Federal Civil Practice

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-prison doctors’ motion for summary judgment in plaintiff-prisoner’s section 1983 action alleging that defendants were deliberately indifferent to plaintiff’s medical needs by failing to provide adequate care for his torn Achilles tendon. While plaintiff argued that one defendant was deliberately indifferent by failing to immobilize his ankle with boot immediately after his injury, and that second defendant was deliberately indifferent when he did not order physical therapy despite recommendation for such therapy from another physician, any delay in waiting to give plaintiff boot did not constitute indifference, where: (1) plaintiff was given other measures to immobilize his ankle at same time; (2) defendants presented testimony that torn Achilles tendon would probably heal without boot. Moreover, failure to order physical therapy was not so contrary to accepted professional standards, where plaintiff had already received full range of motion in ankle as result of existing treatment at time physical therapy had been recommended. (Dissent filed.)

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting plaintiff’s motion for class certification in action that defendant fraudulently represented that its product (Instaflex) relieved joint discomfort, even though defendant argued that Dist. Ct. abused its discretion by not first finding under heightened “ascertainable” standard that proposed class members were sufficiently ascertainable by first examining any potential difficulty in identifying particular members of class and by evaluating ability of Dist. Ct. to distinguish fraudulent claims that might be submitted by putative class members. Ct. found that existing requirements under Rule 23 already address balance of interests when determining suitability of proposed class action in instant low value consumer action, where it might be unreasonable to expect consumers to have saved proof of purchase of defendant’s product. As such, Ct. would allow putative class members to submit affidavits to establish said purchases. It also rejected defendant’s insistence that class demonstrate as initial matter existence of administratively feasible mechanism for determining whether putative class members fell within proposed class definition. Rather, Ct. emphasized that refusing to certify proposed class on manageability grounds should be matter of last resort.

Dist. Ct. erred in granting defendants-prison officials’ motion for summary judgment in section 1983 action by plaintiff-prisoner alleging that defendants were deliberately indifferent to his gastroesophageal reflux disease (GERD) condition by failing to renew his Zantac prescription to treat said condition for period of two months. GERD is potentially dangerous and painful disease, which, if left untreated for two months, is dereliction of medical duty, especially where treatment requires only few over-the-counter pills. On remand, Ct. directed Dist. Ct. to consider whether appointed counsel would be necessary to assist plaintiff.

Dist. Ct. lacked subject matter jurisdiction to consider plaintiffs’ state-court action seeking declaration that they did not owe defendant-insurance company $44,000 in interest payments that accrued over years that plaintiffs borrowed against cash value of variable life-insurance policy issued by defendant, where plaintiffs’ action had been removed to federal court by defendant. Defendant could not establish requisite $75,000 amount in controversy requirement to establish removal jurisdiction, where said interest payments were well below jurisdictional threshold. Moreover, plaintiffs’ separate request in lawsuit to cancel entire loan balance of $70,000 could not be used to satisfy amount in controversy threshold requirement, where there was no legal basis for plaintiff’s request. Also, plaintiff’s subsequent amendment seeking to add federal securities-law claim did not supply Dist. Ct. with jurisdiction since: (1) applicable timeframe for establishing removal jurisdiction is date of removal; and (2) instant securities-law claim was time-barred.

Dist. Ct. erred in denying plaintiff’s request for attorney fees in action challenging Indiana’s retention of interest from lost property held under Indiana’s Unclaimed Property Act, where Ct. of Appeals initially found that said retention was unconstitutional, and where Indiana subsequently amended said Act to provide interest payments to claimants of lost property. While Dist. Ct.’s denial of attorney fee request was based on finding that amendment of Act rendered plaintiff’s underlying constitutional claim moot, plaintiff was still prevailing party both before and after Indiana amended said Act, and thus was entitled to said fees.

