Federal Civil Practice

In action by plaintiff-prisoner alleging that defendants-prison mental health officials were deliberately indifferent to plaintiff-prisoner's mental health needs, Dist. Ct. abused its discretion by requiring plaintiff to post $1,000 bond to cover defendants' costs if plaintiff's lawsuit proved to be unsuccessful, where record showed that Dist. Ct. was aware that plaintiff had no means to acquire said bond, and where Dist. Ct. ultimately dismissed case with prejudice when plaintiff failed to post said bond. Dist. Ct. should have considered plaintiff's ability to pay for said bond prior to requiring that he post said bond, and imposition of bond under instant circumstances constituted denial of access to federal court. Ct. additionally observed that there were other avenues to address perception that plaintiff had pursued vexatious litigation such as imposition of monetary sanctions or institution of future filing ban.

Ct. of Appeals lacked jurisdiction to consider appeal of Dist. Ct.'s denial of two motions to quash subpoenas filed by two non-party state agencies. Ct. rejected agencies' contention that denials were reviewable under collateral-order doctrine and further found that agencies were required to generate contempt order prior to filing any appeal of said denials. Ct. alternatively rejected agencies' arguments that they were not subject to Dist. Ct.'s subpoena power because they were not "persons" under Rule 45, or that instant subpoenas could not be served on them via certified mail.

Dist. Ct. erred in granting motion for summary judgment by certain defendants-prison officials in section 1983 action alleging that defendants were deliberately indifferent to plaintiff-prisoner's medical condition, where defendants took plaintiff off his current medications and prescribed other drugs that were on prison's drug formulatory, and where plaintiff subsequently incurred seizures that ultimately led to his death. While Dist. Ct. appropriately granted summary judgment with respect to non-medical personnel defendants, who were unaware of medical risks posed by sudden change in plaintiff's drugs, trial issue remained as to defendant-jail nurse, who was subjectively aware that plaintiff faced serious risk of medical emergency and still placed him in isolation so as to preclude him from seeking help from others to request emergency care on his behalf. Moreover, plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to support his claim against defendant-County where, according to plaintiff, defendant had policy that delegated medical decision to third-party entity, which routinely switched prisoners off current prescribed medications without appropriate oversight by physicians.

Dist. Ct. did not err in denying motion to dismiss by certain defendants-prison guards and others at prison facility alleging qualified immunity in section 1983 action, claiming that plaintiff's decedent committed suicide in prison facility after defendants acted with deliberate indifference to decedent's serious medical condition involving long history of suicide attempts and mental illness. Complaint contained allegations that defendants had actual knowledge that decedent was suicide risk, and that defendants either failed to communicate said risks to others, failed to take reasonable steps to prevent instant suicide and/or delayed taking any action to assist decedent once defendants discovered decedent on floor of his cell. (Partial dissent filed.)

Dist. Ct. did not err in denying plaintiff's motion for judgment as matter of law in section 1983 action alleging false arrest after jury had rendered verdict in favor of defendants-police officials. While various police officials gave inconsistent statements regarding incident involving plaintiffs' son that led to defendants' restraining plaintiff in squad car for 20-minute period, jury could properly credit testimonies of certain defendants who indicated that plaintiff became belligerent and acted aggressively towards arresting officers. Moreover, Dist. Ct. did not err in admitting evidence of misconduct by plaintiff's son and others that occurred prior to plaintiff's arrival at arrest scene since said evidence was relevant to give context to actions taken by plaintiff, arresting officers and sizable crowd that had gathered at arrest scene. Also, while Dist. Ct. may have erred in admitting evidence of crack cocaine found in son's car, any error was harmless where jury was told that case was solely about actions taken by plaintiff and defendants.

Dist. Ct. erred in dismissing plaintiff's qui tam action alleging that defendant improperly submitted fee-for-service bills to Medicare program for services rendered by supervising physicians for work performed by medical residents, where, according to Dist. Ct., instant lawsuit was too similar to allegations of wrongdoing contained in 1998 GAO report. While allegations contained in 1998 GAO report also concerned fee-for-service bills submitted by totally unsupervised medical residents, said report did not preclude instant qui tam action where GAO report did not allege type of deceit attributed to instant defendant, i.e., misrepresentation to Medicare that same supervising physician was "immediately available" to multiple residents performing concurrently scheduled medical procedures.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing for failure to state valid claim, plaintiffs' section 1983 action against defendants-police officials alleging under class of one equal protection claim that defendants arbitrarily provided plaintiffs with less police protection by failing to respond to their complaints against third-party gang members who allegedly harassed plaintiffs at or near their home. All ten members of Ct. of Appeal found that dismissal was proper to extent that allegations of complaint alleged only inadequate police protection. However, five members of Ct. of Appeals would not allow plaintiffs to re-plead their complaint, and thus affirmed Dist. Ct.'s dismissal with prejudice. Four members of Ct. of Appeals would require that plaintiffs allege that they were victims of discrimination intentionally visited on them by state actor who knew or should have known that they had no justification for singling them out for unfavorable treatment, and who acted for personal reasons with discriminatory intent and effect. Five members of Ct. of Appeals, who would allow plaintiff ability to re-plead complaint, would require plaintiff to allege intentional discrimination on part of state actor, where discrimination lacked rational basis that caused plaintiffs' injuries. (Dissent filed.)

Dist. Ct. erred in granting defendants-prison officials’ motion for summary judgment in section 1983 action alleging that defendants used excessive force during altercation with other prisoners that resulted in plaintiff-prisoner being shot in arm, and that defendants violated 8th Amendment by ignoring plaintiff’s request for medical treatment. While Dist. Ct. based dismissal on finding that instant action was filed beyond applicable 2-year limitations period, Dist. Ct. failed to consider fact that plaintiff had filed internal grievance, which served to toll limitations period. Moreover, plaintiff stated viable excessive force claim where plaintiff’s allegations inferred that unidentified officer acted maliciously in using deadly force against plaintiff, who was not involved in ongoing prison altercation. Ct. also held that plaintiff stated viable 8th Amendment violation where plaintiff alleged that certain defendants ignored plaintiff’s plea for medical aid for his injured arm over 4-day period.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing plaintiff's claim alleging that defendant's dunning letter violated Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) where letter used language containing false sense of urgency to pay debt, such that it overshadowed statutorily mandated language regarding plaintiff's right to wait 30 days to contest validity of debt. While letter contained language warning plaintiff that her "account now meets guidelines for legal action" and told plaintiff to call defendant "today," plaintiff failed to state cause of action under FDCPA where letter contained only non-actionable puffery and instructed plaintiff to locate relevant information about her rights on back of letter. Moreover, under Sims, 445 F3d 959, location of rights on back of letter did not violate FDCPA.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing for failure to state valid claim, plaintiff's section 1983 and civil RICO actions alleging that defendants-Cook County Bd. of Review and its members violated plaintiff's due process and First Amendment rights by red-flagging plaintiff's clients for unfavorable treatment on their property tax appeals and defaming him with respect to his business as property tax consultant, as well as running "pay for play" racketeering enterprise that sought to extort campaign contributions and consulting services from plaintiff. As to his due process claims, plaintiff failed to allege that his work as consultant was constitutionally protected property interest. Moreover, with respect to plaintiff's deprivation of protected liberty interest claim arising out of defendants' alleged defamation of his reputation under "stigma plus" theory, plaintiff failed to allege that defendants altered any right or status that was recognized by state law. Ct. also observed with respect to plaintiff's First Amendment and civil RICO claims that plaintiff failed to allege how defendants had been able to identify which tax appeals had been filed by plaintiff's clients.