Federal Civil Practice

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-police officials’ motion for summary judgment in section 1983 action alleging that defendants used excessive force during confrontation with deceased plaintiff, where defendants responded to report that plaintiff was locked in bathroom and had threatened to kill himself and others, and where defendants ultimately killed plaintiff after first attempting to subdue him with taser and then shot him after plaintiff approached defendants with raised knife. Defendants were entitled to qualified immunity, where defendants’ use of deadly force was reasonable under circumstances of case, especially where there was no evidence that plaintiff had abandoned his threat to kill those who tried to come near him. With respect to second section 1983 action that similarly concerned incident in which defendant-police officer eventually shot mentally ill plaintiff after being called to plaintiff’s home, Dist. Ct. could properly find that defendant was not entitled to qualified immunity, where record showed that defendant did not initially use non-lethal force to subdue plaintiff, and where there was some evidence that although plaintiff posed danger to himself, plaintiff had not threatened violence towards others and was merely passively resisting others.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting on grounds of res judicata defendant-University’s Bd. Of Trustees’ motion for judgment on pleadings in Title VII and ADEA action, alleging that defendant failed to renew teaching contract of plaintiff on basis of her age and in retaliation for plaintiff having registered prior complaint of race discrimination, where plaintiff had filed similar Title VII retaliation complaint against University that had been previously dismissed with prejudice due to plaintiff’s failure to serve her complaint on University. Record showed existence of all three required elements for res judicata where: (1) there was identity of parties in both lawsuits; (2) dismissal of first lawsuit for want of prosecution was ruling on merits of case under Rule 41(b); and (3) both lawsuits were based on same core of operative facts concerning defendant’s failure to renew her teaching contract. Fact that instant lawsuits rested on different legal theories and factual predicates did not require different result. Ct. observed, though, that first lawsuit should have been dismissed without prejudice, but because plaintiff failed to file appeal or Rule 59 motion, said dismissal remained final decision on its merits.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing for failure to state cause of action by plaintiffs (medical patients of defendant) alleging violations of Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) arising out of theft of defendant’s computers containing unencrypted private data relating to defendant’s medical patients that subsequently caused plaintiffs to incur financial losses arising out of use of such stolen data. Defendant failed to qualify as “consumer reporting agency” necessary to become liable under FCRA, where plaintiff failed to allege that: (1) defendant received fee in exchange for compiling and transmitting patient information; or (2) defendant assembled patient information for purpose of furnishing consumer reports to third parties. Ct. further observed that while defendant furnished patient information to third parties to determine eligibility for medical insurance coverage, defendant’s experience with its own patients that generated said information fell within exclusion under section 1681a(d)(A)(i) of FCRA.

Dist. Ct. erred in granting defendant-prison doctor’s motion for summary judgment in section 1983 action alleging that defendant was deliberately indifferent to plaintiff-prisoner’s medical needs by declining to promptly order x-ray of plaintiff’s injured hand that resulted in plaintiff suffering chronic pain and limited mobility in said hand. Prison nurse, who originally saw plaintiff, concluded that plaintiff suffered from “possible/probable fracture,” and although defendant, upon speaking with nurse, first prescribed ibuprofen and ice for plaintiff’s hand, reasonable jury could find that defendant strongly suspected at that time that plaintiff’s hand had been fractured and yet refused to take reasonable measures to evaluate plaintiff’s injury by waiting five days to order x-ray.

Dist Ct. erred in denying plaintiffs-Chicago Public School teachers’ motion to certify class in Title VII, section 1981 and section 1983 action alleging that defendant-School Board’s decision to reconstitute 10 schools by displacing 51% African-American tenured teachers was racially discriminatory, where Africa-American teachers comprised just 27% of overall teacher population. While Dist. Ct. believed that plaintiffs had failed to show existence of common question of law or fact because decisions as to each school was based on subjective factors about school performance, record showed that defendant utilized same objective criteria in first two steps of decision-making process to identify schools for reconstitution, and defendant's use same selection criteria by same decision-makers qualified instant case for class action treatment under Rule 23(b)(3). Moreover, Ct. found that instant case qualified for class action treatment under Rule 23(b)(2), where plaintiff also sought declaratory judgment relief that did not request any monetary or individual relief, and where plaintiff sought same declaratory and injunctive relief for entire class.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendant-police officer’s motion for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds in section 1983 action alleging that defendant violated plaintiff’s 4th Amendment rights by detaining him in conjunction with reported burglary. Defendant had reasonable suspicion to initiate investigatory stop of plaintiff, where plaintiff generally matched five identifying characteristics of culprit, i.e., race, gender, age, shirt color and type of shorts, where plaintiff was spotted near scene of burglary shortly after 911 call. Fact that real culprit was reported as leaving scene in different direction did not require different result where defendant was not aware of said report. Moreover, defendant had arguable probable cause to arrest plaintiff based on description of culprit, plaintiff’s proximity to scene of burglary, and fact that defendant could have reasonably concluded that plaintiff had attempted to flee different police officer. Fact that plaintiff was unaware that said officer was attempting to stop him was immaterial.