In action by decedent’s estate for redetermination of IRS disallowance of estate’s claimed $14 million deduction that represented payouts of estate’s property to decedent’s heirs, Tax Court did not err in denying estate’s request to vacate estate’s prior settlement with IRS that would allow estate to take 52.5% of claimed deduction, even though estate asserted that subsequent lawsuit filed by heirs resulted in estate paying heirs more money than what was at issue at time of settlement. By entering into settlement, estate took risk that new information discovered after settlement agreement would be harmful to estate. Moreover, Ct. rejected estate’s argument that: (1) subsequent lawsuit by heirs constituted “mutual mistake” that supported vacatur of settlement under circumstances where claimed deduction was less than what estate had originally agreed to pay heirs; and (2) IRS made misrepresentation during settlement negotiations by failing to inform estate that heirs might initiate new lawsuit against estate.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing as frivolous plaintiff’s section 1983 action against defendants-financial institutions involved in foreclosure of plaintiff’s mortgage, where plaintiff asserted that defendants violated his federal Constitutional rights by foreclosing on mortgage without holding actual note or mortgage at time of foreclosure. Plaintiff failed to allege that defendants were state actors so as to render them suable under section 1983. Ct. further noted that instant complaint failed to invoke jurisdiction of Dist. Ct. because there was no possibility that Dist. Ct. could have given plaintiff any relief.

Ct. of Appeals lacked jurisdiction to consider plaintiff-prisoner’s appeal of Dist. Ct.’s grant of defendants-prison officials’ motion for summary judgment in section 1983 action alleging that defendants were deliberately indifferent to his safety, where plaintiff filed notice of appeal beyond applicable 30-day period for doing so. Moreover, record showed that plaintiff had attempted to file Rule 59(e) motion to alter Dist. Ct.’s judgment that would have tolled time for filing notice of appeal, but failed to timely file said motion. Ct. of Appeals also observed that plaintiff should have been advised that his best option upon entry of summary judgment order was to file simple notice of appeal, rather filing any Rule 59(e) motion or motion seeking extension of time to file same.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-police officials’ motion for summary judgment in section 1983 action alleging that defendants subjected plaintiff to false arrest and malicious prosecution arising out of plaintiff’s arrest on burglary and battery charges stemming from incident in which plaintiff’s neighbor claimed that plaintiff had entered his house and physically assaulted him. Plaintiff could not establish false arrest claim, where defendant-police officer had probable cause to arrest plaintiff based on neighbor’s identification of plaintiff as culprit under circumstances where officer had no reason to believe that neighbor harbored any ill will toward plaintiff. Plaintiff also could not establish malicious prosecution claim against officer or City since: (1) Indiana law shielded govt. employees from such claim; and (2) any 4th Amendment malicious prosecution claim required plaintiff to show either lack of probable cause or presence of malice. Finally, defendant-neighbor was entitled to dismissal without prejudice of federal malicious prosecution claim, since plaintiff had adequate remedy in state court for such action. Moreover, Dist. Ct. was directed to remand plaintiff’s state-court false-arrest and malicious prosecution claims to state court for resolution in that forum.

Dist. Ct. erred in dismissing on standing grounds plaintiffs’ class action seeking damages arising out of defendant’s delayed announcement that it was subject to cyber attack that resulted in theft of plaintiffs-customers’ credit card numbers, where plaintiffs alleged, among other things, that they experienced fraudulent purchases on their credit cards as result of defendant’s conduct. While record showed that defendant had remedied any current losses arising out of fraudulent purchases and had given plaintiffs one-year of free credit monitoring services, plaintiffs successfully alleged that instant data breach inflicted other concrete particularized injuries that would support their standing to pursue instant claim in form of alleged lost time and money spent on replacing their credit cards and monitoring their credit scores beyond period of time given by defendant. Ct. rejected defendant’s contention that any alleged future injuries would not support Article III standing to pursue instant claim, where plaintiffs adequately asserted substantial risk of incurring future injuries. Moreover, plaintiffs need not wait until they experienced actual identity theft before they can bring instant lawsuit, and fact that other stores could have compromised plaintiffs’ private credit card information did not negate plaintiffs’ standing in instant case.