defendants had issued plaintiff all clothing he was entitled to wear pursuant to prison policy, and plaintiff failed to further allege that defendants were aware that he needed gloves and hat to perform specific exercises that were required for his back condition.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-state officials’ motion for summary judgment in section 1983 and Title VI action alleging that defendants violated plaintiff-contractor’s equal protection rights and engaged in race discrimination when defendants refused to award plaintiff federally-funded road project contract because plaintiff, which was owned by two Caucasian males, had failed to meet goals regarding minimum percentage use of subcontractors that were owned by women or minorities as set forth in defendant’s Disadvantaged Business Enterprise (DBE) program, even though plaintiff was lowest bidder on said project. While record suggested that plaintiff’s bid was rejected for failing to meet DBE goal regarding minimum use of socially and economically disadvantaged individuals, plaintiff did not establish that it would have been awarded contract but for its failure to meet DBE goal since plaintiff’s bid was $1.3 million over program estimate. Ct. further noted that any racial or gender group could qualify as socially and economically disadvantage individual if its gross receipts from prior jobs was under certain level, and that plaintiff could not qualify as socially and economically disadvantaged company because it had made too much money. As such, plaintiff could not establish that race or gender of its owners was barrier to equal competition. Fact that defendant did not award contract to anyone and conducted second bidding process in which plaintiff, although meeting DBE goals, was not lowest bidder, did not require different result.

Dist. Ct. erred in granting defendants-certain prison medical officials’ motion for summary judgment in plaintiff-prisoner’s section 1983 action alleging that defendants were deliberately indifferent to his GERD condition by withholding free Zantac medication for 33 days and by administering Zantac at time of day when it would be ineffective to treat plaintiff’s pain. While defendant-treating physician testified that Zantac was not necessary to treat plaintiff’s condition, said physician failed to explain why he had prescribed Zantac for plaintiff for period of time, and certain medical evidence gleaned from Internet refuted physician’s statement that Zantac can be given at any time of day. Fact that pro se plaintiff failed to present any contrary evidence to dispute defendant-physician’s testimony did not require different result. Ct. further observed that defendant-treating physician could not testify as “expert,” where said physician was defendant in case and was not practicing in medical field at issue in case. (Dissent filed.)