Federal Civil Practice

Dist. Ct. erred in dismissing portion of plaintiff’s section 1983 action, alleging that defendants-police officials violated his 4th Amendment rights when defendants entered his home, subjected him to painful tactics, and refused to provide him with medical attention in attempt to obtain damaging admissions from plaintiff that were used to generate criminal charges to which plaintiff had pleaded guilty. While Dist. Ct. believed that plaintiff’s action was subject to dismissal under Heck, 512 US 477, because judgment in plaintiff’s favor would imply invalidity of his underlying convictions, dismissal was improper since establishment of instant alleged 4th Amendment/excessive force violation would not exonerate plaintiff from his underlying false statement and attempted extortion convictions. However, Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing plaintiff’s 5th Amendment due process claim alleging that he was improperly coerced into providing false response that formed basis of his false-statement conviction, since favorable verdict for plaintiff would be inconsistent with said conviction.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-City officials’ motion for summary judgment in section 1983 action alleging that defendants violated plaintiff-property owner’s class-of-one equal protection rights by making unreasonable demands as part of plaintiff’s efforts to obtain defendants’ approval to construct condominium project. While plaintiff argued that defendant intentionally treated him differently than other property owners, condition of plaintiff’s property that required multiple rounds of asbestos removal precluded plaintiff from establishing existence of similarly-situated comparator. Moreover, existence of said problems provided defendants with rational basis that justified failure to give timely approval for plaintiff to proceed with construction project.

Dist. Ct. erred in granting defendants-prosecutor and police detectives’ motion for summary judgment in section 1983 action alleging that defendants violated plaintiff’s 4th Amendment rights by causing issuance of plaintiff’s arrest warrant without probable cause, after finding that defendant-prosecutor was entitled to absolute immunity and that defendants-detectives were entitled to qualified immunity. Under Kalina, 522 US 118, defendant-prosecutor was not entitled to absolute immunity where plaintiff alleged that prosecutor was acting as witness, as opposed to advocate of state, when he personally vouched for false testimony provided by defendants-detectives in order to obtain plaintiff’s arrest warrant. Moreover, defendants-detectives were not entitled to qualified immunity, where plaintiff alleged that both detectives conducted investigation that turned up no evidence linking plaintiff to crime and yet gave false information to obtain said arrest warrant.

Dist Ct. erred in granting plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment in action seeking injunction against defendant-Ho-Chunk Nation from conducting nonbanked poker games within its tribal casinos, where plaintiff alleged that nonbanked poker was Class III game. Record showed that nonbanked poker was Class II game, and as such defendant had authority under its compact with plaintiff to offer such game without securing plaintiff’s authority. Ct. further noted that because poker was not explicitly prohibited by Wisconsin law, plaintiff could not prevent defendant or any other Indian tribe from offering poker on tribe’s sovereign lands.

Dist. Ct. did not err in denying plaintiffs-gun owners’ request to enjoin enforcement of defendant’s ordinance than banned possession of assault weapons (any semi-automatic gun that can accept large-capacity magazine), as well as large capacity magazine that can accept more than 10 rounds. While plaintiffs argued that said ordinance violated Second Amendment as construed under Heller, 554 US 570, record contained some evidence suggesting that subject guns were “dangerous,” and instant ordinance, consistent with Heller, otherwise allowed citizens to own variety of handguns that could be used for self-protection. Moreover, Ct. agreed with defendant that some categorical limits on kinds of weapons that can be possessed are proper, and further noted that similar ordinance has already been found not to violate Second Amendment by another Circuit Court of Appeals. Ct. also observed that close questions concerning relation among assault weapons, crime and self-defense are best resolved through political process, rather than through court system. (Dissent filed.)

Dist. Ct. erred in granting defendants-prison officials’ motion for summary judgment in plaintiff-prisoner’s action alleging that defendants violated Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act by denying plaintiff’s (member of Navajo Tribe) request for venison and use of multi-color headband during celebration of Tribe’s Ghost Feast, which defendants conceded was religious event. While Dist. Ct. found that absence of venison would not impose substantial burden on plaintiff’s religious exercise, summary judgment required Dist. Ct. to view all disputed facts in light most favorable to plaintiff, who indicated that venison played important role in Ghost Feast. Moreover, limited state of record failed to support defendants’ argument that increased expense at providing USDA-inspected venison was compelling reason to deny such request. Also, defendants failed to establish that plaintiff’s request for multi-colored headband related to their concern that such headband would act as signal of gang membership to other inmates.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-police officials’ motion for summary judgment in section 1983 action alleging defendants lied about date of certain police dept. roll call announcement at which plaintiff-police officer was present, which formed basis of plaintiff’s prosecution on drug conspiracy charges that eventually resulted in plaintiff’s acquittal. Grand jury’s indictment on said charge was prima facie evidence of existence of probable cause that served to preclude plaintiff’s malicious prosecution claim, and record otherwise showed existence of probable cause where: (1) purported drug dealer had attempted to bribe other police officers; and (2) wire tap evidence indicated that plaintiff had made several calls to said drug dealer to either meet in person or to warn drug dealer about arrest of drug dealer’s associate. Moreover, record refuted plaintiff’s theory that he was set up by defendants after they had become aware that plaintiff had warned drug dealer about police surveillance that had been announced at said roll call. Also, plaintiff could not assert similar equal protection claim where: (1) such claim was mere rewording of unsuccessful malicious prosecution action; and (2) none of plaintiff’s comparable police officers were similarly-situated to plaintiff.

Dist. Ct. erred in dismissing on statute of limitations grounds plaintiffs’ class action alleging that defendants violated RICO through efforts to unlawfully market anticonvulsant medication (Depakote) for ineffective and unsafe “off-label” uses that had not been approved by FDA. While defendants argued that instant 2013 action fell outside applicable 4-year limitation period since it sought damages for injuries going back to 1998, when class members began reimbursing for off-label prescriptions for Depakote, Dist. Ct. erred in resolving statute of limitations issue prior to parties conducting any discovery. Moreover, record was unclear from contents of complaint as to when class members actually became aware that they were paying for off-label use of said drug, or when class members should have discovered that they had paid more for off-label uses of said drug than it otherwise would have had to pay in absence of any unlawful marketing scheme.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendant-police officer’s motion to dismiss on qualified immunity grounds plaintiff (15-year old female’s) section 1983 action, alleging that defendant, in responding to 911 call that involved plaintiff and three males, improperly left plaintiff, who was intoxicated, with said males under circumstances where defendant called off another police officer who had also responded to said call, and where plaintiff was subsequently sexually assaulted by one of said males. Plaintiff failed to identify any existing case law that would have required defendant to protect plaintiff against private violence under allegations of instant complaint. Moreover, plaintiff failed to state viable due process claim since: (1) State’s failure to protect individual against private violence does not generally establish any due process claim; (2) any state-created danger exception did not apply, if record showed that defendant merely stood by and did nothing to prevent private violence; and (3) defendant’s decision to leave plaintiff with said males placed her in no worse position than that in which she would have been placed had defendant not acted at all. Fact that instant dismissal occurred before any discovery took place did not require different result.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing plaintiffs’ class action alleging that defendant-airline’s cancellation of flights, as well as its long delays for flights emanating from airports located in European Union Member States, violated certain regulations promulgated by European Parliament. Record showed that said regulations had not been incorporated into defendant’s contract for carriage so as to support any breach of contract claim, and relevant regulations, which required each EU Member State to designate appropriate body to handle enforcement of said regulation, implicitly limited judicial redress to courts of EU Member States.