Federal Civil Practice

In action in which jury found in favor of plaintiff, who alleged that defendant-employer retaliated against her for opposing race discrimination of co-worker, Ct. of Appeals lacked jurisdiction to consider defendant's appeal from underlying judgment where defendant failed to file its notice of appeal within 30 days of final judgment, and where defendant's Rule 50(b) and 59(a) post-trial motions did not serve to toll start of said 30-day period where defendant failed to file said post-judgment motions within 28-day period provided by said Rules. Fact that Dist. Ct. had granted defendant's request for extension of time to file Rule 50(b) and Rule 59(a) motions did not serve to render said motions timely for purpose of tolling time to file subsequent notice of appeal. Accordingly, while Dist. Ct. could appropriately consider instant untimely Rule 50(b) and 59(a) motions, said motions could be considered only under grounds set forth in Rule 60(b)(6), which call for reversal of jury's verdict in favor of plaintiff only under exceptional circumstances, and defendant's evidentiary and manifest weight of evidence issues failed to qualify as exceptional circumstances.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-police officials' motion for summary judgment in section 1983 action alleging that defendants lacked probable cause to arrest plaintiff on charges stemming from alleged breaking into victims' home and fondling two teenaged girls, where Dist. Ct. properly found that defendants were entitled to qualified immunity. Record showed existence of arguable probable cause where plaintiff was spotted within seven minutes of report of break-in near crime scene, and where defendant was only person in area that substantially matched description of intruder given to defendants by one victim. Fact that victim described different color of shirt of intruder did not preclude existence of qualified immunity, especially where, prior to arrest of plaintiff, one defendant consulted with state's attorney, who agreed as to existence of probable cause.

Dist. Ct. erred in granting defendants-police official's motion for summary judgment in plaintiff's section 1983 action alleging under "class-of-one" theory that defendants violated plaintiff's equal protection rights by issuing series of 24 bogus parking tickets. While Dist. Ct. found that plaintiff failed to state cause of action because he neglected to identify similarly situated individuals who had not been subjected to alleged harassment, Ct. of Appeals held that plaintiff's general allegation that defendants intentionally treated him differently than others was sufficient where alleged facts suggested harassment by public officials that had no conceivable legitimate purpose. Dist. Ct. did not err, though, in dismissing plaintiff's similar substantive due process claim where alleged conduct of issuing bogus traffic tickets was insufficient to constitute deprivation that "shocks the conscience" for purposes of due process cases.

Dist. Ct. erred in granting defendants-prison officials' motion for summary judgment in plaintiff-prisoner's section 1983 action alleging that defendants subjected him to cruel and unusual punishment when they served him over period of days "Nutriloaf" as his exclusive food diet where said food caused him to vomit, incur weight loss and incur painful anal fissure. Affidavit from individual indicating that Nutriloaf was nutritious substance for regular meals failed to contain any factual support for said opinion, and defendant otherwise failed to present any facts that would qualify said individual as expert. Moreover, plaintiff's contention that defendants were aware that Nutriloaf was sickening to defendant to extent as alleged in complaint and yet did nothing about it would be sufficient to establish 8th Amendment claim.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-police officials’ motion for summary judgment in section 1983 action alleging that defendants lacked probable cause to arrest plaintiffs on assault and battery charges arising out of incident that occurred at local night club. Defendants had probable cause to arrest plaintiffs based on defendants’ interview with owner of club, who asserted that plaintiffs had attempted to enter club without paying cover charge and had initiated fight with security guards after they had been asked to leave. Fact that plaintiffs asserted that security guards had initiated fight, and that club had security camera would have recorded the incident did not require different result since police are not required to search for exculpatory evidence once probable cause has been established. Moreover, while both plaintiffs were visibly beaten, said fact did not indicate that club owner was lying with respect to claim that plaintiffs had initiated fight.

In section 1983 action alleging that defendants (jail officials and medical personnel) had deprived plaintiff-deceased prisoner's due process rights by exhibiting deliberate indifference to plaintiff's declining schizophrenia and physical conditions that led to plaintiff's death from excessive water drinking, Dist. Ct. erred in granting defendants-jail officials' motion for summary judgment with respect to claim that said defendants subjected plaintiff to unsanitary conditions of his confinement where record contained evidence that said defendants, with knowledge of plaintiff's mental condition, allowed plaintiff to be confined in unsanitary cell and to remain un-bathed and incapable of caring for himself. However, Dist. Ct. did not err in granting all defendants' motion for summary judgment with respect to claim that defendants' alleged deliberate indifference resulted in plaintiff's death where, even though defendants were aware of plaintiff's mental condition, as well as negative ramifications of his seclusion, lack of self-care and weight loss, defendants had no warning that plaintiff might experience psychogenic polydipsia that led to his death from water intoxication. Fact that plaintiff was involved in prior incident when he cut his throat with razor did not require different result where plaintiff ultimately did not commit suicide. Ct. erred, though, in subsequently dismissing plaintiff's state wrongful death action on grounds of collateral estoppel since prior Dist. Ct. finding in section 1983 action that plaintiff's death was not foreseeable was not necessary finding in resolution of section 1983 action so as to support application of collateral estoppel.

Dist. Ct. erred in denying defendant-police officer's motion for summary judgment asserting that he was entitled to qualified immunity with respect to plaintiff's section 1983 action alleging that defendant lacked probable cause to arrest plaintiff on Indiana state charges of murder, assisting criminal and providing false information to police arising out of defendant's investigation into murder that occurred in tavern in which plaintiff was patron. While defendant lacked probable cause to arrest plaintiff on murder charges, defendant was nevertheless entitled to qualified immunity in instant section 1983 action where record showed existence of probable cause with respect to charges of assisting criminal and providing false information to police where: (1) plaintiff gave shifting narratives to defendant regarding shooting incident that raised possibility that plaintiff was covering for third-party shooter; and (2) plaintiff's initial statement to defendant was refuted by film footage of incident so as to give rise to possibility that plaintiff had lied to defendant during his investigation of incident.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing for failure to state cause of action plaintiff-prisoner's section 1983 action alleging that defendant-prison officials violated his constitutional rights by barring him from receiving in mail Physician's Desk Reference and other book on guide to drugs where basis for bar was fact that both books contained subject matter on drugs that was deemed detrimental to prison security. While prison library contained similar books, defendants could reasonably bar around-the-clock access to instant books due to their drug-related content. Fact that plaintiff asserted that books were necessary because prison doctors had previously given him wrong drugs did not require different result.

In class action alleging improper delay in destroying plaintiffs-customers' video rental records under section 2710(e) of Video Privacy Protection Act, Dist. Ct. erred in finding that violations under section 2710(e) could be enforced in private cause of action under section 2710(c) of said Act. Language of section 2710(c) makes clear that it applies only to violations under section 2710(b) pertaining to unlawful disclosures of customer identification, and plaintiffs' proposed lawsuit otherwise would suggest no injury to plaintiffs, where, as here, plaintiffs merely alleged that defendant retained records for longer than one-year period set forth in section 2710(e), but did not disclose information contained in said records.

Dist. Ct. did not err in denying plaintiffs' request for class certification in action alleging that defendant-title insurance company's payments to its attorneys/title agents for purpose of conducting title examination and determining whether title is insurable were actually forms of kickbacks/fee splitting that were unlawful under RESPA. Plaintiffs' lawsuit alleged that said attorneys/title agents received unreasonably high compensation for services actually performed, and resolution of said allegations would require individual assessments concerning amount of work performed on each assignment so as to preclude class action treatment.