Federal Civil Practice

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting judgment in favor of defendants-county officials in instant section 1983 action alleging that defendants violated plaintiff’s constitutional rights by evicting plaintiff from property he had leased from third-party in violation of Wisconsin statute limiting timeframe for effectuating any court-ordered eviction and by destroying plaintiff’s personal property that had been removed from premises. While record was unclear whether sheriff had evicted plaintiff within 10-business-day statutory deadline, any Wisconsin statutory violation would not constitute deprivation of federal constitutional right. Plaintiff further failed to factually support claim that defendants had destroyed any personal property during eviction process.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing on qualified immunity grounds plaintiffs’ section 1983 actions alleging that enactment of Public Act 97-18, which shortened plaintiffs’ six-year terms as Workers’ Compensation arbitrators, deprived them of their property interests in their jobs without due process. Legislature, having previously created plaintiffs’ six-year terms in their positions, is not precluded from altering or even eliminating plaintiffs’ entitlement to full six-year term in their positions. Ct. rejected plaintiffs’ proposed exception to legislative enactment rule that would allow court to examine legislators’ motivation for altering plaintiffs’ property interest in their jobs and further found that process for Legislature’s enactment of Public Act 97-19 provided plaintiffs with sufficient due process. Moreover, plaintiffs failed to demonstrate any clearly established right that was violated by Legislature prematurely ending their six-year terms as arbitrators.

In action alleging that plaintiff sustained certain lung injuries after breathing chlorine gas at defendant’s amusement park, Dist. Ct. did not err in excluding proposed testimony of plaintiff’s treating physician as causative expert, even though plaintiff established that said physician was board certified pulmonologist. Treating physicians are considered no differently than other experts for purposes of Rule 702, and fact that said physician had experience in treating and diagnosing lung conditions did not make her qualified for form opinion as to cause of plaintiff’s lung injuries, where: (1) there was no evidence that said physician had ever treated another patient for chlorine gas exposure or had any training in toxicology; and (2) record was silent as to whether physician had ruled in or out any other potential causes for plaintiff’s lung ailments. Record further showed that plaintiff had failed to timely give defendant summary of treating physician’s opinion as required under Rule 26.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-police officials’ motion for summary judgment in section 1983 action alleging that defendants defamed plaintiff by spreading rumors that he was arsonist and child molester that precluded him from obtaining future employment in law enforcement management position. Plaintiff failed to establish that he had protected liberty interest in future job in law enforcement management since liberty interest protected by due process clause concerns pursuit of general occupation and not right to specific job. Moreover, mere defamation by govt., by itself, does not deprive person of occupational liberty, even when it causes serious impairment of future employment, where, as here, plaintiff failed to make required showing that govt. changed his legal status.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-police officers’ motion for summary judgment in section 1983 action alleging that defendants had subjected him to false arrest when defendants confronted him at apartment after owners of said apartment told defendants that they were true owners of apartment, and after plaintiff had refused to leave said apartment. Defendants had probable cause to arrest plaintiff on criminal trespass to real property charge so as to defeat false arrest claim, where defendants were entitled to believe property owners at time of arrest that they were true owners of said apartment, and where plaintiff lacked any documentary proof that he had paid any rent, as he had claimed to defendants. Fact that defendants may have violated Forcible Entry and Detainer Act by summarily evicting/arresting plaintiff without affording him prior hearing to determine his entitlement to apartment does not require different result.

Plaintiff-civil detainee’s failure to file post-trial motion for judgment as matter of law under Rule 50, in section 1983 action alleging that defendant-prison medical official was deliberately indifferent to plaintiff’s medical needs, precluded Ct. of Appeals from acting on plaintiff’s claim that jury’s verdict in favor of defendant was against manifest weight of evidence. Moreover, plaintiff was not entitled to new trial even though defendant made improper reference during his testimony to length of plaintiff’s incarceration, where: (1) plaintiff did not seek mistrial at time reference was made; and (2) Dist. Ct. gave proper curative instruction to jury.

Dist. Ct. erred in remanding to state court due to lack of federal jurisdiction, instant cases by plaintiffs-airline passengers, who alleged that airplane’s autothrottle, autopilot, and low-airspeed-warning systems contributed to pilot error that caused airline crash when landing at airport, where said cases had been removed to federal court under 28 USC sections 1333 and 1442. While Dist. Ct. correctly found that instant cases were not removable under federal official’s right to have claims resolved in federal court provisions in section 1442(a)(1), Dist. Ct. erred in finding that said cases were not removable under admiralty jurisdiction provisions of section 1333, since: (1) accidents occurring to airplanes can potentially come within admiralty jurisdiction provisions of section 1333 if injuries to plaintiffs were caused by events occurring while airplane is over water; (2) instant flight from Seoul, Korea to San Francisco crossed Pacific Ocean; and (3) finding of NTSB indicated that any malfunction in instant airplane’s systems could have occurred while airplane was still flying over Pacific Ocean before it crashed on landing.

In plaintiff-civil detainee’s section 1983 action alleging that defendants-security guards violated his right to be free from unreasonable restraints when defendants refused to take off his handcuffs in order to allow him to successfully use courthouse restroom, Dist. Ct. erred in giving jury instruction that did not require jury to find that defendants possessed purposeful, knowing or possibly reckless state of mind when taking actions against plaintiff. Moreover, said instruction improperly allowed jury to award plaintiff $1,000 in compensatory damages for defendants being merely negligent in keeping handcuffs on plaintiff’s hands while he used restroom. As such, defendants were entitled to new trial in which jury would still be free to find that defendants violated plaintiff’s constitutional rights by refusing to remove plaintiff’s handcuffs for purpose of humiliating and causing plaintiff psychological pain.

Dist. Ct. erred in dismissing for failure to state valid cause of action plaintiff-prisoner’s section 1983 action, alleging that defendants-prison officials were deliberately indifferent to his severe hand injury by delaying for 10 months appropriate surgery for said injury that in turn caused plaintiff to sustain needless pain as well as left him with permanent injury to his hand. Plaintiff’s hand injury was severe enough for 8th Amendment purposes, and plaintiff adequately asserted that defendants were deliberately indifferent to his hand injury, where: (1) plaintiff incurred lengthy delay before he received any meaningful treatment for his hand injury; and (2) prison doctor refused to follow specialist recommendation for treatment of plaintiff’s hand. Fact that certain prison medical personnel provided some “immediate” and “continuing” medical attention to plaintiff’s hand did not require different result, where said attention was not meaningful in context of plaintiff’s hand injury. Ct. further found that plaintiff stated adequate cause of action against prison’s private healthcare provider for maintaining alleged unconstitutional policy that precluded prison nurse from adequately addressing plaintiff’s injury where prison doctor was not present at time plaintiff sought treatment.