Dist. Ct. did not err in denying plaintiff’s request for class certification in action alleging that defendant sent unwanted commercial faxes in violation of Telephone Consumer Protection Act, where: (1) Dist. Ct. rejected plaintiff’s prior attempt to define appropriate class members; and (2) plaintiff’s subsequent attempt to certify different class members came more than 18 months after close of discovery and more than four years after case had been filed. However, Dist. Ct. erred in dismissing plaintiff’s personal claim where defendant had made prior Rule 68 offer to settle said action for $2 more than plaintiff had sought in his complaint, and where defendant had put 14-day limit as to when plaintiff could accept said offer. While Dist. Ct. believed that plaintiff’s action was “moot” because he had declined offer that would have satisfied his financial demand as well as his demand for entry of injunction, instant case was not moot since Dist. Ct. still could have awarded damages and enter injunction at time of dismissal. Moreover, expired and unaccepted offer of judgment does not satisfy Supreme Court’s definition of mootness.

Dist. Ct. erred in dismissing without prejudice plaintiff-prisoner’s lawsuit against defendant-former prison official, where basis of dismissal was U.S. Marshall’s failure to locate and serve defendant with copy of complaint, as well as plaintiff’s own unsuccessful attempt to serve defendant with copy of complaint. Rule 4(c)(3) requires Dist. Ct. to direct Marshall to serve defendant with copy of complaint, where, as here, plaintiff was authorized to proceed in forma pauperis, and instant two-day unsuccessful effort by Marshall to locate defendant was insufficient for Dist. Ct. to allow Marshall to abandon search, where there was no indication that Marshall had checked Bureau of Prisons’ records for applicable address for defendant.

Dist. Ct. erred in dismissing under Rule 13 portion of plaintiff's 2013 complaint against individual defendants alleging claims of conspiracy to facilitate plaintiff’s false arrest, where Dist. Ct. found that said claims were compulsory counterclaims to defendant-former employer’s 2011 complaint against plaintiff, which alleged conversion and fraud arising out of plaintiff’s alleged theft of former employer’s property, because both 2011 and 2013 actions concerned same transaction and because individual defendants in 2013 lawsuit could have been joined under Rule 20 as parties in counterclaim in 2011 action. Rule 20 sets forth standard for permissive joinder of parties, and Ct. of Appeals rejected defendants’ contention that because individual defendants could have been joined as parties in 2011 action under Rule 20, it was appropriate to treat plaintiff’s current claims against these defendants as compulsory counterclaims in 2011 action. However, Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing under Rule 13 plaintiff’s abuse of process claim against defendant-former employer, where such claim existed against said defendant at time plaintiff filed her answer in 2011 action, and where, as result, such claim was compulsory counterclaim that should have been asserted by plaintiff in 2011 action.

Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendants-police officials’ motion for summary judgment in action alleging that defendants used excessive force when conducting search of plaintiff’s home. Record showed that: (1) search was conducted after discovery of police threats that had been posted on plaintiff’s unsecured internet network; (2) police at time of search had seen neighbor two doors down whom they knew had issued prior police threats; (3) instant search was conducted by 11-man SWAT team, who broke open plaintiff’s door and window, used flash bang grenades and handcuffed elderly plaintiff and her daughter; and (4) day after search police confirmed that said neighbor had actually posed threats. Defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity where use of flash bang grenades without conducting sufficient investigation of actual culprit was unreasonable.