Federal Civil Practice

Ct. of Appeals denied defendant-City’s petition for writ of mandamus seeking to have Ct. remove Dist. Ct. Judge from series of related lawsuits, alleging that defendant’s police officers conducted unconstitutional pedestrian stops and searches. While defendant asserted that Judge made five comments in prior lawsuits that indicated that he was not impartial or had predisposition to rule against defendant in future cases, none of five statements (four of which did not involve Judge’s reference to extrajudicial source) displayed deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible. Moreover, Judge’s observation in prior case that defendant’s Chief of Police was encouraging large amount of pedestrian stops did not indicate that Judge abandoned duty to decide each case fairly on its own merits. Record also showed that Dist. Ct. had made important rulings favorable to defendant in prior cases.

Dist. Ct. erred in finding that plaintiff’s e-filed complaint was untimely where, although plaintiff tendered said complaint by emailing same to Dist. Ct. Clerk within applicable statute of limitations period, plaintiff failed to successfully pay filing fee and upload complaint into CM/ECF system within applicable limitations period in accordance with local rule. Although filing process was not complete under local rule until complaint was uploaded, transmittal of complaint via email effectively delivered it to Clerk for purposes of Rule 5(d)(2). Accordingly, delay in uploading complaint was mere defect in form, which did not prevent instant complaint from tolling statute of limitations period when complaint was initially received by Clerk.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendant-college’s motion for summary judgment in False Claims Act action by plaintiff-former employee of defendant, alleging that defendant’s student recruiting and retention practices resulted in transmission of thousands of false claims for receipt of federal subsidies under Title IV of Higher Education Act. Plaintiff failed to show that at time defendant entered into agreement with govt. that it intended to defraud govt. and then planned to use said agreement to submit false claims for payment. Moreover, any alleged failure by defendant to follow terms of agreement with govt. that took place after defendant’s good-faith intent to follow same, establishes, at most, defendant’s breach of contract, which is insufficient to establish liability under False Claims Act. Also, Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing portion of plaintiff’s complaint that concerned defendant’s alleged conduct that occurred both before and after plaintiff’s employment with defendant, where plaintiff conceded that his allegations had been publicly disclosed, and where plaintiff failed to show that he was original source of said allegations.

Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant’s motion for summary judgment asserting qualified immunity in section 1983 action alleging that defendant violated plaintiff-parolee’s equal protection rights, when plaintiff complained that defendant’s subordinate-parole officer had sexually harassed him, (i.e., by propositioning him, making physical advances and offering to take him off ankle monitor in exchange for allowing subordinate to take nude pictures of him), when defendant, after being told of plaintiff’s complaint, failed to intervene or investigate and then threatened to retaliate by telling plaintiff that he would not get off ankle monitor due to his complaint. While defendant argued that she could not be liable in her supervisory role for only failing to intervene and stop her subordinate from sexually harassing plaintiff, defendant was not entitled to qualified immunity under instant record where reasonable jury could infer through defendant’s alleged failure to intervene and her alleged retaliatory threats that defendant was acting with intent to discriminate.

Dist. Ct. erred in denying without hearing defendants’ motion to vacate default judgment entered against them approximately one year prior to filing instant motion. Defendants included in their motion affidavits that disputed claims in two affidavits from process servers that they had been served with copies of the complaint alleging breach of contract and deceptive practices, and thus hearing was necessary to resolve said dispute. Ct. rejected plaintiff’s claim that affidavits from two service processors entitled it to presumption of truth on issue of whether complaint had been served on defendants, after noting that defendants’ contrary affidavits shifted burden back to plaintiff, as party asserting personal jurisdiction, to prove what it had alleged.

Dist. Ct. erred in severing one of plaintiff-prisoner’s claims in section 1983 action against defendants-prison officials, and in opening new case with severed claim, in assessing plaintiff second filing fee and then dismissing with prejudice severed claim after plaintiff had failed to pay second filing fee. Although plaintiff’s complaint included misjoined defendant that formed basis of severance order, Dist. Ct. should have offered plaintiff opportunity to amend complaint under Rule 15 to cure any misjoined claim rather than require that plaintiff dismiss said claim. Moreover, plaintiff had submitted to prison authorities for e-filing his motion to voluntarily dismiss instant severed claim within deadline set by Dist. Ct. As such, plaintiff’s motion was timely under prison mailbox rule, and thus Dist. Ct. should not have severed plaintiff’s claim or imposed second filing fee.

Dist. Ct. erred in dismissing for failure to exhaust administrative remedies plaintiff-prisoner’s section 1983 action alleging that defendants-prison authorities used excessive force when handcuffing him for failure to obey guard’s order. Defendant need not exhaust any internal remedies, where record showed that plaintiff did not have access to prison handbook to explain any procedure for filing required grievance, and where prison officials told plaintiff that he could not file any grievance. Moreover, record suggested that administrative remedies were not actually available to plaintiff, where prison handbook indicated that plaintiff could not file any grievance given nature of his claim that only contested manner in which discipline was imposed.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing for failure to state viable claim plaintiff-prisoner’s section 1983 action alleging that defendants-prison officials violated his constitutional rights by placing him in segregation for 30 days for insisting on keeping his appointment with his lawyer and then rigging grievance system when he attempted to grieve his placement into segregation. Complaint clarified that basis for plaintiff’s punishment was fact that he “back talked” prison guards when complaining, which is not constitutionally protected speech. Moreover, plaintiff’s placement into segregation for 30 days without any further allegation of significant psychological or other injury was too trivial to constitute any deprivation of prisoner’s constitutionally protected liberty interests.

Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant-police officer’s motion to dismiss on qualified immunity grounds plaintiffs’ section 1983 action, alleging that defendant used excessive force by shooting plaintiff four times under circumstances, where plaintiff was subject of 911 call from someone claiming that plaintiff was suicidal, and where defendant confronted plaintiff while plaintiff was sitting in his garage with shotgun resting on his lap. Defendant was not entitled to qualified immunity where record showed that plaintiff had presented danger only to himself, and where there was factual dispute as to whether plaintiff ever pointed shotgun at defendant. Moreover, denial of motion to dismiss was proper where, under plaintiff’s view of facts, defendant used excessive force by knocking down garage door and immediately shooting plaintiff, who was neither resisting arrest nor threatening others.