Federal Civil Practice

Dist. Ct. did not err in remanding to state court plaintiffs’ multi-consolidated lawsuit, seeking recovery against defendants-shooter, shooter’s father and gun manufacturer of gun used by shooter in Highland Park parade event. Plaintiffs alleged actions under Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Practices Act and Illinois Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act. Record showed that only three defendants moved for removal, and basis for remand order was provision in 28 USC section 1446(b)(B)(A),which requires consent of all defendants for removal, which did not occur here. Ct. of Appeals rejected defendants' arguments that necessity that all defendants agree to remove case did not apply, since: (1) defendant gun manufacturer qualified as entity acting under federal officer for purposes 28 USC section 1442(a)(1); or (2) instant removal was exempt from all-defendant consent under 28 USC section1441(c)(2) because federal issue was imbedded in underlying state-law claims.

Dist. Ct. did nor err in dismissing for lack of standing plaintiffs’ action, alleging economic harm stemming from voluntary recall of defendant’s infant formula that plaintiffs claimed exposed them to potential risk of injury due to fact that formula was produced at defendant’s plant under unclean conditions. Record showed that defendant announced voluntary recall of formula and offered full refund to those who possessed formula. Ct. of Appeals observed that plaintiff’s risk-of-harm theory does not support Article III standing, and further observed that plaintiffs’ alleged injuries were hypothetical and conjectural. Ct. of Appeals also noted that plaintiffs did not allege that formula they purchased was contaminated or that they were subject to risk of harm in personal or individual way.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendant-police officer’s motion for summary judgment in plaintiff’s section 1983 action, alleging that defendant subjected him to false arrest, in incident during which defendant arrived at accident scene where defendant arrested plaintiff after three witnesses accused plaintiff of being involved in hit-and-run accident and of physically battering another individual. Plaintiff could not prevail in his false arrest claim because defendant had probable cause to arrest plaintiff based on three witnesses’ statements that defendant was culprit. Defendant could believe said witnesses, and was not required to exhaust all other investigative avenues in hopes of uncovering potentially exculpatory evidence.

Plaintiff lacked standing to pursue instant action under Fair Debt Collection Practice Act (FDCPA), alleging that defendant’s practice of serving plaintiff with requests to admit facts in underlying state-court action seeking recovery of educational debt without warning plaintiff of ramifications for failing to serve timely responses violated FDCPA. In order to establish standing, plaintiff must establish concrete injury, and plaintiff in this regard stated that his standing was satisfied where: (1) he would have denied said requests if he had been apprised of time span in which to make said denials; and (2) resultant admissions caused him to lose leverage in settlement of debt collection lawsuit. Ct. of Appeals, though, found that neither theory of injury was sufficient to establish standing in this case, where: (1) plaintiff failed to show that he suffered any injury with respect to request to admit admissions, where record showed that defendant never indicated that he would use said admissions against him in debt collection lawsuit; and (2) standing must be established at time instant lawsuit was filed, and plaintiff’s leverage argument arose out of settlement of debt collection lawsuit, which did not occur until four months after filing of instant lawsuit.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing for lack of standing plaintiff-association’s lawsuit, alleging that defendant-school district’s policy that provided direction and resources to schools encountering students with questions about their gender identity violated their Due Process and Free Exercise Rights by interfering with its members' exclusive rights as parents to make decisions with and on behalf of their school children on issues of gender identity. Parents' concerns about possible applications of defendant’s policy that may or may not come to pass were insufficient to confer standing to bring instant lawsuit. Moreover, defendant conceded that instant action was filed as facial pre-enforcement challenge, and Ct. of Appeals found that plaintiff-association lacked standing, where no parent had experienced any actual injury or faced any imminent harm attributable to defendant’s policy.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing plaintiff’s section 1983 action seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as just compensation against various current and former Indiana state officials in their individual and official capacities, when they took plaintiff’s unclaimed property and failed to pay her interest during time state held said property when she attempted to reclaim said property. Dist. Ct. could properly find that plaintiff’s request for prospective relief is moot, since Indiana passed statute that now requires payment of interest on property held by State. Dist. Ct. could also properly find that Eleventh Amendment precluded plaintiff from proceeding against individual defendants in their individual capacities because her claim was really against State, since Indiana alone benefited from unpaid interest and must pay any compensation owed. Plaintiff also could not use section 1983 to bring instant action, since claim was really against State, and State is not “person” who can be sued under section 1983. Ct. of Appeals also found that there is no recognized direct cause of action for compensation under Takings Clause.

