Federal Civil Practice

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing plaintiff's claim alleging that defendant's dunning letter violated Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) where letter used language containing false sense of urgency to pay debt, such that it overshadowed statutorily mandated language regarding plaintiff's right to wait 30 days to contest validity of debt. While letter contained language warning plaintiff that her "account now meets guidelines for legal action" and told plaintiff to call defendant "today," plaintiff failed to state cause of action under FDCPA where letter contained only non-actionable puffery and instructed plaintiff to locate relevant information about her rights on back of letter. Moreover, under Sims, 445 F3d 959, location of rights on back of letter did not violate FDCPA.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing for failure to state valid claim, plaintiff's section 1983 and civil RICO actions alleging that defendants-Cook County Bd. of Review and its members violated plaintiff's due process and First Amendment rights by red-flagging plaintiff's clients for unfavorable treatment on their property tax appeals and defaming him with respect to his business as property tax consultant, as well as running "pay for play" racketeering enterprise that sought to extort campaign contributions and consulting services from plaintiff. As to his due process claims, plaintiff failed to allege that his work as consultant was constitutionally protected property interest. Moreover, with respect to plaintiff's deprivation of protected liberty interest claim arising out of defendants' alleged defamation of his reputation under "stigma plus" theory, plaintiff failed to allege that defendants altered any right or status that was recognized by state law. Ct. also observed with respect to plaintiff's First Amendment and civil RICO claims that plaintiff failed to allege how defendants had been able to identify which tax appeals had been filed by plaintiff's clients.

Dist. Ct. erred in dismissing on standing grounds plaintiffs' action challenging on First Amendment grounds Ill. eavesdropping statute that made it illegal to audio record conversation unless all parties to conversation gave their consent, where plaintiff sought to openly make audio-visual recordings of police officers performing their duties in public places and speaking at volume audible to bystanders. Standing was established where plaintiff's proposed action of recording police officers increased likelihood of arrest and prosecution under instant statute, and where defendant's office had previously filed three cases asserting violation of instant statute against individuals, who had recorded on-duty police officers. Ct. further found that plaintiffs were entitled to entry of preliminary injunction that would block defendant from enforcing instant eavesdropping statute as applied to plaintiffs' proposed actions since, under immediate scrutiny standard, instant statute restricted far more speech than was necessary to protect legitimate privacy interests and otherwise violated free-speech and free-press guarantees. (Dissent filed.)

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendant's motion to reconsider prior Dist. Ct. judge's order that had granted plaintiff's motion for new trial in section 1983 action alleging that defendants-police officers lacked probable cause to stop plaintiff on traffic offense and to arrest him on drug charges where defendants based said stop on anonymous tip. Dist. Ct.'s reinstatement of jury's verdict in favor of defendants was warranted where there was sufficient evidence for jury to believe one defendant's testimony that he had received said anonymous tip that truck that matched plaintiff's truck was carrying large quantity of marijuana at specific location. Fact that prior Dist. Ct. judge believed that said defendant had fabricated existence of anonymous tip, while plausible, was insufficient to overturn jury's verdict. Moreover, instant Dist. Ct. judge could properly revisit prior Dist. Ct. judge's order granting plaintiff new trial where initial order was interlocutory in nature, and where prior Dist. Ct. judge had entered order without giving defendants opportunity to file written response to plaintiff's motion for new trial.

Ct. of Appeals dismissed as moot petitioner's appeal of SEC's revocation of petitioner's registration of one of its securities due to petitioner's failure to file timely financial reports where petitioner, during pendency of instant appeal, filed new registration statement that covered said security. Record showed that instant revocation expired when petitioner re-registered instant security, and petitioner failed to establish existence of any cognizable collateral consequence that would preclude application of mootness doctrine. Fact that Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FIRA) could still prevent petitioner from trading instant security based on SEC's negative comments contained in petitioner's second registration of said security did not require different result where FIRA is not party to instant proceeding, and where Ct. of Appeals could not direct FIRA or others to overlook fact that petitioner had failed to timely file required financial reports.

