Federal Civil Practice

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants' motion for summary judgment in personal injury action alleging that defendant proximately caused plaintiff's injuries where: (1) defendant caused severe accident that resulted in massive traffic jam on interstate; and (2) plaintiff received his injuries when, four hours after defendant had caused initial accident, third-party rear-ended plaintiff's vehicle while plaintiff's vehicle was standing still in same traffic jam. Plaintiff could not establish proximate cause as matter of law given time gap between defendant's prior accident and accident involving plaintiff, where force of first accident was spent long before accident involving plaintiff.

Ct. of Appeals lacked subject matter jurisdiction to consider merits of Dist. Ct.'s grant of plaintiffs' request for preliminary injunction in case seeking to enjoin defendant-City from gifting public property to religious high school, as well as Dist. Ct.'s denial of defendant's motion to modify said injunction where: (1) issuance of injunction, as well as denial of motion to modify took place outside applicable timeframe for filing notice of appeal to either interlocutory order; and (2) although instant notice of appeal was timely filed with respect to entry of final judgment, which dissolved said injunction after sale of said property to religious high school, said entry did not serve to confer jurisdiction to consider instant appeal since defendant did not challenge substance of final order. Moreover, while defendant could ordinarily raise issues with respect to entry of instant interlocutory orders upon entry of final order, it could not do so here, where defendant had actually requested dissolution of injunction. Ct. also noted that any appeal regarding instant interlocutory orders was moot where defendant did not seek reversal of sale of land to religious high school.

In action under IDEA alleging that defendant-school district failed to properly identify children with disabilities for purposes of providing special education services, Dist. Ct. erred in certifying for class action treatment claims of children who were eligible to receive special education services and who are or will be denied or delayed entry into IEP process. Class, as composed by Dist. Ct., was fatally indefinite where relevant criteria for identifying potentially eligible students was unknown, and instant certified class lacked commonality of either legal or factual question to satisfy Rule 23(a)(2) since claims of students necessarily required particularized inquiry into circumstances of each student. Also, prior settlement by defendant-state agency with plaintiff-class must be vacated where: (1) underlying class certification has been vacated; and (2) record showed that defendant-state agency had no authority to direct defendant-school district to comply with terms of settlement. (Partial dissent filed.)

Dist. Ct. erred in granting defendant-law firm’s motion for summary judgment in action alleging that defendant breached employment contract with plaintiff-former associate of law firm where plaintiff alleged that defendant had improperly withheld certain fees and bonuses that were generated from lawsuits that were settled after plaintiff was terminated from law firm. While Dist. Ct. believed that plaintiff was collaterally estopped from asserting instant claim where plaintiff had not prevailed in attorney liens that had been filed in said prior lawsuits, instant attorney lien proceedings, which were against law firm's clients and not instant defendant, did not pertain to allegations in instant breach of employment contract action. Moreover, plaintiff had potential claim under employment contract where defendant had failed to give required 30-day notice prior to termination, and where at least one settlement occurred during said time frame. However, plaintiff could not prevail on his claim that law firm and successor attorney induced breach of instant employment contract since: (1) with respect to law firm, party to contract cannot tortiously interfere with its own contract; and (2) plaintiff failed to provide evidence that successor attorney caused law firm to terminate plaintiff.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendant-mayor’s motion for summary judgment in section 1983 action alleging that defendant improperly terminated plaintiff from his Senior Humane Officer position with city’s animal shelter for political reasons associated with plaintiff’s refusal to support defendant in his mayoral campaign. While defendant conceded that plaintiff was terminated for political reasons, said termination did not violate plaintiff’s First Amendment rights where city ordinance conferred sufficient policymaking responsibilities that involved high level of discretion in plaintiff’s job such that political loyalty was valid qualification under Rutan, 497 US 62.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing under Rooker-Feldman doctrine plaintiff's lawsuit alleging that defendants (various individuals involved with denial of plaintiff's application for Indiana law license) violated his constitutional rights where, according to plaintiff, instant application process improperly focused on his religious beliefs. Dismissal was warranted because instant action would necessarily and impermissibly require Dist. Ct. to review Ind. Supreme Ct.'s denial of plaintiff's application. Ct. further observed that plaintiff had opportunity to raise his federal constitutional claims before Ind. Supreme Ct.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-municipalities and their police officials' motion for summary judgment in section 1983 action alleging that plaintiff's two arrests for disorderly conduct, in which plaintiff had openly carried handgun into two retail stores, violated his 4th Amendment rights since, according to plaintiff, said conduct did not constitute disorderly conduct in light of Wisc. Constitution and 2nd Amendment. Defendants were entitled to qualified immunity since: (1) at time of plaintiff's 2008 and 2009 arrests, law was unsettled with respect to whether individual openly carrying firearm constituted disorderly conduct; and (2) defendants could have believed that plaintiff had committed offense of disorderly conduct where they had received reports that defendant's presence in said retail stores made customers and store personnel fear for their safety. Ct. also found that plaintiff failed to establish violation of either section 7(a) or 7(b) of Privacy Act stemming from defendants' attempts to obtain his social security number during booking process since: (1) plaintiff failed to prove that he suffered any loss of right or benefit arising out of his refusal to divulge social security number; and (2) law was unsettled as to whether section 7(b) applied to municipalities at time of instant requests for his social security number.

Dist. Ct. erred in granting defendants-school districts' motion for summary judgment in action under Title IX and section 1983, alleging that defendants improperly refused to schedule girls' high school basketball games during "prime-time" that occurred on Friday and Saturday nights and instead scheduled boys' basketball games during said time. Record showed that defendants scheduled boys' basketball on Friday or Saturday nights 95% of time while scheduling girls' basketball games only 53% during same time, and instant disparity in scheduling was sufficient enough to establish Title IX claim under theory of denial of equal athletic opportunity where plaintiffs presented evidence of negative impact on girls in terms of disproportionate academic burdens resulting from larger number of week-night games, as well as reduced school and community support when forced to play during week.

Dist. Ct. did not err in certifying for class action treatment plaintiffs-bank employees' lawsuit under Ill. Minimum Wage Law, alleging that defendant-employer denied them overtime pay by: (1) instructing them not to record hours actually worked; (2) modifying recorded overtime hours; (3) providing "comp" time instead of paying overtime; and (4) directing them to work during unpaid breaks. While defendant argued that Dist. Ct.'s certification of two classes consisting of hourly workers and assistant branch managers performing duties of hourly workers failed to comply with Rule 23(c)(1)(B) and did not satisfy commonality prerequisites for class certification, Dist. Ct.'s definition of instant classes was sufficiently clear so as to leave no doubt as to which employees constituted each class. Moreover, instant two classes satisfied commonality requirement where allegations of complaint did not require individual assessments of liability as to each class member, but rather concerned defendant's enforcement of its policy with respect to recording and paying overtime.