Federal Civil Practice

Dist. Ct. erred in denying defendants-police officers’ motion to dismiss on qualified immunity grounds plaintiff’s section 1983 action, alleging that defendants-police officers violated plaintiff-off-duty police officer’s constitutional rights by detaining him without warrant or justification and taking him to local mental health facility after defendants had become aware of report that plaintiff had thoughts of suicide and of shooting others on police force. Wisconsin statute (Wis. Stat. section 51.15) allowed defendants to take plaintiff to appropriate mental health facility if they had cause to believe that plaintiff was mentally ill and had demonstrated substantial probability of imposing physical harm to himself or others. Moreover, defendants had complied with Wisc. Statute where record showed that plaintiff had previously told psychiatrist about threat to shoot people in police command, and that treatment director at mental health facility believed that plaintiff should be committed. Fact that instant three-day confinement occurred 15 days after police dept. had received psychiatrist’s report, or that plaintiff had acted rationally when defendants spoke to him prior to taking him to mental health facility did not require different result.

In instant action under Federal Tort Claims Act, Dist. Ct. did not err in denying motion by father of plaintiff to intervene in instant case, where said motion was filed nine months after parties had reached $13 million settlement and few weeks after case had been dismissed, and where intervention motion was filed so as to allow plaintiff’s attorney to seek portion of 25% contingency fee that had formed part of settlement. Dist. Ct. could properly find that motion was untimely, especially where plaintiff’s attorney failed to file intervention motion during time that attorney was monitoring case while it was still pending. Also, Dist. Ct. could not use supplemental jurisdiction to reopen case to resolve attorney fee question, where resolution of said issue would not affect net recovery of plaintiff.

Dist. Ct. erred in dismissing plaintiff-prisoner’s section 1983 action alleging that defendants-prison administrators violated his 8th Amendment rights by: (1) placing computer disk in his exit property from prison knowing that one condition of his supervised release prohibited possession of computer-related materials; and (2) subsequent discovery of disk by authorities resulted in plaintiff’s re-incarceration, which in turn, resulted in plaintiff serving more time in jail than what he should have served. Plaintiff’s allegations were sufficient to state viable 8th Amendment claim, at least with respect to defendant-assistant warden who allegedly knew of prison practice of placing similar disk in property of other inmates, and who was aware that said practice put other inmates in jeopardy who had restrictions on possession of computer-related materials. Moreover, Dist. Ct. should have allowed plaintiff to file amended complaint with respect to other defendants to assert claims regarding their alleged knowledge of prison’s practices and of plaintiff’s conditions of supervised release.

Dist. Ct. erred in dismissing for failure to state viable cause of action portion of plaintiff’s section 1983 action alleging that defendant-parole officer violated plaintiff's 8th Amendment rights by delaying her release from parole beyond its termination date. Record contained some evidence that defendant did not inform plaintiff that she was off parole until 13 months after its actual expiration, and plaintiff stated potentially viable 8th Amendment claim where: (1) parole is form of custody; (2) parolee who proves that her continued parole is unlawful is entitled to habeas relief; and (3) unlawful extension of custody is form of cruel and unusual punishment. Ct. rejected defendant’s claim that plaintiff had failed to allege that he had requisite mental state, where he had no power to adjust parole outdate, since: (1) plaintiff further alleged that defendant had prohibited her from contacting relevant officials who could have provided her with accurate information about parole’s outdate; and (2) defendant’s job duties required that he obtain accurate information regarding plaintiff’s parole outdate.

Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendants-prosecutor and lab technicians’ motion to dismiss on grounds of qualified immunity plaintiff’s section 1983 action alleging that defendants deprived him of due process by destroying exculpatory DNA evidence in order to frame plaintiff on murder charge. Instant action was not barred under Parratt doctrine, even though state tort remedies existed for same wrong, where instant claim concerned right essential to fundamental fairness of criminal trial. Moreover, defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity since at time of original investigation case law had established that bad-faith destruction of exculpatory evidence would violate suspect’s due process rights. Fact that plaintiff was not re-tried on murder charge after destruction of exculpatory evidence did not require different result. (Partial dissent filed.)

