Federal Civil Practice

In action brought by govt. seeking civil forfeiture of funds held by defendant that belonged to Abu al Tayyeb, who was suspected of providing financial and military support for al Qaeda, Dist. Ct. erred in granting summary judgment to instant claimants-insurance companies that had paid over $2.5 billion in property damage claims arising out of September 11 attacks, where said claimants asserted that they were entitled to said funds under Terrorism Risk Insurance Act (TRIA). Although claimants had standing to sue for said funds, they were not entitled to said funds under TRIA since at time instant claim was filed by claimants, said funds were not “blocked” funds, but rather were subject to license issued by Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), and thus were outside ambit of TRIA where, as here, govt. had been given authority to control said funds through instant civil forfeiture action. (Partial dissent filed.)

Dist. Ct. erred in dismissing for failure to state cause of action plaintiff-prisoner’s 1983 action alleging that defendants-prison officials’ transportation of plaintiff from county jail to state prison while clothed in transparent jumpsuit that exposed plaintiff’s genitals and buttocks violated his 8th Amendment rights, where plaintiff alleged that use of transparent jumpsuit had no legitimate correctional purpose, but was instead used to humiliate and inflict psychological pain. Moreover, Dist. Ct. erred in granting defendants’ motion for summary judgment on plaintiff’s 4th Amendment claim on basis that plaintiff had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, where plaintiff’s transfer made it impossible to comply with jail’s specific grievance procedures. However, plaintiff could not prevail on merits of his 4th Amendment claim, where plaintiff’s status as convicted prisoner precluded him from establishing that wearing said jumpsuit constituted unreasonable search in absence of allegation that defendants had actually intruded into his body.

In personal injury action filed by debtor, in which debtor sought to substitute his Bankruptcy Trustee as plaintiff due to fact that debtor had failed to include instant action in his previously-filed Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition, Dist. Ct. erred in finding that Trustee’s recovery in instant action could not exceed value of debts that had not been paid in debtor’s Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition. Dist. Ct. did not find that debtor had deliberately hid instant action from his creditors in bankruptcy proceeding, and Dist. Ct.’s categorical rule that would limit recovery in all cases where debtor had failed to include litigation in bankruptcy petition could potentially hurt creditors under circumstances where limitation would reduce amount at stake to level which would induce Trustee to abandon subsequent litigation. As such, debtors, who in good faith erred by not including all litigation in bankruptcy petition, remain entitled to any surplus recovered in such litigation just as if said litigation had been originally listed in bankruptcy petition.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting on immunity grounds defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff-reporter’s section 1983 action alleging that defendants violated his First Amendment right to freedom of press by denying his request for media credentials for Illinois House of Representatives and Illinois Senate, where defendants held belief that plaintiff’s employer was lobbyist, and where House and Senate had rule than banned lobbyists from having access to floor of each chamber that credentials would have given to plaintiff. Defendants were entitled to absolute legislative immunity, where instant denial concerned subject matter that was within defendants’ core legislative activities.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-police officials’ motion for summary judgment in section 1983 action alleging that defendants lacked probable cause to arrest plaintiff on murder charge, where defendants based plaintiff’s arrest on statements from two witnesses identifying plaintiff as culprit from videotape of crime scene. While plaintiff claimed that it was unreasonable for defendants to believe that any witness could have credibly identified him from poor quality of video, defendants could have reasonably found that said identifications were credible, where witnesses knew plaintiff in some capacity and had allegedly spent time with plaintiff on day of incident. Moreover, plaintiff’s alibi claim appeared to be weak. Fact that identifications proved to be wrong was irrelevant to probable cause finding. Also, plaintiff failed to show that his 47-hour detention prior to his probable cause hearing was unreasonable.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-police officials’ motion for summary judgment in section 1983 action by plaintiff alleging that defendants violated his 4th Amendment rights by ordering that his blood be drawn for evidentiary purposes following his arrest for driving under influence of alcohol, where defendants had no warrant to draw plaintiff’s blood. Although Ct. in McNeely, 133 S.Ct. 1552 (2013), held that natural dissipation of alcohol from person’s bloodstream, without more, does not constitute per se exigency, defendants were still entitled to qualified immunity where case law, prior to McNeely, was not clearly established on issue as to whether natural dissipation of alcohol from bloodstream constituted per se exigency that would excuse lack of warrant, and where Wisc. law had adopted per se exigency rule in blood-alcohol cases.

Dist. Ct. erred in dismissing plaintiff’s RICO action, alleging that defendants (operator of plaintiff’s gas station and supplier of gas for said station) acted together to defraud plaintiff out of his gas station by failing to pay for gasoline purchased on behalf of plaintiff’s gas station, where gas station was ultimately foreclosed on after plaintiff had failed to pay $65,000 judgment arising out of gasoline debt. While Dist. Ct. found that Rooker-Feldman Doctrine deprived it of jurisdiction to consider plaintiff’s claim since plaintiff was essentially seeking to overturn state-court foreclosure order, Rooker-Feldman Doctrine did not block instant lawsuit, where plaintiff sought damages for activity that he alleged predated state foreclosure action and caused injury independent of it. On remand, Dist. Ct. must make determination as to whether res judicata applied to preclude plaintiff’s RICO action to extent that RICO action was compulsory counterclaim that should have been asserted in prior debt-collection action.

Dist. Ct. erred in entering injunction in instant nationwide federal class action that enjoined class members from pursuing Missouri statewide class action that raised similar claims against defendants. Record showed that statewide class action was scheduled for trial in May of 2015, while settlement of instant federal class action was not scheduled for fairness hearing until June 23, 2015. As such, entry of instant injunction violated Anti-Injunction Act (Act) since: (1) although statewide action might serve to derail settlement in federal action, Dist. Ct. failed to explain how entry of injunction was necessary in aid of Dist. Ct.’s jurisdiction in federal class action; and (2) instant parties have not contended that judgment in statewide action could threaten Dist. Ct.’s ability to adjudicate federal class action. Moreover, Act provides only limited opportunities for federal intervention into parallel state-court actions and leaves to state court question as to whether it would be prudent to allow federal court to initially resolve similar claim.

Ct. of Appeals affirmed jury’s verdict in favor of defendant in section 1983 action alleging that defendant terminated plaintiff from her position in County Auditor’s office in retaliation for her political support of Barack Obama, where plaintiff challenged sufficiency of evidence supporting jury’s verdict, and where plaintiff had failed to file with Dist. Ct. any post-verdict motion raising said issue as required under Rule 50(b). Party’s failure to comply with Rule 50(b) forecloses any challenge to sufficiency of evidence on appeal.

Dist. Ct. did not err in imposing $1,000 sanction on debtor’s counsel for submitting frivolous pleadings in Dist. Ct. Record showed that bank had filed state-court foreclosure action against debtor, and that after debtor filed for bankruptcy protection, counsel for debtor filed frivolous claims against bank alleging that mortgage paperwork produced by bank had been fraudulently altered. Moreover, Dist. Ct. properly affirmed Bankruptcy Court’s finding in favor of Bank on its proof of claim regarding said mortgage, after finding that mortgage documents were enforceable, and could further find that instant sanction was appropriate where: (1) counsel’s documents contesting said claim were vexatious, unfocused and “nigh-unintelligible;” and (2) counsel filed other frivolous pleadings after being warned not to do so.