Federal Civil Practice

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing as frivolous plaintiff’s section 1983 action against defendants-financial institutions involved in foreclosure of plaintiff’s mortgage, where plaintiff asserted that defendants violated his federal Constitutional rights by foreclosing on mortgage without holding actual note or mortgage at time of foreclosure. Plaintiff failed to allege that defendants were state actors so as to render them suable under section 1983. Ct. further noted that instant complaint failed to invoke jurisdiction of Dist. Ct. because there was no possibility that Dist. Ct. could have given plaintiff any relief.

Ct. of Appeals lacked jurisdiction to consider plaintiff-prisoner’s appeal of Dist. Ct.’s grant of defendants-prison officials’ motion for summary judgment in section 1983 action alleging that defendants were deliberately indifferent to his safety, where plaintiff filed notice of appeal beyond applicable 30-day period for doing so. Moreover, record showed that plaintiff had attempted to file Rule 59(e) motion to alter Dist. Ct.’s judgment that would have tolled time for filing notice of appeal, but failed to timely file said motion. Ct. of Appeals also observed that plaintiff should have been advised that his best option upon entry of summary judgment order was to file simple notice of appeal, rather filing any Rule 59(e) motion or motion seeking extension of time to file same.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-police officials’ motion for summary judgment in section 1983 action alleging that defendants subjected plaintiff to false arrest and malicious prosecution arising out of plaintiff’s arrest on burglary and battery charges stemming from incident in which plaintiff’s neighbor claimed that plaintiff had entered his house and physically assaulted him. Plaintiff could not establish false arrest claim, where defendant-police officer had probable cause to arrest plaintiff based on neighbor’s identification of plaintiff as culprit under circumstances where officer had no reason to believe that neighbor harbored any ill will toward plaintiff. Plaintiff also could not establish malicious prosecution claim against officer or City since: (1) Indiana law shielded govt. employees from such claim; and (2) any 4th Amendment malicious prosecution claim required plaintiff to show either lack of probable cause or presence of malice. Finally, defendant-neighbor was entitled to dismissal without prejudice of federal malicious prosecution claim, since plaintiff had adequate remedy in state court for such action. Moreover, Dist. Ct. was directed to remand plaintiff’s state-court false-arrest and malicious prosecution claims to state court for resolution in that forum.

Dist. Ct. erred in dismissing on standing grounds plaintiffs’ class action seeking damages arising out of defendant’s delayed announcement that it was subject to cyber attack that resulted in theft of plaintiffs-customers’ credit card numbers, where plaintiffs alleged, among other things, that they experienced fraudulent purchases on their credit cards as result of defendant’s conduct. While record showed that defendant had remedied any current losses arising out of fraudulent purchases and had given plaintiffs one-year of free credit monitoring services, plaintiffs successfully alleged that instant data breach inflicted other concrete particularized injuries that would support their standing to pursue instant claim in form of alleged lost time and money spent on replacing their credit cards and monitoring their credit scores beyond period of time given by defendant. Ct. rejected defendant’s contention that any alleged future injuries would not support Article III standing to pursue instant claim, where plaintiffs adequately asserted substantial risk of incurring future injuries. Moreover, plaintiffs need not wait until they experienced actual identity theft before they can bring instant lawsuit, and fact that other stores could have compromised plaintiffs’ private credit card information did not negate plaintiffs’ standing in instant case.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting judgment in favor of defendants-county officials in instant section 1983 action alleging that defendants violated plaintiff’s constitutional rights by evicting plaintiff from property he had leased from third-party in violation of Wisconsin statute limiting timeframe for effectuating any court-ordered eviction and by destroying plaintiff’s personal property that had been removed from premises. While record was unclear whether sheriff had evicted plaintiff within 10-business-day statutory deadline, any Wisconsin statutory violation would not constitute deprivation of federal constitutional right. Plaintiff further failed to factually support claim that defendants had destroyed any personal property during eviction process.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing on qualified immunity grounds plaintiffs’ section 1983 actions alleging that enactment of Public Act 97-18, which shortened plaintiffs’ six-year terms as Workers’ Compensation arbitrators, deprived them of their property interests in their jobs without due process. Legislature, having previously created plaintiffs’ six-year terms in their positions, is not precluded from altering or even eliminating plaintiffs’ entitlement to full six-year term in their positions. Ct. rejected plaintiffs’ proposed exception to legislative enactment rule that would allow court to examine legislators’ motivation for altering plaintiffs’ property interest in their jobs and further found that process for Legislature’s enactment of Public Act 97-19 provided plaintiffs with sufficient due process. Moreover, plaintiffs failed to demonstrate any clearly established right that was violated by Legislature prematurely ending their six-year terms as arbitrators.

In action alleging that plaintiff sustained certain lung injuries after breathing chlorine gas at defendant’s amusement park, Dist. Ct. did not err in excluding proposed testimony of plaintiff’s treating physician as causative expert, even though plaintiff established that said physician was board certified pulmonologist. Treating physicians are considered no differently than other experts for purposes of Rule 702, and fact that said physician had experience in treating and diagnosing lung conditions did not make her qualified for form opinion as to cause of plaintiff’s lung injuries, where: (1) there was no evidence that said physician had ever treated another patient for chlorine gas exposure or had any training in toxicology; and (2) record was silent as to whether physician had ruled in or out any other potential causes for plaintiff’s lung ailments. Record further showed that plaintiff had failed to timely give defendant summary of treating physician’s opinion as required under Rule 26.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-police officials’ motion for summary judgment in section 1983 action alleging that defendants defamed plaintiff by spreading rumors that he was arsonist and child molester that precluded him from obtaining future employment in law enforcement management position. Plaintiff failed to establish that he had protected liberty interest in future job in law enforcement management since liberty interest protected by due process clause concerns pursuit of general occupation and not right to specific job. Moreover, mere defamation by govt., by itself, does not deprive person of occupational liberty, even when it causes serious impairment of future employment, where, as here, plaintiff failed to make required showing that govt. changed his legal status.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-police officers’ motion for summary judgment in section 1983 action alleging that defendants had subjected him to false arrest when defendants confronted him at apartment after owners of said apartment told defendants that they were true owners of apartment, and after plaintiff had refused to leave said apartment. Defendants had probable cause to arrest plaintiff on criminal trespass to real property charge so as to defeat false arrest claim, where defendants were entitled to believe property owners at time of arrest that they were true owners of said apartment, and where plaintiff lacked any documentary proof that he had paid any rent, as he had claimed to defendants. Fact that defendants may have violated Forcible Entry and Detainer Act by summarily evicting/arresting plaintiff without affording him prior hearing to determine his entitlement to apartment does not require different result.