Dist. Ct. erred in dismissing for failure to state cause of action plaintiff-deaf girl scout’s action alleging that defendant-Girl Scouts’ refusal to provide her with sign language interpreter at Girl Scout functions violated section 504 of Rehabilitation Act, where Dist. Ct. improperly believed defendant, as private organization, could not qualify as entity “principally engaged” in business of providing educational or social services for purpose of coverage under said Act. Private corporations choosing to provide educational or social services are potentially covered under Rehabilitation Act, and plaintiff’s amended complaint alleged viable claim under said Act, where: (1) plaintiff asserted that defendant had received federal funds; and (2) plaintiff cited numerous instances in which defendant had characterized itself and its programs as educational. As such, Dist. Ct. erred in dismissing original complaint without giving plaintiff opportunity to proffer amended complaint and then further erred by rejecting as futile plaintiff’s “principally engaged” theory of liability as alleged in proposed amended complaint.

Dist. Ct. erred in dismissing portion of plaintiff’s section 1983 action, alleging that defendants-police officials violated his 4th Amendment rights when defendants entered his home, subjected him to painful tactics, and refused to provide him with medical attention in attempt to obtain damaging admissions from plaintiff that were used to generate criminal charges to which plaintiff had pleaded guilty. While Dist. Ct. believed that plaintiff’s action was subject to dismissal under Heck, 512 US 477, because judgment in plaintiff’s favor would imply invalidity of his underlying convictions, dismissal was improper since establishment of instant alleged 4th Amendment/excessive force violation would not exonerate plaintiff from his underlying false statement and attempted extortion convictions. However, Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing plaintiff’s 5th Amendment due process claim alleging that he was improperly coerced into providing false response that formed basis of his false-statement conviction, since favorable verdict for plaintiff would be inconsistent with said conviction.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-City officials’ motion for summary judgment in section 1983 action alleging that defendants violated plaintiff-property owner’s class-of-one equal protection rights by making unreasonable demands as part of plaintiff’s efforts to obtain defendants’ approval to construct condominium project. While plaintiff argued that defendant intentionally treated him differently than other property owners, condition of plaintiff’s property that required multiple rounds of asbestos removal precluded plaintiff from establishing existence of similarly-situated comparator. Moreover, existence of said problems provided defendants with rational basis that justified failure to give timely approval for plaintiff to proceed with construction project.

Dist. Ct. erred in granting defendants-prosecutor and police detectives’ motion for summary judgment in section 1983 action alleging that defendants violated plaintiff’s 4th Amendment rights by causing issuance of plaintiff’s arrest warrant without probable cause, after finding that defendant-prosecutor was entitled to absolute immunity and that defendants-detectives were entitled to qualified immunity. Under Kalina, 522 US 118, defendant-prosecutor was not entitled to absolute immunity where plaintiff alleged that prosecutor was acting as witness, as opposed to advocate of state, when he personally vouched for false testimony provided by defendants-detectives in order to obtain plaintiff’s arrest warrant. Moreover, defendants-detectives were not entitled to qualified immunity, where plaintiff alleged that both detectives conducted investigation that turned up no evidence linking plaintiff to crime and yet gave false information to obtain said arrest warrant.

Dist Ct. erred in granting plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment in action seeking injunction against defendant-Ho-Chunk Nation from conducting nonbanked poker games within its tribal casinos, where plaintiff alleged that nonbanked poker was Class III game. Record showed that nonbanked poker was Class II game, and as such defendant had authority under its compact with plaintiff to offer such game without securing plaintiff’s authority. Ct. further noted that because poker was not explicitly prohibited by Wisconsin law, plaintiff could not prevent defendant or any other Indian tribe from offering poker on tribe’s sovereign lands.