Federal Civil Practice

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendant's motion to reconsider prior Dist. Ct. judge's order that had granted plaintiff's motion for new trial in section 1983 action alleging that defendants-police officers lacked probable cause to stop plaintiff on traffic offense and to arrest him on drug charges where defendants based said stop on anonymous tip. Dist. Ct.'s reinstatement of jury's verdict in favor of defendants was warranted where there was sufficient evidence for jury to believe one defendant's testimony that he had received said anonymous tip that truck that matched plaintiff's truck was carrying large quantity of marijuana at specific location. Fact that prior Dist. Ct. judge believed that said defendant had fabricated existence of anonymous tip, while plausible, was insufficient to overturn jury's verdict. Moreover, instant Dist. Ct. judge could properly revisit prior Dist. Ct. judge's order granting plaintiff new trial where initial order was interlocutory in nature, and where prior Dist. Ct. judge had entered order without giving defendants opportunity to file written response to plaintiff's motion for new trial.

Ct. of Appeals dismissed as moot petitioner's appeal of SEC's revocation of petitioner's registration of one of its securities due to petitioner's failure to file timely financial reports where petitioner, during pendency of instant appeal, filed new registration statement that covered said security. Record showed that instant revocation expired when petitioner re-registered instant security, and petitioner failed to establish existence of any cognizable collateral consequence that would preclude application of mootness doctrine. Fact that Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FIRA) could still prevent petitioner from trading instant security based on SEC's negative comments contained in petitioner's second registration of said security did not require different result where FIRA is not party to instant proceeding, and where Ct. of Appeals could not direct FIRA or others to overlook fact that petitioner had failed to timely file required financial reports.

Dist. Ct. did not err in finding that intervenor was in contempt for failing to abide by prior settlement order that directed intervenor to obtain $250,000 bond to assure payment to Texas Railroad Commission of any costs it might impose on operator of certain oil wells, as well as obtain authorization by said Commission to operate said oil wells. However, Dist. Ct. erred in imposing sanction that allowed receiver to keep $600,000 that intervenor had previously paid for leases on said oil wells, where Dist. Ct. had failed to explain how $600,000 sanction was related to receiver's costs incurred as result of intervenor's misconduct. On remand, Dist. Ct. must either re-impose instant sanction and provide explanation for compensatory basis for said sanction, or impose different sanction amount, or proceed under rules governing criminal contempt that allow for issuance of punitive sanctions.

Ct. of Appeals directed Dist. Ct. to vacate injunction that precluded member of proposed class action in prior class-action lawsuit regarding alleged misrepresentations made by defendant with respect to its clothes dryer from filing instant "copy-cat" class action in California state court, even though prior class action lawsuit had been dismissed. Under Smith, 131 S.Ct. 61, instant plaintiff, as neither party nor in privity with class representative in prior class action lawsuit, could not be bound by judgment in prior lawsuit. Moreover, record showed that class representative in prior class action lawsuit had failed to give instant plaintiff notice of pendency of said lawsuit.

Dist. Ct. erred in denying plaintiff’s post-verdict motion for judgment as matter of law in section 1983 action alleging that defendants (police officials) used excessive force in arresting plaintiff when they shot her four times in leg with SL6 baton launcher after plaintiff had disregarded their orders to come out of her car. While certain defendants were confused at time of plaintiff’s arrest as to whether plaintiff was driving stolen vehicle, defendants' use of SL6 baton launcher on four occasions was unreasonable where: (1) defendants were aware that plaintiff was intoxicated; (2) plaintiff never exhibited any sort of aggressive behavior or made any attempt to escape; (3) plaintiff’s passive resistance in not complying with defendant’s directives required that defendants use only minimal force when placing her under arrest; (4) at time defendants made decision to use SL6 baton launcher, plaintiff had her legs outside of car with both feet on ground; and (5) plaintiff did nothing to escalate situation after defendants had fired first shot at her legs. Moreover, case law was clear at time of instant incident that multiple trauma-inducing shots would constitute excessive force when used to secure non-resisting, intoxicated arrestee. (Dissent filed.)

In section 1983 action alleging that defendants (various jail officials and police officers) violated plaintiff-pre-trial detainee's rights when defendants ignored indications that plaintiff needed psychiatric care while booking plaintiff on charge and then released her in unfamiliar, high-crime area while she was in manic state, Dist. Ct. erred in denying certain defendants' request for qualified immunity on portion of plaintiff's claim asserting that plaintiff had right to continued detention in jail until plaintiff's medical needs had been resolved since no case law supported such right. However, certain defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity as to portion of plaintiff's claim alleging that defendants' release of plaintiff into high-crime area had augmented her danger, where plaintiff asserted that said defendants did nothing to mitigate said danger. Moreover, other defendants, who were involved in decision not to provide plaintiff with medical attention while she was in custody, were not entitled to qualified immunity at this stage of proceeding since plaintiff's failure to provide medical attention claim could only be resolved on merits.

Dist. Ct. did not err in remanding back to Illinois state court instant lawsuit that had at time of removal pending motions by defendants seeking Rule 137 sanctions against plaintiff’s counsel, after Dist Ct. found that instant lawsuit had been improperly removed under 28 USC section 1441. Plaintiff’s counsel could not properly remove state court action since: (1) plaintiff’s counsel was not party in state court action; (2) plaintiff’s counsel was not defendant; (3) removal required consent of all defendants, and none of instant six defendants had consented to removal; and (4) all six defendants were citizens of Illinois, which would preclude removal under 28 USC 1441(b). Ct. further found that $12,587 in sanctions imposed by Dist. Ct. against plaintiff’s counsel due to improper removal was reasonable, and that defendants were entitled to legal fees generated by defendants in instant appeal.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants' motion for summary judgment in section 1983 action alleging that defendants conspired to retaliate against plaintiff for his cooperation with FBI in its investigation of defendant-assistant state's attorney when defendants prosecuted plaintiff on charges of official misconduct and criminal sexual abuse. Defendant-assistant state's attorney was entitled to absolute immunity for prosecuting plaintiff on said charges, and plaintiff failed to demonstrate either that assistant state's attorney deviated from his prosecutorial function, or that instant assistant state's attorney played any role in local Sheriff's investigation of plaintiff that was initiated after several women complained that they were sexually abused by plaintiff while he was on duty as police officer. Moreover, plaintiff failed to factually link any remaining defendants to any conspiracy to frame plaintiff.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing for failure to state cause of action plaintiff-prisoner's 8th Amendment claim alleging defendants-prison guards injured his wrist after ordering him to get against wall of prison hallway during incident involving other prisoners. Plaintiff's allegations did not establish 8th Amendment claim where pleadings indicated that any injury occurred during defendants' attempt to maintain order in prison. Ct., though, rejected Dist. Ct.'s rationale that dismissal was appropriate in view of "de minimus" nature of plaintiff's injuries since: (1) Dist. Ct. could not determine severity of plaintiff's injuries at preliminary stage of lawsuit; and (2) plaintiff was not required to show significance of injury if prison guard otherwise inflicted pain maliciously or sadistically.

Ct. of Appeals denied requests for attorney fees pursuant to Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA) filed by three petitioners who were prevailing parties in lawsuit seeking vacatur of rule issued by FMCSA concerning use of electronic monitoring devices in commercial trucks. Record showed that said petitioners were not responsible for paying any attorney fees incurred in prosecution of instant petition for review, while fourth petitioner, which did not qualify for fees under EAJA, was only entity responsible for payment of said fees.