Federal Civil Practice

In section 1983 action by plaintiff, who was civilly committed under Illinois Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act following his conviction on aggravated sexual assault charges and who alleged that prison’s policies restricting his access to R-rated movies, M-rated video games, and video game consoles violated his 1st Amendment rights, Dist. Ct. erred in granting defendants-prison officials’ motion for summary judgment with respect to prohibition on R-rated movies and M-rated video games, even though defendant attached affidavits from psychologist and prison program director indicating that said movies and video games were contrary to treatment and security goals of prison facility. Under reasonable relationship standard, defendant’s evidence was too weak to justify instant bans on movies and video games, where record lacked any data for linking said bans to defendant’s therapeutic and security goals. Dist. Ct. did not err, though, with respect to ban on video gaming consoles, where instant consoles had capability of accessing internet that would allow plaintiff to both contact his victims and obtain illegal pornography.

Dist. Ct. did not err in finding that Indiana statute (i.e. Partisan Balance Statute) that established process for electing judges to Marion County Superior Court violated 1st and 14th Amendments to U.S. Constitution. Record showed that instant statute, which limited ability of major political parties to nominate individuals to only half of available judicial positions, worked exactly as intended by ensuring that all candidates nominated by Democratic and Republican parties were elected in uncontested general election. As such, said statute essentially denied voters effective and meaningful vote because their vote was irrelevant to outcome of general election. Ct. rejected govt. claims that instant statute was constitutional because: (1) instant statute did not burden right to vote, or if it did, govt. had valid regulatory interest in ensuring partisan balance of judges on Superior Court bench; and (2) instant statute was consistent with govt. interest in keeping costs of judicial elections to minimum.

Plaintiff-pretrial detainee was entitled to new trial in section 1983 action alleging that defendants-prison officials used excessive force in applying Taser to plaintiff while plaintiff was held in defendants’ facility. Dist. Ct. erred by instructing jury that plaintiff was required to establish subjective intent of defendants, since, under Kingsley, 135 SCt 2466, pretrial detainee must show only that force purposefully or knowingly used against plaintiff was objectively unreasonable, and that no showing of defendants' state of mind was required. Moreover, said error was not harmless, where jury could have held for defendants after concluding that defendants, while unreasonable in use of Taser, did not have reckless or malicious intent. Ct. further rejected defendants’ claim that they were entitled to qualified immunity, after noting that both before and after Kingsley decision standards for amount of force that could permissibly be used remained same.

Dist. Ct. erred in dismissing on lack of venue grounds plaintiff’s action alleging that defendant sent plaintiff unsolicited junk faxes in violation of Telephone Consumer Protection Act, where basis for dismissal was Dist. Ct.’s belief that Dist. Ct. was wrong forum to resolve instant dispute, since plaintiff had entered into “Provider Agreement” with defendant’s subsidiary that would exempt instant faxes, and since said agreement contained arbitration clause, which defendant was entitled to enforce under assumption theory. Defendant did not raise arbitration clause issue until it filed reply to plaintiff’s response to its motion to dismiss, and Dist. Ct. improperly granted motion without giving plaintiff adequate opportunity to respond to said argument. As such, Dist. Ct. should have allowed plaintiff to file sur-reply, and plaintiff is entitled to remand for opportunity to take discovery for purposes of reconsideration of said issue.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing plaintiff’s Title VII action against defendant-employer alleging discrimination and retaliation as sanction arising out of plaintiff’s attempt to enforce phony arbitration agreement. Record showed that plaintiff manufactured employment agreement by sandwiching phony arbitration agreement between actual first and last pages of real employment agreement. Moreover, Dist. Ct. could properly believe that plaintiff had deliberately submitted false employment agreement in effort to compel defendant to arbitrate instant claims, and that plaintiff had lied to Dist. Ct. about how said document had been generated. Ct. rejected plaintiff’s argument that dismissal was too harsh of sanction.

Dist. Ct. erred in dismissing for failure to exhaust administrative remedies plaintiff-prisoner’s section 1983 action alleging that defendants were deliberately indifferent to her medical needs associated with birth of her baby, where plaintiff alleged that defendants’ delay in taking her to hospital contributed to baby’s birth defects. Plaintiff was not required to file internal grievance in order to proceed with instant case, where: (1) plaintiff had no opportunity to grieve any delay until after any alleged harm done by delay had been completed; and (2) plaintiff was not aware of either deadline for filing grievance or fact that defendant would not be able to entertain any grievance once she was transferred to different facility four days after her return from hospital.

Dist. Ct. erred in granting defendant’s motion for summary judgment in action under Freedom of Information Act seeking copies of all documents reflecting defendant’s statistics concerning H-1B visa applications, where defendant produced only single document that contained data table of information sought by plaintiff. Defendant failed to conduct adequate search, when it unilaterally narrowed plaintiff’s request for “all documents” to single, newly-generated statistical table. Ct. further noted that governmental agencies must be responsive to content and form of records sought by FOIA request, and instant request called for production of pre-existing documents. As such, defendant was required to perform new search of internal documents that was subject to any exemption under FOIA.

Dist. Ct. did not err in entering order turning Syrian assets over to plaintiffs-victims of state terrorism under Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), even though other claimants, who also were victims of state terrorism, believed they were entitled to said assets, where: (1) Dist. Ct. had entered judgment in plaintiff’s favor against Syria; (2) plaintiffs had registered their judgment and served citation to discover assets on December 8, 2011; and (3) plaintiffs had priority to said assets under Illinois law where claimants had not registered their judgment against Syria and served any citation to discover assets until approximately three years after plaintiffs had done so. Fact that plaintiffs had not complied with section 1608(e) of FSIA by serving copy of default judgment on Syria did not require different result since plaintiffs, as victims of state terrorism, had obtained their judgment under section 1605(a) of FSIA and complied with provisions contained in section 1610(g), but did not need to comply with section 1608(e).

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing plaintiff’s section 1983 action as sanction for plaintiff’s failure to attend her own deposition on two occasions. Dist. Ct. had warned plaintiff after she missed first deposition that he would dismiss her case if she missed second deposition, and plaintiff thereafter missed second deposition. Moreover, Dist. Ct. could properly reject plaintiff’s contention that she was unaware of second deposition, where her own attorney had emailed her details of said deposition, and where plaintiff left note at her attorney’s office indicating that she was aware of date of second deposition.

In action seeking recovery based on plaintiff-children’s exposure to vinyl cloride that had seeped into plaintiffs’ underground drinking water, Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing plaintiff’s action after granting defendant’s motion in limine to exclude all three of plaintiff’s proposed expert witnesses, who claimed existence of causal link between seepage of vinyl cloride and plaintiffs’ illnesses. Dist. Ct. could properly find that methodologies used by plaintiff’s experts were unreliable, where: (1) plaintiffs’ experts improperly linked plaintiffs’ illnesses on bare fact that plaintiffs were exposed to vinyl cloride at levels that exceeded applicable regulations; (2) articles relied upon by experts concerned levels of vinyl cloride that were greater than levels at issue in instant case; and (3) no expert established as initial matter why vinyl cloride should have been considered as possible cause of plaintiffs’ illnesses. Fact that there were no available studies that had examined impact of vinyl cloride on children did not require different result.