Federal Civil Practice

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendant-police officer’s motion for partial judgment on pleadings with respect to plaintiff’s section 1983 action, alleging that defendant violated plaintiff’s decedent’s substantive due process rights when defendant, while driving to work at 78 miles per hour on 45 mile per hour stretch of highway, illegally changed lanes, crossed fog line onto shoulder of highway, and fatally struck decedent on shoulder of road without seeing her while still traveling 55 miles per hour. Plaintiff was required to plead sufficient facts to establish that defendant acted with “criminal recklessness,” and plaintiff's allegations that defendant’s speeding on highway and illegal lane change, when coupled with allegation that defendant never saw decedent prior to fatal collision, did not suggest that defendant disregarded extreme or obvious risks and was willing to let fatal collision occur. Moreover, plaintiff’s allegations, which were grounded in negligence rather than recklessness, failed to allege constitutional violation.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-prison correctional officers’ motion for summary judgment in plaintiff-prisoner’s section 1983 action, alleging that defendants were deliberately indifferent to his reports that his cellmate had physically threatened him in months leading up to physical assault of plaintiff by cellmate on day cellmate was scheduled to be transferred from plaintiff’s cell. Record showed that: (1) plaintiff had submitted several transfer requests to one defendant, who had authority to grant said requests, but failed to act on any request; and (2) other defendant had actually assisted plaintiff in drafting one transfer request and advised him on how to make request more meritorious. Dist. Ct. could properly find that plaintiff had failed to establish indifference on part of defendant who had helped him draft transfer request. Moreover, Dist. Ct. could properly find that plaintiff had failed to causally connect his injuries to other defendant’s failure to act on his transfer requests, where record showed that plaintiff voluntarily approached cellmate and began interaction that led to his injuries.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting motion for summary judgment filed by two defendants-prison’s chief engineer and dietary manager in section 1983 action, alleging that defendants were deliberately indifferent to dangerous condition of prison kitchen, where plaintiff suffered severe burns after tripping on kitchen floor while carrying bucket of scalding water from stove to sink because hot water faucets in kitchen were not working. Plaintiff was required to show that defendants were actually exposed to information concerning risk of danger, and plaintiff failed to show that: (1) defendant dietary engineer knew or must have known that plaintiff was carrying dangerously hot water at time of his injuries; and (2) defendant chief engineer was aware that inmates were instructed to carry scalding water across kitchen floor. Dist. Ct. erred, though, in dismissing at pleading stage plaintiff’s claim against defendant-kitchen supervisor, where plaintiff alleged that supervisor was present in kitchen at time of plaintiff’s injuries, and where complaint pleaded sufficient facts to permit inference that supervisor was aware of floor condition that contained holes and broken tiles and was ware that water plaintiff was carrying was dangerously hot.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendant-debt collector’s motion for summary judgment in plaintiff-wife of debtor’s action, under Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), alleging that defendant repeatedly called plaintiff’s phone after debtor had sent email challenging validity of debt, and after plaintiff had told defendant that she was not responsible for debtor’s debt. Defendant was entitled to invoke bona fide error defense under section 1692k(c) of FDCPA, where: (1) debtor sent email challenging validity of debt to defendant’s CEO, which was not mentioned as suitable method to inform defendant of debtor’s challenge to validity of debt; (2) had debtor properly submitted his dispute via methods set forth in letter sent to debtor, defendant could have followed its policy and practice of stopping all collection activity until debt was validated; and (3) collector at defendant had failed to properly code plaintiff’s phone number on its do-not-call list to prevent plaintiff from receiving future calls. Ct. further found that defendant maintained procedures reasonably adapted to avoid error, and that fact that human error was cause of instant failure to place plaintiff’s phone on do-not-call list, which, in urn, resulted in plaintiff receiving series of telephone calls, did not require different result.