Federal Civil Practice

Dist. Ct. erred in granting defendant's motion for summary judgment in action by plaintiffs (persons required to register as sex offenders) alleging that defendant's failure to provide any procedure to correct errors in sex offender registry violated plaintiffs' due process rights. While Dist. Ct. found no violation where defendant had implemented substitute policy, which granted incarcerated individuals means to correct errors in registry, Ct. of Appeals found that substitute policy did not go far enough, and that plaintiffs, who were not incarcerated, were entitled to some process for correcting errors where mistakes on registry implicated liberty interests protected by Due Process Clause.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-prison officials' motion for summary judgment in section 1983 action by plaintiffs-civilly committed detainees under Ill. Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act, who objected to defendants' policies that: (1) limited various classes of civilly committed detainees from having face-to-face interactions with other civilly committed detainees within facility; and (2) refused to allow plaintiffs ability to contact other civilly committed detainees via facility's internal mail system instead of U.S. mail. Defendants were not required to obtain prior approval by health professionals regarding its policy that limited plaintiffs' ability to associate face-to-face with other civilly committed detainees since defendants' policy was justified as security measure. Ct. also found no impingement of First Amendment rights where plaintiffs had option to communicate with each other via U.S. mail. (Partial dissent filed.)

In action by plaintiff-Holocaust survivors and victims against defendants-Hungarian national bank and national railway seeking under expropriation exception to Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act over $75 billion on allegations that defendants participated in expropriating property from Hungarian Jews during World War II, Dist. Ct. erred in denying defendants' motion to dismiss after finding that plaintiffs' allegations were sufficient to assert expropriation exception to FSIA. Under expropriation exception to FSIA, plaintiffs were required to show that they exhausted their Hungarian remedies or that there was compelling reason for their failure to do so, and that remand was required for plaintiffs to establish any exhaustion of remedies. Plaintiffs also failed to establish that defendant national railway was engaged in any commercial activity in U.S. so as to apply expropriation exception to FSIA. Ct. further found that Dist. Ct.'s denials of instant motions to dismiss were appealable as collateral orders under 28 USC section 1291.

In action by plaintiff-Holocaust survivors and victims against defendants-private banks seeking under expropriation exception to Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act over $75 billion on allegations that defendants participated in expropriating property from Hungarian Jews during World War II, Ct. of Appeals lacked jurisdiction to consider defendants' appeal of Dist. Ct.'s denial of their motions to dismiss on grounds of lack of subject matter jurisdiction and lack of personal jurisdiction since said orders were not final and appealable and were not collateral orders that could be immediately appealed. However, Ct. of Appeals granted defendants' petition for writ of mandamus with respect to their claim that plaintiffs lacked personal jurisdiction over them where defendants argued that plaintiffs failed to show under "essentially at home" standard that defendants had sufficient contacts within U.S. necessary to exercise general jurisdiction over foreign defendants. Fact that defendants had U.S. account holders having accounts worth $93 million and $147 million did not require different result where plaintiffs failed to show that defendants' U.S. accounts, which represented less than one percent of their total accounts, as well as any other contacts, were continuous and systematic so that defendants could expect that they might be sued in any U.S. court for any claim arising anywhere in world.

In action by plaintiff-Holocaust survivors and victims against defendant-private bank seeking under expropriation exception to Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act over $75 billion on allegations that defendant participated in expropriating property from Hungarian Jews during World War II, Ct. of Appeals lacked jurisdiction to consider appeal of defendant's motion to dismiss case on political question defense grounds arising out of U.S. involvement in creation of Austrian General Settlement Fund. Denial of motion to dismiss was not final and appealable order and was not collateral order that could be immediately appealed. Ct. also rejected defendant's invitation to exercise pendant appellate jurisdiction of appeal in instant case based on existence of appeal of collateral order in which Dist Ct. denied motion to dismiss on sovereign immunity grounds filed by co-defendants (Hungarian national bank and national railway) to which Ct. of Appeals had jurisdiction. Ct. also denied defendant's petition for writ of mandamus that had similarly challenged denial of its motion to dismiss on same political question doctrine argument after finding that defendant, which argued that U.S. govt.'s filing of Statement of Interest required immediate dismissal of instant case, had failed to establish clear right to mandamus relief where Statement of Interest did not itself compel dismissal of instant claims against defendant.

Dist. Ct. erred in granting plaintiffs-trustees of welfare fund's request for entry of permanent injunction to restrain defendant-law firm from proceeding with state-court action against plaintiff that attempted to collect under common fund doctrine legal fees and costs from settlement proceeds of personal injury action that had been filed by beneficiary of said fund. While plaintiffs argued that, due to language in plan, plan was entitled to reimbursement of all medical expenses that had been advanced to beneficiary without any deduction for legal fees and costs generated in personal injury action, Anti-Injunction Act precluded plaintiffs from seeking injunction of state-court proceeding. Fact that defendant's state-court proceeding could force plaintiffs to pay portion of defendant's fees in violation of plan's language did not require different result where state-court action did not either directly involve recovery of benefits under plan or prevent plan's trustees from fulfilling their duties under ERISA since trustees can present their federal defenses in state-court action and can seek damages should state-court reject said defenses.

Dist. Ct. erred in granting defendants-prison officials' motion for summary judgment in section 1983 action alleging that defendants violated his constitutional rights by fondling his testicles unnecessarily during pat down and strip searches. While Dist. Ct. found that any injury was too slight to support instant claim, Ct. of Appeals held that unwanted touching of person's genitals that is intended to humiliate victim or to gratify assailant's sexual desires can violate prisoner's constitutional rights whether or not force exerted by assailant was significant.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-attorneys motion for summary judgment in action by plaintiffs-investors alleging legal malpractice and securities fraud claims arising out of defendants’ roles in drafting formation documents for two legal entities used as part of failed investment scheme, where plaintiffs failed to establish existence of attorney client relationship. Record showed that defendants were hired only to draft formation documents for legal entities, and thus plaintiffs lacked attorney-client relationship with defendants where basis for lawsuit concerned actions taken past point of entities’ formation. Moreover, while one investor indicated that defendants were “working for you just like they are working for me,” none of instant plaintiffs could have reasonably believed that such statement provided them with personal attorney-client relationship for indefinite future. Also, plaintiff failed to establish actual fraud claim based on statements made by one defendant that his law firm would handle formation of legal entities since actual fraud claim may not be based upon representation of future conduct.

In section 1983 action by plaintiff-prisoner alleging that defendants-prison officials were deliberately indifferent to his medical needs, Dist. Ct. erred in submitting to jury elements instruction that suggested that plaintiff was required to prove that defendants violated his right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment since: (1) cruel and unusual punishment was not independent element of plaintiff's deliberate indifference claim; and (2) said instruction served to confuse jury into thinking that plaintiff needed to show that defendants affirmatively punished him by withholding medical services. Instant elements instruction also wrongly required plaintiff to prove that he "suffered damage" in order to establish his liability claim.

Dist. Ct. erred in granting plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment in section 1985 action against defendant-City alleging that defendant had threatened their future exercise of their First Amendment rights to preach at festival conducted by different church on City streets through official City policy that would have improperly excluded them from preaching at future festivals held by said church. Only evidence of defendant's policy came in form of ill-fated argument made by defendant's counsel in instant lawsuit regarding ability of defendant to exclude plaintiff from preaching at future festivals, and such argument did not constitute official policy of defendant for purposes of establishing defendant's liability under section 1983.