Federal Civil Practice

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-prison officials’ motion for summary judgment in action alleging that defendants’ interception of plaintiff-prisoner’s pornographic magazines violated plaintiff’s First Amendment rights. Instant magazines contained pictures of naked or scantily clad women, as well as pictures of sexual acts, and plaintiff failed to present any evidence to counter opinion of former warden that instant magazines posed danger to prison because: (1) inmates would engage in black-market trading of pornography; (2) inmates would engage in more inmate-on-inmate violence; (3) female employees at prison would be objectified by inmates more often; and (4) inmates would engage in masturbation more frequently. Ct. observed, though, that defendants should have supported former warden’s opinions with data, and that other data existed that would dispute some claims made by warden.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-police official and County’s motion for summary judgment in section 1983 action alleging that defendant-officer subjected him false arrest and false imprisonment stemming from plaintiff’s arrest on charge of sexual assault of 11-year-old girl, which officer learned was false only after plaintiff had been arrested. While plaintiff argued that officer lacked probable cause to make warrantless arrest in his home, record showed that officer had consent to enter defendant’s home and had arguable probable cause to arrest him, for purposes of obtaining qualified immunity to instant lawsuit, where: (1) alleged victim repeated same detailed accusations to various individuals; (2) information given by alleged victim’s parents generally corroborated alleged victim’s story; (3) alleged victim’s picture of scene of assault generally matched plaintiff’s property; and (4) car trip in which plaintiff drove alleged victim to her home took over one hour longer than it should have taken. Moreover, while information gained by officer from MapQuest did not support alleged victim’s story, officer actually believed that various routes that she mapped on MapQuest supported alleged victim’s story. Also, officer was not required to wait until she received GPS data before arresting plaintiff, since law enforcement is not required to discover more information to undermine probable cause once it has been established. (Dissent filed.)

Dist. Ct. erred in denying plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunction seeking to have defendant cease his efforts at coercing credit card companies to prohibit their customers from using companies’ credit cards to purchase advertisements on plaintiff’s website, that included advertisements for “adult” services related to male, female and transsexual escorts, strippers and strip clubs and other jobs related to services offered in other adult categories. Record showed that: (1) defendant, while using his title as Cook County Sheriff, sent letter to credit card companies and requested that said companies “immediately cease and desist” from allowing individuals to use companies’ credit cards to place advertisements on plaintiff’s website; (2) defendant, while citing to federal money laundering statute, intimated that said credit card companies might be criminal accomplices to industry that victimizes women and girls; and (3) credit card companies agreed with defendant to stop allowing such use of their credits cards shortly after receiving defendant’s letter. As such, Ct. of Appeals found that preliminary injunction should have been entered against defendant where: (1) credit card companies were victims of govt. coercion that was aimed at shutting down plaintiff’s adult section on its website; and (2) defendant improperly employed threats of prosecution/sanctions for future speech, which was tantamount to unlawful prior restraint. Ct. further observed that although defendant as private citizen could denounce plaintiff’s actions in maintaining its website, he could not use his govt. title to make legal threats in effort to shut down website.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction to bar defendants-Tribal Entities from proceeding against plaintiffs in tribal court action seeking declaration that bonds sold by defendants to plaintiffs were invalid under Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA) as well as tribal law. Dist. Ct. could properly find that: (1) plaintiffs were not required to litigate bond dispute before tribal court prior to seeking redress in federal courts, where defendants had executed certain bond documents selecting non-tribal forum to resolve instant contractual dispute; and (2) defendants had waived sovereign immunity pursuant to waiver clauses in bond documents, even though defendants had claimed that entire bond transaction was product of fraudulent inducement. Ct. also rejected defendants’ claim that instant bond documents were void under IGRA as unapproved management contracts based on finding in prior lawsuit that other bonds documents had violated IGRA, where: (1) instant bond documents were only collateral to bond documents that had been viewed as unlawful management contract between parties; and (2) unlike bond documents in prior action, instant bond documents did not purport to reserve oversight over defendants’ casino operations. Also, under Montana, 450 US 544, tribal court lacked jurisdiction over plaintiffs, who were non-members of defendants’ tribe, where instant tribal action did not pertain to tribal self-government or control over tribe’s internal relations and did not seek redress for any of plaintiffs’ consensual activities on tribal land.

