Federal Civil Practice

Dist. Ct. erred in dismissing for failure to exhaust administrative remedies plaintiff-prisoner’s section 1983 action alleging that defendants-prison authorities used excessive force when handcuffing him for failure to obey guard’s order. Defendant need not exhaust any internal remedies, where record showed that plaintiff did not have access to prison handbook to explain any procedure for filing required grievance, and where prison officials told plaintiff that he could not file any grievance. Moreover, record suggested that administrative remedies were not actually available to plaintiff, where prison handbook indicated that plaintiff could not file any grievance given nature of his claim that only contested manner in which discipline was imposed.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing for failure to state viable claim plaintiff-prisoner’s section 1983 action alleging that defendants-prison officials violated his constitutional rights by placing him in segregation for 30 days for insisting on keeping his appointment with his lawyer and then rigging grievance system when he attempted to grieve his placement into segregation. Complaint clarified that basis for plaintiff’s punishment was fact that he “back talked” prison guards when complaining, which is not constitutionally protected speech. Moreover, plaintiff’s placement into segregation for 30 days without any further allegation of significant psychological or other injury was too trivial to constitute any deprivation of prisoner’s constitutionally protected liberty interests.

Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant-police officer’s motion to dismiss on qualified immunity grounds plaintiffs’ section 1983 action, alleging that defendant used excessive force by shooting plaintiff four times under circumstances, where plaintiff was subject of 911 call from someone claiming that plaintiff was suicidal, and where defendant confronted plaintiff while plaintiff was sitting in his garage with shotgun resting on his lap. Defendant was not entitled to qualified immunity where record showed that plaintiff had presented danger only to himself, and where there was factual dispute as to whether plaintiff ever pointed shotgun at defendant. Moreover, denial of motion to dismiss was proper where, under plaintiff’s view of facts, defendant used excessive force by knocking down garage door and immediately shooting plaintiff, who was neither resisting arrest nor threatening others.

Dist. Ct. erred in denying defendants-police officers’ motion to dismiss on qualified immunity grounds plaintiff’s section 1983 action, alleging that defendants-police officers violated plaintiff-off-duty police officer’s constitutional rights by detaining him without warrant or justification and taking him to local mental health facility after defendants had become aware of report that plaintiff had thoughts of suicide and of shooting others on police force. Wisconsin statute (Wis. Stat. section 51.15) allowed defendants to take plaintiff to appropriate mental health facility if they had cause to believe that plaintiff was mentally ill and had demonstrated substantial probability of imposing physical harm to himself or others. Moreover, defendants had complied with Wisc. Statute where record showed that plaintiff had previously told psychiatrist about threat to shoot people in police command, and that treatment director at mental health facility believed that plaintiff should be committed. Fact that instant three-day confinement occurred 15 days after police dept. had received psychiatrist’s report, or that plaintiff had acted rationally when defendants spoke to him prior to taking him to mental health facility did not require different result.

In instant action under Federal Tort Claims Act, Dist. Ct. did not err in denying motion by father of plaintiff to intervene in instant case, where said motion was filed nine months after parties had reached $13 million settlement and few weeks after case had been dismissed, and where intervention motion was filed so as to allow plaintiff’s attorney to seek portion of 25% contingency fee that had formed part of settlement. Dist. Ct. could properly find that motion was untimely, especially where plaintiff’s attorney failed to file intervention motion during time that attorney was monitoring case while it was still pending. Also, Dist. Ct. could not use supplemental jurisdiction to reopen case to resolve attorney fee question, where resolution of said issue would not affect net recovery of plaintiff.

Dist. Ct. erred in dismissing plaintiff-prisoner’s section 1983 action alleging that defendants-prison administrators violated his 8th Amendment rights by: (1) placing computer disk in his exit property from prison knowing that one condition of his supervised release prohibited possession of computer-related materials; and (2) subsequent discovery of disk by authorities resulted in plaintiff’s re-incarceration, which in turn, resulted in plaintiff serving more time in jail than what he should have served. Plaintiff’s allegations were sufficient to state viable 8th Amendment claim, at least with respect to defendant-assistant warden who allegedly knew of prison practice of placing similar disk in property of other inmates, and who was aware that said practice put other inmates in jeopardy who had restrictions on possession of computer-related materials. Moreover, Dist. Ct. should have allowed plaintiff to file amended complaint with respect to other defendants to assert claims regarding their alleged knowledge of prison’s practices and of plaintiff’s conditions of supervised release.

Dist. Ct. erred in dismissing for failure to state viable cause of action portion of plaintiff’s section 1983 action alleging that defendant-parole officer violated plaintiff's 8th Amendment rights by delaying her release from parole beyond its termination date. Record contained some evidence that defendant did not inform plaintiff that she was off parole until 13 months after its actual expiration, and plaintiff stated potentially viable 8th Amendment claim where: (1) parole is form of custody; (2) parolee who proves that her continued parole is unlawful is entitled to habeas relief; and (3) unlawful extension of custody is form of cruel and unusual punishment. Ct. rejected defendant’s claim that plaintiff had failed to allege that he had requisite mental state, where he had no power to adjust parole outdate, since: (1) plaintiff further alleged that defendant had prohibited her from contacting relevant officials who could have provided her with accurate information about parole’s outdate; and (2) defendant’s job duties required that he obtain accurate information regarding plaintiff’s parole outdate.

Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendants-prosecutor and lab technicians’ motion to dismiss on grounds of qualified immunity plaintiff’s section 1983 action alleging that defendants deprived him of due process by destroying exculpatory DNA evidence in order to frame plaintiff on murder charge. Instant action was not barred under Parratt doctrine, even though state tort remedies existed for same wrong, where instant claim concerned right essential to fundamental fairness of criminal trial. Moreover, defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity since at time of original investigation case law had established that bad-faith destruction of exculpatory evidence would violate suspect’s due process rights. Fact that plaintiff was not re-tried on murder charge after destruction of exculpatory evidence did not require different result. (Partial dissent filed.)

Dist. Ct. erred in dismissing for failure to state cause of action plaintiff-deaf girl scout’s action alleging that defendant-Girl Scouts’ refusal to provide her with sign language interpreter at Girl Scout functions violated section 504 of Rehabilitation Act, where Dist. Ct. improperly believed defendant, as private organization, could not qualify as entity “principally engaged” in business of providing educational or social services for purpose of coverage under said Act. Private corporations choosing to provide educational or social services are potentially covered under Rehabilitation Act, and plaintiff’s amended complaint alleged viable claim under said Act, where: (1) plaintiff asserted that defendant had received federal funds; and (2) plaintiff cited numerous instances in which defendant had characterized itself and its programs as educational. As such, Dist. Ct. erred in dismissing original complaint without giving plaintiff opportunity to proffer amended complaint and then further erred by rejecting as futile plaintiff’s “principally engaged” theory of liability as alleged in proposed amended complaint.