Federal Civil Practice

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-police officials’ motion for summary judgment in section 1983 action alleging that plaintiff’s decedent was targeted and killed in retribution for his actions as police informant, and that defendants were liable for failing to protect him. Fourteenth Amendment imposes no general duty on state to protect individuals from harm by private actors, and plaintiff otherwise failed to establish any causation linking murder of plaintiff’s decedent by unknown assailant to any disclosure by defendants that decedent was police informant.

Ct. of Appeals lacked jurisdiction to consider plaintiff’s appeal of Dist. Ct. order that granted defendants’ motion for partial summary judgment in action alleging copyright infringement and seeking damages and injunctive relief that would prohibit use of certain photo. Dist. Ct. erroneously issued final judgment after ruling on defendants’ partial summary judgment motion, where issue of plaintiff’s injunctive relief was never adjudicated and remained pending.

Dist. Ct. did not err in denying insurance company’s motion to intervene in class action lawsuit under Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA) action for purposes of challenging proposed settlement of lawsuit that called for payment of $20 million to plaintiffs-class members with defendant insured paying only $200,000, and with balance to be collected against instant insurance company if instant TPCA claim was covered under policy issued by insurance company. Insurance company’s intervention motion was untimely since it should have been brought at beginning of lawsuit approximately three years prior to filing of instant motion, even though insurance company, which had denied coverage in beginning stages of instant lawsuit, had cause to believe that insured and plaintiffs might collude to stick insurance company with excessive recovery through proposed settlement. Ct. further noted that insurance company was successful in first stage of state court proceeding seeking determination as to whether instant insurance policy provided coverage for TCPA claim.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing plaintiff’s habeas petition challenging certain aspects of his 2005 criminal conviction for aggravated criminal sexual abuse, where plaintiff had already served his full sentence for his 2005 conviction, and where plaintiff was currently under civil confinement pursuant to Illinois Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act. While defendant argued that Dist. Ct. had jurisdiction to consider his habeas petition because he still was “in custody” for purposes of his sexual abuse conviction because said conviction was necessary predicate for his current civil confinement, Dist. Ct. lacked jurisdiction to consider plaintiff’s habeas petition because plaintiff’s civil confinement was mere collateral consequence of his criminal conviction, and thus was insufficient to render him in custody pursuant to his 2005 conviction.

Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant’s motion to dismiss instant defamation action, where said motion was based on State of Washington’s anti-SLAPP statute that would provide both immunity to defendant and opportunity for early disposition in instant claim, where subject matter of alleged defamatory statements concerned matters of public concern, and where defendant’s alleged defamatory comments pertained to defendant’s conclusion that plaintiff’s disposal of hazardous waste violated Illinois policy. Defendant could not rely on instant Washington anti-SLAPP statute to support dismissal of lawsuit, where Washington Supreme Court had subsequently found said statute to be unconstitutional.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting motion for summary judgment by defendants-prison guards in section 1983 action by plaintiff-prisoner alleging that said defendants failed to protect him from attack by another prisoner. Defendant presented no evidence that one defendant was present during said attack, and plaintiff failed to present evidence that other defendant had actual knowledge that plaintiff was at serious risk of being harmed. Dist. Ct. also did not err in failing to recruit substitute counsel for plaintiff, where plaintiff failed to show that substitute counsel would have uncovered evidence that would have affected outcome of case.

In instant Title VII action alleging that defendant terminated plaintiff-Caucasian police officer from his position on account of his race, Dist. Ct. did not err in denying plaintiff’s motion to compel defendant-employer to produce results of “climate survey” that plaintiff had alleged contained evidence of pattern of discriminatory conduct towards non-African-American police officers. Plaintiff’s request for said document was made after deadline for making such requests, and plaintiff failed to show how he was prejudiced by Dist. Ct.’s denial where defendant failed to avail himself of subsequent opportunity to take depositions to find out about specific relevance of said survey to his discrimination claim.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing for failure to state viable cause of action plaintiff’s action alleging that defendant breached terms of settlement agreement arising out of his failure to make two settlement payments. Settlement agreement required that plaintiff dismiss cause of action it had filed against defendant in Greece, and plaintiff failed to allege in its complaint that said dismissal had actually occurred so as to trigger defendant’s obligation to make settlement payments. Fact that plaintiff had alleged its “belief” that said dismissal had occurred was insufficient to state viable cause of action that otherwise required allegation of actual dismissal. (Dissent filed.)

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendant-consumer credit-reporting agency’s motion for summary judgment in action by plaintiff, alleging that defendant’s failure to initially indicate on plaintiff’s credit report that plaintiff’s dismissal of her Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition was via plaintiff’s motion to withdraw violated Fair Credit Reporting Act, since, according to plaintiff, her credit report did not accurately describe status of her bankruptcy petition. Record showed that when plaintiff’s bankruptcy petition was withdrawn, no documentation certifying said withdrawal had been submitted to defendant, and defendant was not required to conduct its own research into underlying reasons for dismissal of plaintiff’s bankruptcy petition. Ct. further noted that since every bankruptcy case that is “withdrawn” at debtor’s request is technically “dismissed,” defendant did not inaccurately indicate status of plaintiff’s bankruptcy petition.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-City and police officer’s motion for summary judgment in section 1983 action alleging that defendant-officer’s failure to investigate plaintiff’s claim that he was assaulted by off-duty police officer violated plaintiff’s constitutional right to access to courts, since said failure resulted in spoliation of evidence that could have been used in civil case filed by plaintiff against alleged assailant. Plaintiff does not have constitutional right to have police investigate his case at all. Moreover, plaintiff did not show that any failure by officer to investigate foreclosed plaintiff's ability to learn facts of case and to seek relief for any injury where: (1) police officer did not conceal any facts about incident that plaintiff did not already know; and (2) plaintiff was not reliant on officer to discover facts necessary to fill in gaps in his knowledge. Fact that prompt search of alleged assailant’s home might have produced stronger case of plaintiff in his action against alleged assailant does not require different result.