Dist. Ct. lacked jurisdiction over plaintiff’s qui tam action alleging that defendant-plaintiff’s former employer violated False Claims Act by improperly contracting services through subsidiary corporation and then falsely claiming that they satisfied all requirements necessary to receive federal funds. Record showed that any improprieties by defendant were previously revealed in audit of defendant, which counts as prior “public disclosure” under False Claims Act that precluded plaintiff from bringing instant action. Moreover, plaintiff failed to establish that she was original source of information that formed basis of audit finding.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-police officials’ motion for summary judgment in section 1983 action alleging that defendants subjected plaintiff to false arrest on charge of criminal trespass during contractual dispute that plaintiff had with landowner over whether plaintiff could remove trees that were arguably subject of instant contract. Defendants were entitled to qualified immunity, where plaintiff failed to identify any factually similar case that would have alerted defendants that they lacked probable cause to arrest plaintiff for trespass. Moreover, plaintiff failed to identify case establishing relative legal rights of property owner and possessor of timber deed. Also, under Ill. law, individual can be guilty of criminal trespass, even if initial entry on land was lawful, where, as here, individual refuses to leave property after receiving notice to depart.

Dist. Ct. erred in granting motion for summary judgment filed by defendants-prison dentist and guard in section 1983 action alleging that defendants were deliberately indifferent to plaintiff-prisoner’s medical needs by waiting 16 days to treat plaintiff’s abscessed tooth that eventually resulted in removal of said tooth. Medical professional cannot merely fail to take action, where said professional had knowledge of both instant serious condition that had potential deadly consequence if left untreated, as well as plaintiff's complaints of pain. Moreover, defendant-guard, who was also aware of plaintiff’s condition, had duty to assist plaintiff in obtaining treatment in light of knowledge that no medical professional was actually treating plaintiff for his serious medical condition. Also, defendant-dentist failed to provide any reason to support instant 16-day delay in treating plaintiff.

Dist. Ct. did not err in entering judgment in plaintiff’s favor in ERISA action against defendant seeking delinquent contributions to plaintiff’s multi-employer health and welfare fund, where: (1) Magistrate Judge entered default judgment due to defendant’s failure to file answer to complaint; (2) defendant failed to file Rule 55(c) motion to vacate default judgment; and (3) defendant filed untimely motion for extension of time to file answer and subsequently filed motion to stay proceedings in favor of conducting arbitration. Entry of judgment was appropriate, where at time Dist. Ct. considered damages issue, defendant had not answered complaint, filed any Rule 55(c) motion or contested plaintiff’s evidentiary submission for relief, and once Dist. Ct. entered its judgment, time to seek relief for good cause under Rule 55(c) had expired. Fact that defendant conducted settlement negotiations during course of instant litigation did not require different result, since defendant could have filed answer and asked Dist. Ct. to stay matter for purpose of conducting settlement negotiations.

Dist. Ct. erred in refusing to approve settlement of personal injury claim involving minor, where basis of refusal was terms of plaintiff’s contingent fee agreement calling for counsel’s receipt of one-third of gross settlement, while all litigation expenses would be covered by plaintiff’s share of agreement, and where terms of contingency agreement resulted in plaintiff receiving only 42 percent of gross settlement. While Dist. Ct. indicated that it would only approve settlement if litigation expenses were deducted from gross settlement and plaintiff’s attorneys received one-third of net settlement and if computerized-research fees were removed as compensable litigation expense, Ct. of Appeals observed that: (1) amount of fees produced by agreement did not exceed market value of attorneys’ services or violate reasonableness test set forth in Rule 1.5 of Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct; and (2) Dist. Ct. made no finding that amount plaintiff received under contingency-fee contract was inadequate to address minor’s future needs. Moreover, Dist. Ct.’s belief that instant fee agreement was contract of adhesion was not supported by record, where there was no evidence of coercion or overreaching. Dist. Ct., though, did not err in excluding computerized-research costs as recoverable expense in instant contingent-fee setting.

Dist. Ct. erred in dismissing on collateral estoppel grounds plaintiff’s ADA action alleging that defendants-state court officials failed to accommodate plaintiff’s tardive dyskinesia, which, according to plaintiff, prevented her from effectively proceeding in her state-court lawsuit against third-party due to its effect on her ability to communicate within courtroom. Record showed that plaintiff raised her ADA claim in post-trial motion in her state-court action, and that state court had denied plaintiff’s request for such relief, and that appellate court had affirmed jury’s verdict. Moreover, while Ct. of Appeals found that all elements of collateral estoppel had been technically satisfied, Dist. Ct. should not have applied it because: (1) state trial court had unfairly denied certain requested accommodations; and (2) plaintiff’s disability prevented her from participating in oral argument on her post-trial motion, which, in turn, prevented her from having full and fair opportunity to litigate her accommodation issue in state-court proceeding. (Dissent filed.)