In section 1983 action by plaintiff-prisoner, alleging that defendant-prison officials wrongfully disciplined him for theft in retaliation for registering administrative complaints against them, Dist. Ct. found that plaintiff failed to properly exhaust his administrative remedies, and thus dismissed plaintiff’s case as time-barred because: (1) it was filed beyond applicable six-year limitation period; and (2) Wisconsin statute that would have tolled instant limitation period for time spent by plaintiff to exhaust his administrative remedies did not apply. Ct. of Appeals, though, in remanding matter to Dist. Ct., noted that defendants have now abandoned claim that case was time-barred because plaintiff had improperly exhausted his administrative remedies. Moreover, while defendant asserted different statute of limitations defense, they waived said claim because they had failed to raise it in Dist. Ct.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing plaintiff’s section 1983 action claim, alleging that State of Illinois OEIG report that concluded that plaintiff and her elevator service and repair business engaged in kickback scheme with University of Illinois Chicago employee and recommended that State and City of Chicago terminate all business with plaintiff and bar any future business with her and her company constituted due process deprivation of her occupational liberty. Record showed that State and City ceased doing business with plaintiff in response to report, but that federal jury acquitted plaintiff of bribery charges and OEIG never rescinded its report. However, to support instant “stigma-plus” due process claim, plaintiff needed to plead that she suffered tangible loss, which plaintiff did not do, where she did not plead loss of occupation, where record showed that she was always operator in her occupation of her business in servicing and repairing elevators through relevant time period, and where plaintiff maintained and expanded her 20 percent business in private clients and expanded her out-of-state business. Moreover, OEIG report did not preclude plaintiff from obtaining other public contracts, and record showed that she has obtained some federal government work. Thus, without liberty deprivation with respect to her occupation, plaintiff cannot sustain stigma-plus claim.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing for lack of standing plaintiff’s action alleging that defendant-debt collector violated Fair Debt Collector Practices Act (FDCPA), where defendant attempted to collect $5,246.21 debt without announcing that creditor had not verified said debt balance. Plaintiff did not allege that she had incurred any concrete injury arising out of actions taken by defendant other than bare claim that defendant had “interrupted” her “self-employment.” However, plaintiff failed to provide any other details as to how defendant’s actions led to any loss of income when directed to do so by Dist. Ct. As such, Dist. Ct. could properly dismiss instant case for lack of standing due to lack of evidence that plaintiff suffered any concrete loss.

Dist. Ct. did not err in excluding plaintiff’s proposed lay witness from rendering opinion on plaintiff’s lost profits arising out of defendant’s denial of plaintiff application for special use permit to operate adult entertainment club that served liquor, where plaintiff’s business never opened for business, and where State of Illinois enacted legislation that made it impossible for plaintiff to operate said business some three months after plaintiff filed instant lawsuit. Opinion of said witness stemmed from his operation of different adult entertainment and fell within realm of expert witness testimony, and plaintiff had failed to disclose said witness as expert witness. Moreover, extensive differences between existing adult entertainment business and plaintiff’s business precluded apt comparison and witness lacked personal knowledge to support key aspects of his opinion, Too, Dist. Ct. could also base instant exclusion on differences in locations of plaintiff’s proposed business and location of comparative business. Dist. Ct. also did not abuse its discretion in either: (1) excluding different expert report, where said report was disclosed six years after 2015 close of discovery deadline; or (2) entering order that precluded plaintiff from introducing evidence of any damages figure that had not been properly disclosed under Rule 26, under circumstances where plaintiff had not updated any damages calculation under Rule 26 since December of 2012.