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing plaintiff’s class action, alleging violations of Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act, as well as breach of contract, unjust enrichment, interference with contract and intrusion upon seclusion claims, arising out of defendant-University’s transfer of plaintiff’s anonymized medical records to defendant-Google for purposes of advancing research project designed to develop software capable of anticipating patients’ future healthcare needs. Plaintiff lacked standing to bring instant claims, where plaintiff failed to allege that he suffered injury in fact that was concrete and particularized, actual or imminent and was otherwise traceable to defendants’ conduct. Fact that plaintiff claimed potential risk that he might be identified from instant records in future was insufficient to confer standing, especially where plaintiff had not alleged that defendant-Google took any steps to identify him. Plaintiff also could not obtain standing on his breach of contract claim alleging that transfer of his medical records by University represented compensable “overpayment” that he made to University for his medical care. Ct. further rejected plaintiff’s contention that any breach of contract allegation, by itself, establishes concrete injury.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-two officers’ motion for summary judgment in plaintiff’s section 1983 action, alleging that defendants violated his Fourth Amendment rights when third defendant-officer used excessive force during wellness check of plaintiff, where officer tased plaintiff twice and struck him several times. Plaintiff conceded that he was not cooperative with said officer, and record showed that all three officers had probable cause to believe at time that plaintiff had committed battery on his mother who had requested wellness check. Plaintiff failed to counter sworn allegations contained in summary judgment motion with anything other than allegations in instant complaint, and Dist. Ct. could properly find that officer’s use of force was reasonable under instant circumstances. Also, plaintiff was not entitled to new trial on his unlawful entry claim, even though plaintiff alleged that Dist. Ct. gave erroneous jury instruction that attempted to define outer contours of plaintiff’s home, where plaintiff failed to establish any prejudice arising out of giving said instruction, where defendants argued and jury accepted claim that exigent circumstances justified warrantless entry through plaintiff s doorway.

Dist. Ct. erred in granting defendant-police officer’s motion to dismiss plaintiff-17-year-old student’s section 1983 action, alleging that defendant violated her equal protection and due process rights under 14th Amendment, as well as her 4th Amendment rights, when defendant subjected her to sexual harassment while plaintiff was in defendant’s squad car during class assignment to go on “ride along” with law enforcement officer. While case law varies on several doctrinal pathways to support instant sexual harassment claim, sexual assault by official acting under color of law has potential remedies under either equal protection or due process clauses under 14th Amendment. In this regard, plaintiff sufficiently alleged either equal protection or substantive due process claim, where she asserted that defendant touched her in sexually offensive ways while she was in squad car, as well as suggested to another police officer that plaintiff wanted to be prostitute. Also, same allegations supported plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment claim, since “seizure” by police officer for Fourth Amendment purposes does not require that seizure occur during criminal investigation. Fact that plaintiff did not identify similarly-situated individual whom defendant treated more favorably did not defeat her equal protection claim. Dist. Ct., though, did not err in dismissing plaintiff’s similar claim against defendant-police chief, where complaint failed to allege sufficient facts to establish that police chief, as police officer’s supervisor, played some role in alleged harassment by either facilitating, approving or ignoring officer’s offensive conduct.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendant-credit data furnisher’s motion for summary judgment in plaintiff’s action under Fair Credit Reporting Act, alleging that defendant provided inaccurate information about status of her mortgage and her payment history on same, after unreasonably investigating dispute of its data. While plaintiff asserted that defendant provided Equifax with inaccurate amended Pay Data and Account History, Dist. Ct. could reasonably find that no reasonable jury could find that defendant provided patently inaccurate or misleading information, where record showed that plaintiff’s examples of inaccurate information were either not materially misleading or not inaccurate.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing plaintiff’s False Claims Act action, alleging that defendants-tribal hospital and several employees of hospital retaliated against plaintiff by terminating her from her hospital position after she had flagged irregularities in hospital’s billing practices that she believed reflected fraud. Dist. Ct. could properly have found that defendants were entitled to tribal sovereign immunity, since hospital could be viewed as arm of Tribe. Moreover, individual defendants could also assert tribal sovereign immunity because plaintiff essentially sued them in their official capacities. Ct. rejected plaintiff’s contention that tribal sovereign immunity did not apply, because: (1) according to plaintiff, anti-retaliation provisions of False Claims Act abrogated tribal sovereign immunity; and (2) defendants could not otherwise assert tribal sovereign immunity. Ct. of appeals, though, held that defendant-hospital could assert tribal sovereign immunity, where record showed that hospital was acting in tribal capacity, where relevant factors pointed to common understanding that hospital further Tribe’s self-sufficiency and self governance.