Federal Civil Practice

Dist. Ct. erred in granting defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiffs' class action alleging that defendant violated Driver's Privacy Protection Act (DPPA) by obtaining certain personal information from plaintiffs' driving records and selling said information to third-parties, where basis of dismissal was Dist. Ct.'s belief that plaintiffs lacked standing to initiate said action. Plaintiffs had requisite standing to pursue instant action where DPPA defined relevant injury as impermissible use of individual's personal information from driving records, and favorable ruling from Dist. Ct. would prohibit defendant from obtaining plaintiffs' personal information. However, dismissal was still appropriate where: (1) DPPA permits disclosure of personal information for 14 specific uses; and (2) plaintiffs failed to allege that third-parties ultimately receiving said information did not have permissible use for said information.

In section 1983 action alleging that defendants-police officials used excessive force by tasering plaintiff when arresting plaintiff on obstruction and resisting arrest charges during confrontation in her home, plaintiff waived any error regarding Dist. Ct.'s decision in pre-trial order to allow govt. to use in instant trial plaintiff's prior convictions for misdemeanor retail theft and obstructing police officer. While use of said convictions by govt. might have been inappropriate, defendant waived under Ohler, 529 US 753, any error where plaintiff introduced said convictions herself in effort to remove sting of anticipated admission of said evidence. Ct. rejected defendant's contention that holding in Ohler should be limited to criminal matters.

Dist. Ct. erred in dismissing plaintiff-prisoner's 1983 action alleging that defendants used excessive force during his arrest where said dismissal was imposed as sanction for plaintiff's failure to pay defendants $9,055.14 in court-ordered legal fees that were generated when plaintiff's counsel failed to file timely final pretrial order. Plaintiff's inability to pay said sanction did not support Dist. Ct.'s finding that said failure was "contumacious," and instant dismissal was too severe of sanction where: (1) defendants had previously offered to settle underlying claim for more than instant fee award; (2) plaintiff's counsel paid sanction during pendency of instant appeal after plaintiff had filed ARDC complaint against counsel; and (3) plaintiff was personally blameless for failing to file timely pretrial order.

Dist. Ct. erred in issuing on abstention grounds stay of instant Title VII action alleging that defendant terminated plaintiff on account of his race and national origin, where stay was based on Dist. Ct.'s belief that plaintiff's claims would eventually be barred by res judicata once adverse judgment in plaintiff's state case against defendants (alleging defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress arising out of defendants' issuance of negative evaluation) had become final. Dist. Ct.'s anticipation of outcome in state case was not enough to justify abstention given Supreme Ct. admonition not to stay federal action without articulating strong justification for doing so. Moreover, while instant federal action may eventually be barred by res judicata, defendants should not be allowed to stall federal action in order to wait for favorable state court action to become final.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing plaintiff-prisoner's Bivens complaint alleging that defendants-prison officials violated his right to access to courts by restricting his access to prison library during prosecution of his underlying section 1983 claim. Plaintiff failed to establish any prejudice arising out of restrictions placed on him where he was able to file several substantive motions in underlying section 1983 proceeding in spite of said restrictions, and where plaintiff failed to allege any actual injury arising out of any lack of access to prison library.

Dist. Ct. did not err in denying under Rules 8(d)(1) and 10(b) plaintiffs' motion seeking leave to file second amended complaint alleging RICO and section 1983 actions arising out of contention that defendants forced plaintiffs to hire off-duty deputy sheriffs as security for plaintiffs' private outdoor stage events, as well as determining that plaintiffs' complaint should be dismissed with prejudice. Plaintiffs had failed on three occasions to comply with basic pleading rules requiring concise statements of claims in separately numbered paragraphs. Record also showed that plaintiff's allegations were unintelligible, as well as vague and conclusory, that Dist. Ct. gave explicit directions as to how to cure said pleading deficiencies, and that plaintiff's counsel essentially ignored said directions and repeated many pleading defects in proposed amended complaints.

In section 1983 action alleging that defendant-prison chaplain violated plaintiff-prisoner's First Amendment rights by denying his request for vegan diet based on plaintiff's claim that said diet was required by his observation of Moorish Science Temple of America religion, remand was required to determine whether defendant was entitled to qualified immunity. On remand, Dist. Ct. must hold hearing to determine whether defendant's denial was based on suspicion that plaintiff was seeking vegan diet for personal reason (for which defendant would be entitled to qualified immunity) rather than religious reason. If denial was based on defendant's belief that vegan diet was not tenet of Moorish Science religion, defendant would not be entitled to qualified immunity, and plaintiff would be entitled to jury trial to determine whether plaintiff actually held religious belief on necessity of vegan diet.

Dist. Ct. erred in granting defendant-doctor's motion for summary judgment in plaintiff-prisoner's Bivens' action alleging that defendant was deliberately indifferent to his need for eye surgery arising out of his pterygia condition. Record showed that six out of eight specialists recommended surgery after observing that plaintiff's pterygia condition affected his vision and caused him pain, and that defendant ignored his own opinion that plaintiff required either further evaluation of his vision or surgery when defendant failed to conduct any additional evaluation and waited extended period of time before any surgery was approved. Ct. rejected Dist. Ct.'s finding that record merely established difference of opinion as to course of treatment among eye specialists.

Dist. Ct. did not err in finding that defendants-prison officials were entitled to qualified immunity in action by plaintiff-publisher of The New Abolitionist newsletter that challenged defendants' decision to refuse to distribute said newsletter to inmates in prison where newsletter contained content that posed unacceptable risk to inmate rehabilitation and prison security. Record supported instant ban where certain articles in newsletter contained false information about conditions in prison facility and encouraged inmates to distrust prison staff. Fact that eventual distribution of newsletter to inmates did not generate any actual security threats was irrelevant.

Dist. Ct. did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiffs' motion under Rule 60(b) to reinstate their employment discrimination claim where plaintiff had voluntarily dismissed said action under Rule 41(a)(1) nine months prior to seeking instant reinstatement. Rule 60(b) is extraordinary remedy that is granted only in exceptional circumstances, and plaintiffs' explanation that they sought prior voluntary dismissal for equitable and tactical reasons arising out of arrest of one plaintiff did not fit within one of six categories of grounds eligible for Rule 60(b) relief. Moreover, instant request came after expiration of relevant statute of limitations period, and plaintiffs' counsel could not properly assume that Ill. statute allowing re-filing of case that had been voluntarily dismissed within one year of re-filing applied in instant case.