Federal Civil Practice

Dist. Ct. erred in dismissing portion of plaintiff-pre-trial detainee’s section 1983 action alleging that defendants-prison officials subjected him to inhumane conditions of confinement that included insufficient food portions, presence of rodents and filthy water. As pre-trial detainee, plaintiff was entitled to be free from conditions that amounted to punishment, and Dist. Ct. erred in failing to consider two letters submitted by pro se plaintiff that provided factual assertions regarding his conditions of confinement. Moreover, plaintiff’s claims that prison food was well below nutritional values, and that prison water was contaminated with cyanide and lead were sufficient to state cause of action. However, Dist. Ct. properly dismissed portion of instant complaint alleging that plaintiff’s $3 per-day wage for working in prison violated Fair Labor Standards Act (FSLA), since plaintiff was not “employee” of prison for purpose of coverage under FSLA. (Partial dissent filed.)

In breach of contract action alleging that defendants-Korean citizens unlawfully retained equipment that plaintiff had sent to defendants, Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants’ motion to vacate issuance of default judgment and to dismiss instant action after finding that it lacked personal jurisdiction over defendants. Fact that defendants formed contract with Illinois plaintiff was insufficient, by itself, to establish personal jurisdiction over defendants, and trips to Illinois by one defendant were also insufficient to establish personal jurisdiction where said trips were either irrelevant to formation of contract or were not taken for purpose of negotiating instant contract with plaintiff. Ct. further observed that instant contract was strictly Korean business deal, where defendants did not solicit plaintiff to enter into any agreement, and where original agreements were executed in Korea.

Dist. Ct. erred in dismissing for want of prosecution plaintiff-prisoner’s lawsuit alleging that defendants-prison officials failed to protect him from physical attack by other prisoners, where defendants filed motion to dismiss to address plaintiff’s refusal to sign medical release that would have allowed defendants unlimited access and use of all of plaintiff’s medical records, regardless of whether said records pertained to injuries sustained in instant attack. Dist. Ct. could not use Rule 41(b) to support instant dismissal, since plaintiff had not failed to comply with any rule or court order, and since defendants, if anything, should have filed motion to compel to address medical release issue. Moreover, defendants’ demand for instant unlimited access and use of plaintiff’s medical records was improper.

In section 1983 action by plaintiff, who was civilly committed under Illinois Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act following his conviction on aggravated sexual assault charges and who alleged that prison’s policies restricting his access to R-rated movies, M-rated video games, and video game consoles violated his 1st Amendment rights, Dist. Ct. erred in granting defendants-prison officials’ motion for summary judgment with respect to prohibition on R-rated movies and M-rated video games, even though defendant attached affidavits from psychologist and prison program director indicating that said movies and video games were contrary to treatment and security goals of prison facility. Under reasonable relationship standard, defendant’s evidence was too weak to justify instant bans on movies and video games, where record lacked any data for linking said bans to defendant’s therapeutic and security goals. Dist. Ct. did not err, though, with respect to ban on video gaming consoles, where instant consoles had capability of accessing internet that would allow plaintiff to both contact his victims and obtain illegal pornography.

Dist. Ct. did not err in finding that Indiana statute (i.e. Partisan Balance Statute) that established process for electing judges to Marion County Superior Court violated 1st and 14th Amendments to U.S. Constitution. Record showed that instant statute, which limited ability of major political parties to nominate individuals to only half of available judicial positions, worked exactly as intended by ensuring that all candidates nominated by Democratic and Republican parties were elected in uncontested general election. As such, said statute essentially denied voters effective and meaningful vote because their vote was irrelevant to outcome of general election. Ct. rejected govt. claims that instant statute was constitutional because: (1) instant statute did not burden right to vote, or if it did, govt. had valid regulatory interest in ensuring partisan balance of judges on Superior Court bench; and (2) instant statute was consistent with govt. interest in keeping costs of judicial elections to minimum.

Plaintiff-pretrial detainee was entitled to new trial in section 1983 action alleging that defendants-prison officials used excessive force in applying Taser to plaintiff while plaintiff was held in defendants’ facility. Dist. Ct. erred by instructing jury that plaintiff was required to establish subjective intent of defendants, since, under Kingsley, 135 SCt 2466, pretrial detainee must show only that force purposefully or knowingly used against plaintiff was objectively unreasonable, and that no showing of defendants' state of mind was required. Moreover, said error was not harmless, where jury could have held for defendants after concluding that defendants, while unreasonable in use of Taser, did not have reckless or malicious intent. Ct. further rejected defendants’ claim that they were entitled to qualified immunity, after noting that both before and after Kingsley decision standards for amount of force that could permissibly be used remained same.

Dist. Ct. erred in dismissing on lack of venue grounds plaintiff’s action alleging that defendant sent plaintiff unsolicited junk faxes in violation of Telephone Consumer Protection Act, where basis for dismissal was Dist. Ct.’s belief that Dist. Ct. was wrong forum to resolve instant dispute, since plaintiff had entered into “Provider Agreement” with defendant’s subsidiary that would exempt instant faxes, and since said agreement contained arbitration clause, which defendant was entitled to enforce under assumption theory. Defendant did not raise arbitration clause issue until it filed reply to plaintiff’s response to its motion to dismiss, and Dist. Ct. improperly granted motion without giving plaintiff adequate opportunity to respond to said argument. As such, Dist. Ct. should have allowed plaintiff to file sur-reply, and plaintiff is entitled to remand for opportunity to take discovery for purposes of reconsideration of said issue.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing plaintiff’s Title VII action against defendant-employer alleging discrimination and retaliation as sanction arising out of plaintiff’s attempt to enforce phony arbitration agreement. Record showed that plaintiff manufactured employment agreement by sandwiching phony arbitration agreement between actual first and last pages of real employment agreement. Moreover, Dist. Ct. could properly believe that plaintiff had deliberately submitted false employment agreement in effort to compel defendant to arbitrate instant claims, and that plaintiff had lied to Dist. Ct. about how said document had been generated. Ct. rejected plaintiff’s argument that dismissal was too harsh of sanction.

Dist. Ct. erred in dismissing for failure to exhaust administrative remedies plaintiff-prisoner’s section 1983 action alleging that defendants were deliberately indifferent to her medical needs associated with birth of her baby, where plaintiff alleged that defendants’ delay in taking her to hospital contributed to baby’s birth defects. Plaintiff was not required to file internal grievance in order to proceed with instant case, where: (1) plaintiff had no opportunity to grieve any delay until after any alleged harm done by delay had been completed; and (2) plaintiff was not aware of either deadline for filing grievance or fact that defendant would not be able to entertain any grievance once she was transferred to different facility four days after her return from hospital.

Dist. Ct. erred in granting defendant’s motion for summary judgment in action under Freedom of Information Act seeking copies of all documents reflecting defendant’s statistics concerning H-1B visa applications, where defendant produced only single document that contained data table of information sought by plaintiff. Defendant failed to conduct adequate search, when it unilaterally narrowed plaintiff’s request for “all documents” to single, newly-generated statistical table. Ct. further noted that governmental agencies must be responsive to content and form of records sought by FOIA request, and instant request called for production of pre-existing documents. As such, defendant was required to perform new search of internal documents that was subject to any exemption under FOIA.