Federal Civil Practice

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-police officials’ motion for summary judgment in section 1983 action alleging false arrest and malicious prosecution arising out of plaintiff’s arrest on murder charge after certain eyewitnesses had recanted their initial identification of plaintiff as culprit shortly before start of plaintiff’s trial. Defendants had probable cause to arrest plaintiff on murder charge where four eyewitnesses identified him as culprit, and where plaintiff presented no evidence that any defendant had coached said eyewitnesses to identify plaintiff as culprit, or that any defendant knew eyewitnesses were lying about their identifications. Fact that one defendant failed to record beginning of each interview with eyewitnesses did not require different result, where there was no evidence that eyewitnesses said anything helpful to plaintiff during unrecorded moments of interviews. Ct. similarly rejected plaintiff’s claim that one defendant made false statements about said eyewitness identifications in affidavit seeking plaintiff’s arrest warrant, since said defendant could rely on said identifications when seeking warrant, even though eyewitnesses had originally expressed uncertainty about being able to identify anyone at crime scene.

Dist. Ct. erred in granting defendants-prison officials’ motion for summary judgment in action alleging that defendants violated plaintiff-former employee’s constitutional rights by denying her application to marry prisoner with whom she had engaged in improper romantic relationship while she was employed at prison. While defendants argued that denial of plaintiff’s request to marry prisoner was appropriate because plaintiff, having previously violated rules pertaining to having contact with prisoners, was more likely to engage in other prohibited acts, and because defendants feared that plaintiff might share confidential security information with prisoner, Ct. found that defendants’ policy reasons for denying instant marriage request that were centered in its visitation policy were insufficient to justify said denial, where plaintiff’s request consisted of single, brief marriage ceremony, and where defendants did not otherwise explain how allowance of such ceremony would pose security risk. Ct. further emphasized that prison’s visitation policy, by itself, is insufficient to justify denial of prisoner’s request to marry.

Dist. Ct. erred in reducing jury’s $2.4 million and $1 million awards in favor of plaintiffs to $1.17 million and $300,000 in section 1983 and 1985 claims alleging false arrest, excessive force and race discrimination on part of defendants-police officials, where Dist. Ct. had failed to give plaintiffs option of new trial in lieu of accepting lower damage award. Moreover, Dist. Ct. should not have reduced instant jury’s awards, where said awards rationally related to both physical and verbal harassment defendants inflicted on plaintiffs during their prolonged 204-day and 45-day detentions in jail. Fact that another jury could have given lower award, or that plaintiffs' counsel made inappropriate and inflammatory comments about other inmates in jail did not require different result. Moreover, instant awards were not excessive in view of awards in other excessive force cases.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-police officials’ motion for summary judgment in section 1983 action alleging that defendants used excessive force during confrontation with deceased plaintiff, where defendants responded to report that plaintiff was locked in bathroom and had threatened to kill himself and others, and where defendants ultimately killed plaintiff after first attempting to subdue him with taser and then shot him after plaintiff approached defendants with raised knife. Defendants were entitled to qualified immunity, where defendants’ use of deadly force was reasonable under circumstances of case, especially where there was no evidence that plaintiff had abandoned his threat to kill those who tried to come near him. With respect to second section 1983 action that similarly concerned incident in which defendant-police officer eventually shot mentally ill plaintiff after being called to plaintiff’s home, Dist. Ct. could properly find that defendant was not entitled to qualified immunity, where record showed that defendant did not initially use non-lethal force to subdue plaintiff, and where there was some evidence that although plaintiff posed danger to himself, plaintiff had not threatened violence towards others and was merely passively resisting others.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting on grounds of res judicata defendant-University’s Bd. Of Trustees’ motion for judgment on pleadings in Title VII and ADEA action, alleging that defendant failed to renew teaching contract of plaintiff on basis of her age and in retaliation for plaintiff having registered prior complaint of race discrimination, where plaintiff had filed similar Title VII retaliation complaint against University that had been previously dismissed with prejudice due to plaintiff’s failure to serve her complaint on University. Record showed existence of all three required elements for res judicata where: (1) there was identity of parties in both lawsuits; (2) dismissal of first lawsuit for want of prosecution was ruling on merits of case under Rule 41(b); and (3) both lawsuits were based on same core of operative facts concerning defendant’s failure to renew her teaching contract. Fact that instant lawsuits rested on different legal theories and factual predicates did not require different result. Ct. observed, though, that first lawsuit should have been dismissed without prejudice, but because plaintiff failed to file appeal or Rule 59 motion, said dismissal remained final decision on its merits.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing for failure to state cause of action by plaintiffs (medical patients of defendant) alleging violations of Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) arising out of theft of defendant’s computers containing unencrypted private data relating to defendant’s medical patients that subsequently caused plaintiffs to incur financial losses arising out of use of such stolen data. Defendant failed to qualify as “consumer reporting agency” necessary to become liable under FCRA, where plaintiff failed to allege that: (1) defendant received fee in exchange for compiling and transmitting patient information; or (2) defendant assembled patient information for purpose of furnishing consumer reports to third parties. Ct. further observed that while defendant furnished patient information to third parties to determine eligibility for medical insurance coverage, defendant’s experience with its own patients that generated said information fell within exclusion under section 1681a(d)(A)(i) of FCRA.

