Federal Civil Practice

Plaintiff-civil detainee’s failure to file post-trial motion for judgment as matter of law under Rule 50, in section 1983 action alleging that defendant-prison medical official was deliberately indifferent to plaintiff’s medical needs, precluded Ct. of Appeals from acting on plaintiff’s claim that jury’s verdict in favor of defendant was against manifest weight of evidence. Moreover, plaintiff was not entitled to new trial even though defendant made improper reference during his testimony to length of plaintiff’s incarceration, where: (1) plaintiff did not seek mistrial at time reference was made; and (2) Dist. Ct. gave proper curative instruction to jury.

Dist. Ct. erred in remanding to state court due to lack of federal jurisdiction, instant cases by plaintiffs-airline passengers, who alleged that airplane’s autothrottle, autopilot, and low-airspeed-warning systems contributed to pilot error that caused airline crash when landing at airport, where said cases had been removed to federal court under 28 USC sections 1333 and 1442. While Dist. Ct. correctly found that instant cases were not removable under federal official’s right to have claims resolved in federal court provisions in section 1442(a)(1), Dist. Ct. erred in finding that said cases were not removable under admiralty jurisdiction provisions of section 1333, since: (1) accidents occurring to airplanes can potentially come within admiralty jurisdiction provisions of section 1333 if injuries to plaintiffs were caused by events occurring while airplane is over water; (2) instant flight from Seoul, Korea to San Francisco crossed Pacific Ocean; and (3) finding of NTSB indicated that any malfunction in instant airplane’s systems could have occurred while airplane was still flying over Pacific Ocean before it crashed on landing.

In plaintiff-civil detainee’s section 1983 action alleging that defendants-security guards violated his right to be free from unreasonable restraints when defendants refused to take off his handcuffs in order to allow him to successfully use courthouse restroom, Dist. Ct. erred in giving jury instruction that did not require jury to find that defendants possessed purposeful, knowing or possibly reckless state of mind when taking actions against plaintiff. Moreover, said instruction improperly allowed jury to award plaintiff $1,000 in compensatory damages for defendants being merely negligent in keeping handcuffs on plaintiff’s hands while he used restroom. As such, defendants were entitled to new trial in which jury would still be free to find that defendants violated plaintiff’s constitutional rights by refusing to remove plaintiff’s handcuffs for purpose of humiliating and causing plaintiff psychological pain.

Dist. Ct. erred in dismissing for failure to state valid cause of action plaintiff-prisoner’s section 1983 action, alleging that defendants-prison officials were deliberately indifferent to his severe hand injury by delaying for 10 months appropriate surgery for said injury that in turn caused plaintiff to sustain needless pain as well as left him with permanent injury to his hand. Plaintiff’s hand injury was severe enough for 8th Amendment purposes, and plaintiff adequately asserted that defendants were deliberately indifferent to his hand injury, where: (1) plaintiff incurred lengthy delay before he received any meaningful treatment for his hand injury; and (2) prison doctor refused to follow specialist recommendation for treatment of plaintiff’s hand. Fact that certain prison medical personnel provided some “immediate” and “continuing” medical attention to plaintiff’s hand did not require different result, where said attention was not meaningful in context of plaintiff’s hand injury. Ct. further found that plaintiff stated adequate cause of action against prison’s private healthcare provider for maintaining alleged unconstitutional policy that precluded prison nurse from adequately addressing plaintiff’s injury where prison doctor was not present at time plaintiff sought treatment.

Dist. Ct. erred in dismissing for failure to state viable claim plaintiff-Trustee’s action alleging that defendant-law firm committed legal malpractice by failing to advise now insolvent investment fund to seek additional protections when lending fund’s money to third-party, who used said funds for improper Ponzi scheme and by failing to advise fund of possibility that third-party was committing fraud. Dist. Ct. improperly analyzed motion to dismiss from viewpoint of defendant and failed to address plaintiff’s main contention that defendant failed to alert fund that there was increased risk in allowing third-party to repay loan through himself rather through direct payment from more secure entity. Ct. rejected proposition that transaction lawyer never needs to supply client with legal information that affects degree of business risk associated with particular transaction and instead found that said lawyer must tell clients which different legal forms are available to carry out client’s business, and how any risks of that business differ with different legal forms.

Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant’s motion to vacate default judgment that had been entered after defendant’s original counsel had failed to file answer to complaint. Instant motion to vacate had been filed within six months of entry of final judgment, and thus “mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect” standard applied under Rule 60(b)(1). Moreover, plaintiff failed to show that both its own conduct and conduct of its lawyer satisfied definition of “excusable neglect,” where: (1) defendant initially failed to tender complaint to its insurer when it received instant personal injury complaint; and (2) defendant failed to act promptly to protect itself after being alerted by co-defendant that defendant’s counsel had failed to file answer to complaint.

Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendants’ motion to vacate default judgment entered against them in action alleging that defendants breached franchise agreement, even though defendants argued that they were victims of their original attorney’s failure to file answer to complaint or file more timely motion to vacate default judgment. Instant motion to set aside default judgment was filed more than one year after entry of final judgment, and thus defendants were required under Rule 60(b)(6) to establish existence of “extraordinary circumstances.” Moreover, defendants did not establish such standard where defendants merely alleged that their counsel committed malpractice. As such, while defendants had potential malpractice claim against their attorney, they could not reopen instant case, where plaintiff played no role with respect to any malpractice committed by defendant’s attorney. Ct. further observed that defendants could have taken steps to discover their attorney’s alleged inaction and could have taken more timely steps to retain substitute counsel.

Dist. Ct. did not err in denying plaintiff’s request for preliminary injunction in action alleging that defendants violated plaintiffs’ constitutional rights by requiring them to take annual drug tests as part of condition for plaintiffs being allowed to renew residential leases as tenants in certain housing buildings. Dist. Ct. could properly find that plaintiffs’ underlying claim lacked merit where source of instant drug-testing policy were defendants-private owners of said buildings rather than defendant housing authority, and where said policy would therefore be beyond reach of 4th Amendment. Moreover, while there was evidence that housing authority did not disapprove of drug testing in subject buildings and had requested that one private owner conduct said tests, record also showed that decisions to drug-test were made by building owners, and that housing authority did not coerce said owners to require drug testing of its tenants.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing with prejudice plaintiff’s pro se second-amended complaint alleging violations of Title VII, as well as section 1981 and 1983, arising out of her termination as bus driver. Dist. Ct. identified certain deficiencies in plaintiff’s second-amended complaint, and plaintiff failed to indicate either in her post-trial motion or on appeal how any proposed third-amended complaint would cure said deficiencies. Ct. rejected plaintiff’s contention that she was entitled to file third-amended complaint because counsel who had assisted her in drafting original complaint was in process of “getting up to speed” on her case.

Dist. Ct. did not err in awarding only $303,000 in attorney fees to plaintiffs’ class counsel as part of plaintiffs’ claim that defendant had failed to timely notify class members of their COBRA rights. While class counsel contended that he was entitled to additional fees from instant class members under “common fund” theory, counsel was not entitled to any additional fees, where his initial fees were received pursuant to fee-shifting statute. Ct. further noted that additional fees would be unwarranted in instant case where class counsel: (1) had filed untimely notice of appeal as to other aspects of underlying case; and (2) sought remand of case based, in part, on claim that certain class members had received too much compensation.