Federal Civil Practice

Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant’s motion to dismiss instant defamation action, where said motion was based on State of Washington’s anti-SLAPP statute that would provide both immunity to defendant and opportunity for early disposition in instant claim, where subject matter of alleged defamatory statements concerned matters of public concern, and where defendant’s alleged defamatory comments pertained to defendant’s conclusion that plaintiff’s disposal of hazardous waste violated Illinois policy. Defendant could not rely on instant Washington anti-SLAPP statute to support dismissal of lawsuit, where Washington Supreme Court had subsequently found said statute to be unconstitutional.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting motion for summary judgment by defendants-prison guards in section 1983 action by plaintiff-prisoner alleging that said defendants failed to protect him from attack by another prisoner. Defendant presented no evidence that one defendant was present during said attack, and plaintiff failed to present evidence that other defendant had actual knowledge that plaintiff was at serious risk of being harmed. Dist. Ct. also did not err in failing to recruit substitute counsel for plaintiff, where plaintiff failed to show that substitute counsel would have uncovered evidence that would have affected outcome of case.

In instant Title VII action alleging that defendant terminated plaintiff-Caucasian police officer from his position on account of his race, Dist. Ct. did not err in denying plaintiff’s motion to compel defendant-employer to produce results of “climate survey” that plaintiff had alleged contained evidence of pattern of discriminatory conduct towards non-African-American police officers. Plaintiff’s request for said document was made after deadline for making such requests, and plaintiff failed to show how he was prejudiced by Dist. Ct.’s denial where defendant failed to avail himself of subsequent opportunity to take depositions to find out about specific relevance of said survey to his discrimination claim.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing for failure to state viable cause of action plaintiff’s action alleging that defendant breached terms of settlement agreement arising out of his failure to make two settlement payments. Settlement agreement required that plaintiff dismiss cause of action it had filed against defendant in Greece, and plaintiff failed to allege in its complaint that said dismissal had actually occurred so as to trigger defendant’s obligation to make settlement payments. Fact that plaintiff had alleged its “belief” that said dismissal had occurred was insufficient to state viable cause of action that otherwise required allegation of actual dismissal. (Dissent filed.)

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendant-consumer credit-reporting agency’s motion for summary judgment in action by plaintiff, alleging that defendant’s failure to initially indicate on plaintiff’s credit report that plaintiff’s dismissal of her Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition was via plaintiff’s motion to withdraw violated Fair Credit Reporting Act, since, according to plaintiff, her credit report did not accurately describe status of her bankruptcy petition. Record showed that when plaintiff’s bankruptcy petition was withdrawn, no documentation certifying said withdrawal had been submitted to defendant, and defendant was not required to conduct its own research into underlying reasons for dismissal of plaintiff’s bankruptcy petition. Ct. further noted that since every bankruptcy case that is “withdrawn” at debtor’s request is technically “dismissed,” defendant did not inaccurately indicate status of plaintiff’s bankruptcy petition.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-City and police officer’s motion for summary judgment in section 1983 action alleging that defendant-officer’s failure to investigate plaintiff’s claim that he was assaulted by off-duty police officer violated plaintiff’s constitutional right to access to courts, since said failure resulted in spoliation of evidence that could have been used in civil case filed by plaintiff against alleged assailant. Plaintiff does not have constitutional right to have police investigate his case at all. Moreover, plaintiff did not show that any failure by officer to investigate foreclosed plaintiff's ability to learn facts of case and to seek relief for any injury where: (1) police officer did not conceal any facts about incident that plaintiff did not already know; and (2) plaintiff was not reliant on officer to discover facts necessary to fill in gaps in his knowledge. Fact that prompt search of alleged assailant’s home might have produced stronger case of plaintiff in his action against alleged assailant does not require different result.

In civil action by plaintiff-prisoner alleging that defendants-prison officials delayed date of plaintiff’s assignment from orderly to law clerk in retaliation for having lodged prior administrative grievances, Dist. Ct. did not err in denying plaintiff’s habeas petition requesting that he be brought to trial from his New Jersey prison and instead conducting trial with plaintiff participating via video teleconference. Govt. showed that transport of plaintiff to Indiana posed both expense to govt. as well as security risk in light of plaintiff’s history of assault behavior. Moreover, trial itself posed single, straight-forward issue that concerned potential damages of only $30, and Dist. Ct. had previously confirmed during pre-trial conference that video-conference would pose no logistical problem in terms of plaintiff’s ability to observe trial proceedings.

Dist. Ct. did not err in denying plaintiff’s request for issuance of $6,800 in sanctions against defendant due to defendant’s failure to attend court-ordered deposition. Record showed that defendant’s failure to attend deposition was inadvertent and irreproachable incident, where: (1) defendant was not present at court hearing when he was ordered to attend deposition; (2) defendant first became aware of court order approximately one hour after scheduled start of deposition and made offer to attend deposition at later time in same day; and (3) defendant made four unsuccessful attempts to reschedule deposition.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendant-employer’s motion for summary judgment in section 1983 action alleging that plaintiff-police officer was terminated in retaliation for his protected speech arising out of incident in which plaintiff confronted protesters in front of abortion clinic. Record showed that defendant had received report that plaintiff used harsh and profane language when questioning protesters’ use of signs in front of clinic, and Ct. found that under Pickering test, none of his statements made during instant confrontation was protected under First Amendment, where his statements to protesters: (1) had potential to create problems in maintaining discipline in police force; (2) had potential for disruption within police force; (3) conflicted with plaintiff’s responsibility of fostering trust and respect with public; and (4) were unjustified in terms of manner in which they were uttered. Dist. Ct. erred, though, in granting defendant’s motion for summary judgment with respect to plaintiff’s claim for administrative review of his termination, where plaintiff had never been given opportunity to brief said claim.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendant-School District’s motion for summary judgment in section 1983 action by plaintiff-student, alleging, among other things, that defendant singled him out for school residency investigations that served to render him ineligible to participate in high school basketball program for 10 days in retaliation for plaintiff’s mother lodging various complaints with School District. Plaintiff failed to present any evidence to counter defendant’s explanation that instant residency concerns were prompted by complaint from unrelated third-parties and not plaintiff’s mother. Moreover, Dist. Ct. could properly accept defendant’s proposed facts when ruling on instant summary judgment motion, where plaintiff’s failed to comply with local rule requiring him to make references to record when proposing alternative set of facts. Also, Ct. held that plaintiff had waived most of his appellate arguments regarding Dist. Ct.’s dismissal of other aspects of his section 1983 complaint due to his failure to comply with citation to record requirements set forth in Fed. R. App. Pro. 28(a).