Federal Civil Practice

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-school officials’ motion for summary judgment in section 1983 action alleging that defendant deprived plaintiff (12 year-old student) of his life while plaintiff was attending school function at time of his death from drowning in lake. While record showed that defendants may have been negligent by allowing plaintiff and others to go into lake without providing lifeguard, said negligence was insufficient to establish basis for liability in instant due process case, which otherwise requires showing that defendants committed reckless act that resulted in injury to plaintiff.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants’ (County officials) motion for summary judgment on grounds of qualified immunity in section 1983 action alleging that defendants’ denial of plaintiff’s request for renewal of child care provider certificate based on their discovery that plaintiff had 1988 substantiated finding of child abuse violated plaintiff’s due process rights. At time of instant denial, no case law clearly established that defendants’ reliance on instant substantiated finding violated plaintiff’s due process rights where defendants had played no role in determination of substantiated finding.

Dist. Ct. did not err in finding that attorney work product exemption applied so as to deny plaintiff’s FOIA request for copy of report prepared by consultant hired by govt. to assess responsibility of plaintiff and other entities accused of contaminating Fox River in Wisconsin. Plaintiff agreed that consultant’s report qualified as work product, and fact that govt. disclosed certain portions of report in prior consent decrees involving other entities accused of instant contamination did not serve as waiver of all related material in report. Ct. also rejected plaintiff’s claim that underlying factual material used to support author’s opinion in report was subject to disclosure under FOIA after noting that “factual” and “opinion” materials were both covered by FOIA work product exemption.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing for lack of venue plaintiffs’ class action alleging that defendants conspired to defraud plaintiffs by spending on other items plaintiffs’ money given to build time share properties, where dismissal was based on forum selection clause (calling for disputes to be resolved in Mexican court) contained in contracts signed by plaintiffs and by predecessor-in-interest to one defendant. While plaintiffs argued that neither defendant could enforce forum selection clause since neither defendant had signed instant contracts, Dist. Ct. found that both defendants could enforce said clause since: (1) one defendant was parent corporation of successor to entity that had signed instant contracts and thus could stand on same legal footing as said entity; and (2) other defendant could enforce clause on mutuality grounds where plaintiffs could enforce said clause against it due to allegations in complaint that both defendants had conspired to defraud plaintiffs.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendant’s motion for summary judgment in action alleging that defendant-ambulance service violated Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act (EMTALA) by failing to stabilize plaintiff as she was about to give birth prior to sending her to hospital, and that said failure resulted in injuries to plaintiff’s baby. While “emergency room” for purposes of coverage under EMTALA could be defendant’s ambulance itself, Dist. Ct. could properly find under 2003 “clarification” of EMTALA regulation that plaintiff had not come to “emergency room” where, as here, ambulance was operating under direction of communitywide emergency medical service protocols.

Plaintiff was entitled to new damages hearing in section 1983 action alleging that he was subjected to wrongful conviction on attempted murder and armed robbery charges based on police officials’ misconduct in using suggestive photo lineup and unconventional solicitation of multiple statements to falsely implicate plaintiff in charged offenses. Jury awarded plaintiff only $73,125 in compensatory and $5,000 in punitive damages to cover plaintiff’s eight years of wrongful incarceration, and Dist. Ct.’s improper refusal to allow plaintiff ability to present evidence of actual innocence had likely impact on jury’s low damages award.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-prison officials’ motion to dismiss plaintiff-prisoner’s section 1983 action seeking monetary damages arising out of defendants’ alleged failure to provide plaintiff with access to prison library to conduct research into possible grounds to file motion to withdraw guilty plea. Plaintiff’s lawsuit was barred by Heck, 512 U.S. 447, since any favorable determination on plaintiff’s damages claim would necessarily imply invalidity of his conviction, and plaintiff had not yet obtained favorable termination of his conviction. Fact that plaintiff no longer has opportunity to file habeas petition to challenge his conviction did not mandate different result where record revealed no impediment that would have prevented him from seeking collateral relief to challenge his conviction during his period of incarceration.

Dist. Ct. did not err in denying as untimely motion by four, currently-hired firefighters to intervene in class action that resulted in City being directed to hire other individuals who had been seeking employment as firefighters at same time as proposed intervenors sought and obtained employment as firefighters. Proposed intervenors, who had been hired as firefighters by 2006, knew or should have known by 2007 that they were no longer members of instant class action due to their changed status as hired firefighters, and yet waited until 2012 to seek instant intervention under perception that they too should receive remedy as result of class action. Moreover, Dist. Ct. could properly conclude that any remedy arising out of class action lawsuit should be reserved for those firefighter applicants, who never received employment under circumstances where proposed intervenors might not have been injured at all.

In section 1983 action alleging that defendants-police officials used excessive force by deploying tear gas and flashbang grenades in attempt to gain access to plaintiff's apartment after plaintiff had notified police that he had gun and threatened to kill himself, Dist. Ct. did not err in admitting evidence of plaintiff's psychological profile, as well as fact that plaintiff was facing potential 5-year prison sentence for recent substance abuse violations, even though defendants were not aware of said evidence at time of incident. Plaintiff's estate had opened door to introduction of said evidence by introducing evidence of plaintiff's mindset, and thus disputed evidence was relevant to counter estate's evidence that plaintiff was in good spirits near time of incident. Dist. Ct. did not err in granting judgment as matter of law on qualified immunity grounds as to defendant-police commanders with respect to their decision to use tear gas and flashbang grenades, where no case law precluded use of either device under circumstances where plaintiff posed danger to others. Fact that defendants used 12 times incapacitating level of tear gas did not require different result where plaintiff was still functioning within apartment. Finally, Dist. Ct. did not err in granting summary judgment with respect to defendants who shot and killed plaintiff where one defendant testified that he was in fear of his own life when plaintiff pointed gun at him.

Ct. of Appeals lacked jurisdiction to consider interlocutory appeal by defendant-employer of Dist. Ct.'s order denying defendant's request for arbitration of plaintiff-union's lawsuit alleging that defendant violated terms of collective bargaining agreement (CBA) by laying off certain union members and generating sham asset sale of company as alleged ruse to avoid certain obligations under CBA. While defendant argued that Ct. of Appeals had jurisdiction to consider appeal under section 16(a)(1) of Federal Arbitration Act, record showed that defendant's employees were transportation workers performing occasional interstate projects, such that instant CBA was properly classified as contract for employment of interstate workers under section 1 of FFA, which, in turn precluded defendant from using FFA as basis for appellate jurisdiction of instant appeal.