Dist. Ct. did not err in finding that intervenor was in contempt for failing to abide by prior settlement order that directed intervenor to obtain $250,000 bond to assure payment to Texas Railroad Commission of any costs it might impose on operator of certain oil wells, as well as obtain authorization by said Commission to operate said oil wells. However, Dist. Ct. erred in imposing sanction that allowed receiver to keep $600,000 that intervenor had previously paid for leases on said oil wells, where Dist. Ct. had failed to explain how $600,000 sanction was related to receiver's costs incurred as result of intervenor's misconduct. On remand, Dist. Ct. must either re-impose instant sanction and provide explanation for compensatory basis for said sanction, or impose different sanction amount, or proceed under rules governing criminal contempt that allow for issuance of punitive sanctions.

Ct. of Appeals directed Dist. Ct. to vacate injunction that precluded member of proposed class action in prior class-action lawsuit regarding alleged misrepresentations made by defendant with respect to its clothes dryer from filing instant "copy-cat" class action in California state court, even though prior class action lawsuit had been dismissed. Under Smith, 131 S.Ct. 61, instant plaintiff, as neither party nor in privity with class representative in prior class action lawsuit, could not be bound by judgment in prior lawsuit. Moreover, record showed that class representative in prior class action lawsuit had failed to give instant plaintiff notice of pendency of said lawsuit.

Dist. Ct. erred in denying plaintiff’s post-verdict motion for judgment as matter of law in section 1983 action alleging that defendants (police officials) used excessive force in arresting plaintiff when they shot her four times in leg with SL6 baton launcher after plaintiff had disregarded their orders to come out of her car. While certain defendants were confused at time of plaintiff’s arrest as to whether plaintiff was driving stolen vehicle, defendants' use of SL6 baton launcher on four occasions was unreasonable where: (1) defendants were aware that plaintiff was intoxicated; (2) plaintiff never exhibited any sort of aggressive behavior or made any attempt to escape; (3) plaintiff’s passive resistance in not complying with defendant’s directives required that defendants use only minimal force when placing her under arrest; (4) at time defendants made decision to use SL6 baton launcher, plaintiff had her legs outside of car with both feet on ground; and (5) plaintiff did nothing to escalate situation after defendants had fired first shot at her legs. Moreover, case law was clear at time of instant incident that multiple trauma-inducing shots would constitute excessive force when used to secure non-resisting, intoxicated arrestee. (Dissent filed.)

In section 1983 action alleging that defendants (various jail officials and police officers) violated plaintiff-pre-trial detainee's rights when defendants ignored indications that plaintiff needed psychiatric care while booking plaintiff on charge and then released her in unfamiliar, high-crime area while she was in manic state, Dist. Ct. erred in denying certain defendants' request for qualified immunity on portion of plaintiff's claim asserting that plaintiff had right to continued detention in jail until plaintiff's medical needs had been resolved since no case law supported such right. However, certain defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity as to portion of plaintiff's claim alleging that defendants' release of plaintiff into high-crime area had augmented her danger, where plaintiff asserted that said defendants did nothing to mitigate said danger. Moreover, other defendants, who were involved in decision not to provide plaintiff with medical attention while she was in custody, were not entitled to qualified immunity at this stage of proceeding since plaintiff's failure to provide medical attention claim could only be resolved on merits.

Dist. Ct. did not err in remanding back to Illinois state court instant lawsuit that had at time of removal pending motions by defendants seeking Rule 137 sanctions against plaintiff’s counsel, after Dist Ct. found that instant lawsuit had been improperly removed under 28 USC section 1441. Plaintiff’s counsel could not properly remove state court action since: (1) plaintiff’s counsel was not party in state court action; (2) plaintiff’s counsel was not defendant; (3) removal required consent of all defendants, and none of instant six defendants had consented to removal; and (4) all six defendants were citizens of Illinois, which would preclude removal under 28 USC 1441(b). Ct. further found that $12,587 in sanctions imposed by Dist. Ct. against plaintiff’s counsel due to improper removal was reasonable, and that defendants were entitled to legal fees generated by defendants in instant appeal.