Federal Civil Practice

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing for failure to state cause of action plaintiff-prisoner's section 1983 action alleging that defendant-prison officials violated his constitutional rights by barring him from receiving in mail Physician's Desk Reference and other book on guide to drugs where basis for bar was fact that both books contained subject matter on drugs that was deemed detrimental to prison security. While prison library contained similar books, defendants could reasonably bar around-the-clock access to instant books due to their drug-related content. Fact that plaintiff asserted that books were necessary because prison doctors had previously given him wrong drugs did not require different result.

In class action alleging improper delay in destroying plaintiffs-customers' video rental records under section 2710(e) of Video Privacy Protection Act, Dist. Ct. erred in finding that violations under section 2710(e) could be enforced in private cause of action under section 2710(c) of said Act. Language of section 2710(c) makes clear that it applies only to violations under section 2710(b) pertaining to unlawful disclosures of customer identification, and plaintiffs' proposed lawsuit otherwise would suggest no injury to plaintiffs, where, as here, plaintiffs merely alleged that defendant retained records for longer than one-year period set forth in section 2710(e), but did not disclose information contained in said records.

Dist. Ct. did not err in denying plaintiffs' request for class certification in action alleging that defendant-title insurance company's payments to its attorneys/title agents for purpose of conducting title examination and determining whether title is insurable were actually forms of kickbacks/fee splitting that were unlawful under RESPA. Plaintiffs' lawsuit alleged that said attorneys/title agents received unreasonably high compensation for services actually performed, and resolution of said allegations would require individual assessments concerning amount of work performed on each assignment so as to preclude class action treatment.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-police officials' motion for summary judgment in section 1983 action alleging that defendants were deliberately indifferent toward plaintiff-prisoner's risk of suicide where defendants failed to discover razor blade in plaintiff's wallet, which allowed plaintiff ability to kill himself while in backseat of squad car during time that defendants were transporting plaintiff to hospital for psychiatric screening. Although defendants may have been negligent in failing to remove razor blade from wallet, plaintiff failed to present evidence that defendants intentionally disregarded plaintiff's known safety risks. Moreover, record showed that defendants took some measures to discover contents of wallet, as well as took other measures to protect plaintiff from himself while plaintiff was in their custody.

In section 1983 action alleging that defendants (two assistant state’s attorneys) solicited false testimony in plaintiff’s murder trial, Dist. Ct. erred in denying defendant-Wharrie’s motion to dismiss case on grounds of absolute immunity, even though defendant’s acts took place after first trial, when said defendant was no longer acting in capacity of lead prosecutor. Record showed that said defendant still had prosecutorial disclosure obligations to plaintiff under Brady and Giglio, which allowed said defendant to assert absolute immunity. Plaintiff also failed to state viable federal cause of action against said defendant where plaintiff had alleged that subsequent prosecutor (defendant Kelly) was aware of said falsification and still used said testimony. Moreover, plaintiff failed to state viable federal cause of action against defendant Kelly, even though defendant-Wharrie’s alleged act of solicitation took place before Kelly had become prosecutor in case, since any alleged violation of plaintiff’s constitutional rights took place at time of trial when defendant Kelly was using his prosecutorial discretion.

Dist. Ct. erred in denying request by plaintiffs (700 African-American brokers) for class certification in action seeking injunctive relief against defendant-employer alleging that defendant’s policy of permitting individual brokers to create teams that shared clients created disparate impact based on race where Dist. Ct. concluded that defendant’s delegation of decisions that influenced plaintiffs’ compensation to 135 regional directors precluded finding of existence of common issue that could be resolved in proposed class action. Record showed that plaintiffs satisfied prerequisites for establishment of class action treatment under Rules 23(b)(2) and (c)(4) where: (1) lawsuit involved two company-wide policies that permitted brokers to form their own teams and based account distributions on past success of said brokers; and (2) issues with respect to whether defendant’s policies created disparate impact and whether said policies were nonetheless justified by business necessity were common to entire class. Ct. further observed that should plaintiffs prevail in class action, any damages calculations would have to occur in individual lawsuits to determine degree to which any class members were adversely affected by defendant’s policies.

Ct. of Appeals granted defendant's motion to dismiss appeal by plaintiff's lawyers of Dist. Ct. order directing said lawyers to pay $1,475 in defendant's attorney fees as sanction for plaintiff's inclusion of defendant in underlying employment discrimination claim where facts showed that defendant had never employed plaintiff. Plaintiff's lawyers filed notice of appeal more than 30 days after entry of sanctions order, and Ct. of Appeals rejected lawyers' argument that Rule 58 applied so as to render instant notice of appeal timely where Ct. of Appeals determined that Dist. Ct.'s entry of sanctions order was pursuant to Rule 54, which did not require Dist. Ct. to generate separate judgment document so as to trigger different period for filing notice of appeal.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing for failure to state cause of action plaintiff's lawsuit alleging that defendant violated anti-assignment provisions contained in section 407(a) of Social Security Act when defendant collected satellite dish termination fee from plaintiff's debit card that had been funded with plaintiff's Social Security benefits. Merchants do not violate section 407(a) when they allow Social Security recipients to pay for goods and services by using debit or credit cards, and Ct. rejected plaintiff's argument that use of debit card became forbidden assignment of Social Security benefits when plaintiff authorized use of debit card in advance of her debt.

Dist. Ct. did not abuse its discretion in relinquishing supplemental jurisdiction and remanding two state-law claims alleging violation of Ill. Franchise Disclosure Act where plaintiff on eve of trial informed Dist. Ct. that it would be withdrawing its sole federal claim under Robinson-Patman Act and proceed only on its state-law claims. Once all federal claims drop out of case, general presumption arises in favor of remanding matter back to state court, and Dist. Ct. did not abuse its discretion in remanding case to state court where instant state-law claims were complex and raised unsettled legal issues. Fact that remand occurred just prior to start of trial did not require different result where pre-trial rulings focused mainly on discovery issues, as opposed to substantive issues of case.