Dist. Ct. erred in granting defendant-prison doctor’s motion for summary judgment in section 1983 action alleging that defendant was deliberately indifferent to plaintiff-prisoner’s medical needs by declining to promptly order x-ray of plaintiff’s injured hand that resulted in plaintiff suffering chronic pain and limited mobility in said hand. Prison nurse, who originally saw plaintiff, concluded that plaintiff suffered from “possible/probable fracture,” and although defendant, upon speaking with nurse, first prescribed ibuprofen and ice for plaintiff’s hand, reasonable jury could find that defendant strongly suspected at that time that plaintiff’s hand had been fractured and yet refused to take reasonable measures to evaluate plaintiff’s injury by waiting five days to order x-ray.

Dist Ct. erred in denying plaintiffs-Chicago Public School teachers’ motion to certify class in Title VII, section 1981 and section 1983 action alleging that defendant-School Board’s decision to reconstitute 10 schools by displacing 51% African-American tenured teachers was racially discriminatory, where Africa-American teachers comprised just 27% of overall teacher population. While Dist. Ct. believed that plaintiffs had failed to show existence of common question of law or fact because decisions as to each school was based on subjective factors about school performance, record showed that defendant utilized same objective criteria in first two steps of decision-making process to identify schools for reconstitution, and defendant's use same selection criteria by same decision-makers qualified instant case for class action treatment under Rule 23(b)(3). Moreover, Ct. found that instant case qualified for class action treatment under Rule 23(b)(2), where plaintiff also sought declaratory judgment relief that did not request any monetary or individual relief, and where plaintiff sought same declaratory and injunctive relief for entire class.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendant-police officer’s motion for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds in section 1983 action alleging that defendant violated plaintiff’s 4th Amendment rights by detaining him in conjunction with reported burglary. Defendant had reasonable suspicion to initiate investigatory stop of plaintiff, where plaintiff generally matched five identifying characteristics of culprit, i.e., race, gender, age, shirt color and type of shorts, where plaintiff was spotted near scene of burglary shortly after 911 call. Fact that real culprit was reported as leaving scene in different direction did not require different result where defendant was not aware of said report. Moreover, defendant had arguable probable cause to arrest plaintiff based on description of culprit, plaintiff’s proximity to scene of burglary, and fact that defendant could have reasonably concluded that plaintiff had attempted to flee different police officer. Fact that plaintiff was unaware that said officer was attempting to stop him was immaterial.

Dist. Ct. did not err in denying plaintiff’s request for class certification in action alleging that defendant sent unwanted commercial faxes in violation of Telephone Consumer Protection Act, where: (1) Dist. Ct. rejected plaintiff’s prior attempt to define appropriate class members; and (2) plaintiff’s subsequent attempt to certify different class members came more than 18 months after close of discovery and more than four years after case had been filed. However, Dist. Ct. erred in dismissing plaintiff’s personal claim where defendant had made prior Rule 68 offer to settle said action for $2 more than plaintiff had sought in his complaint, and where defendant had put 14-day limit as to when plaintiff could accept said offer. While Dist. Ct. believed that plaintiff’s action was “moot” because he had declined offer that would have satisfied his financial demand as well as his demand for entry of injunction, instant case was not moot since Dist. Ct. still could have awarded damages and enter injunction at time of dismissal. Moreover, expired and unaccepted offer of judgment does not satisfy Supreme Court’s definition of mootness.