Federal Civil Practice

In section 1983 action alleging that defendants-police officers subjected plaintiff to false arrest and illegal search, which resulted in drug possession charges involving small quantity of drugs that were eventually non-suited by prosecution, Dist. Ct. erred in allowing testimony of Ass't. State's Attorney, who testified on behalf of defendants and indicated existence of practice of non-suiting large number of cases in courtroom where defendant had his charge dismissed due to small quantity of drugs at issue in said charge. Testimony given by Ass't. State's Attorney was in essence expert witness opinion testimony, and thus, should have been stricken under Rule 37(c)(1) where, as here, defendants had failed to identify said witness as expert, as required by Rule 26(a)(2). Moreover, defendants' failure to identify said witness was prejudicial since: (1) plaintiff was unprepared to effectively challenge witness' competency to testify about percentage of drug cases that were dismissed without court resolving merits of cases; and (2) plaintiff was operating under impression that Dist. Ct. would not allow defendants to provide evidence regarding why plaintiff's drug charge was dismissed where Dist. Ct. had issued pre-trial ruling on said issue.

Dist. Ct. erred in dismissing for failure to state valid cause of action plaintiff-prisoner’s section 1983 action alleging that certain prison officials were deliberately indifferent to his medical needs after he sustained injuries during attack by another prisoner. Plaintiff’s allegations, that he sustained injuries to his body and eye that caused him to endure severe pain for five days while guards merely looked on, were sufficient to state 8th Amendment violation. Moreover, plaintiff should be given opportunity on remand to amend his complaint to specifically name said prison officials/guards as defendants.

Dist. Ct. erred in dismissing for lack of standing lawsuit filed by plaintiff-discretionary beneficiary of certain Trusts, alleging that defendants-Trustee of said Trusts and others breached fiduciary duty owed to plaintiff and other contingent beneficiaries when defendants purchased stock on behalf of Trusts that resulted in over $200 million in losses to said Trusts where, according to plaintiff, said purchase was done to advance defendants’ financial interests. While Dist. Ct. held that plaintiff lacked standing because she could not show likelihood that corpus of Trusts would be insufficient to pay discretionary distributions of trust assets to plaintiff during her lifetime, plaintiff acquired right to bring action for breach of fiduciary duty by virtue of defendants’ relationship to plaintiff, and plaintiff otherwise had cognizable interest in prudent and loyal administration of Trusts. Fact that plaintiff’s interest in Trusts’ assets might not rise to level of property interest was irrelevant.

Dist. Ct. did not err in rejecting plaintiffs’ challenge to Indiana statute that prevented retail liquor stores from shipping wine to their customers via motor carrier and instead required that said retailers make deliveries of wine themselves or by their employees who had personally verified age of Indiana residents purchasing said wine. While plaintiffs argued that Indiana statute was preempted by Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act, which precludes states from enacting laws relating to route or service of motor carriers, Ct. found that Indiana statute possessed strong presumption of validity so as to defeat instant preemption claim where statute fell within core power given to states to regulate manner of liquor sales under 21st Amendment. Ct. similarly rejected plaintiffs’ claim that Indiana statute violated Commerce Clause because it constituted undue burden on interstate commerce.

Dist. Ct. erred in granting defendant-prison official's motion for summary judgment in section 1983 action alleging that defendant violated plaintiff-prisoner's First Amendment rights when he ordered forcible shearing of plaintiff's dreadlocks. Although defendant explained that plaintiff's dreadlocks posed security risk for prison, defendant failed to explain why it permitted Rastafarians to wear dreadlocks and not plaintiff. Also, defendant could not defend rule that only Rastafarians could wear dreadlocks since such a rule would wrongfully discriminate in favor of one religious sect over plaintiff's personal beliefs where plaintiff alleged that he held sincere belief that his membership in African Hebrew Isrealites of Jerusalem religion required that he not cut his hair.

Dist. Ct. erred in denying plaintiffs' request for class certification in action alleging that defendant's merger with another hospital violated section 7 of Clayton Act where, according to plaintiffs, result of merger was higher prices for hospital services for individual patients and third-party payors. Basis for denial was Dist. Ct.'s erroneous conclusion that plaintiffs' expert had conceded away validity of his common method by which he proposed to show antitrust impact that merger had on members of proposed class. Moreover, lack of uniformity in defendant's price increases did not require denial of class certification where plaintiff's expert's difference-in differences methodology could properly estimate anti-trust impact of said price increases. Additionally, record showed that common questions of other liability issues were sufficient to satisfy prerequisites for class action treatment under Rule 23(b)(3).

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing as time-barred plaintiff's lawsuit alleging unjust enrichment, aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty and conspiracy arising out of defendant's alleged conduct in pressuring third-parties/corporate directors to repay missing escrow funds that had been guaranteed by defendant where third-parties had wrongfully transferred $40.9 million from another entity to which plaintiff had been appointed receiver. Applicable 5-year limitations period had expired by time plaintiff had filed instant lawsuit, and doctrine of adverse domination, which potentially tolls limitation period in causes of action involving wrongdoing corporate directors, as well as their co-conspirators, did not apply in instant case where plaintiff had failed to allege that defendant conspired with third-parties to commit instant wrongful transfers. Fact that defendant had pressured third-parties to repay missing escrow funds, by itself, was insufficient to establish conspiracy in absence of allegation of agreement between defendant and third-parties to use funds from plaintiff's entity to replace missing escrow funds.

Ct. of Appeals dismissed for lack of jurisdiction plaintiff's appeal of Dist. Ct.'s order dismissing for failure to state valid claim plaintiff's lawsuit that challenged on First Amendment grounds certain appropriations from Illinois capital fund that were made to certain religious organizations, where Dist. Ct. improperly granted plaintiff's motion to file late notice of appeal. Record showed that plaintiff's counsel filed motion for extension of time one day after expiration of 30-day period for filing notice of appeal, and explanation given by counsel for his failure to file timely notice of appeal, i.e., that deadline "slipped through cracks" due to demands on his time arising out of his campaign for Illinois Governor during November 2010 general election, failed to establish excusable neglect required for extension of instant deadline.

Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendants' request for attorney fees under Equal Access to Justice Act where defendants were prevailing parties in False Claims Act, even though defendants argued that govt. was guilty of overreaching when it decided to bring FCA claim against defendants. Dist. Ct. could properly find that govt. had reasonable basis to believe that defendants knowingly submitted false invoices for work performed by defendants' Tribe under Hazardous Fuels Reduction program, so as to preclude attorney fee award, where: (1) record showed that Tribe had serious budget difficulties in its road dept. that eventually spent funds at issue in FCA claim; and (2) defendants used different invoicing systems that created confusion as to whether Tribe had actually performed work indicated in invoices. Ct. also rejected defendants' claim that govt. had failed to properly investigate its own FCA claim prior to filing said claim and noted that factual dispute contained in record demonstrated that reasonable person could have believed either party's theory of case.

Ct. of Appeals granted motion by law firm to "add" law firm to docket, where law firm had been awarded legal fees from class action settlement fund arising out of its representation of individual litigants, where appellants (class action counsel) filed instant appeal seeking portion of law firm's fees on ground that appellants contributed to creation of fund from which law firm's fees would be paid. Law firm possessed sufficient interest in outcome of case to warrant inclusion in docket. Ct., though, noted that law firm's status would be that of party in said appeal even though law firm did not request permission to intervene and further found that Dist. Ct. would be free to examine propriety of fees awarded to law firm should appellants prevail on appeal.