Federal Civil Practice

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing plaintiffs-prisoners’ section 1983 actions alleging that defendants-prison officials’ policy of pricing prison commissary items more than 25% over costs of items sold violated their procedural due process rights. Plaintiffs failed to establish that they had federal constitutional right to either commissary access or to particular prices for commissary items and also failed to allege that post-deprivation remedies were inadequate to satisfy constitutional due process requirements.

Dist. Ct. erred in denying plaintiff-prisoner’s request to proceed in forma pauperis in his section 1983 action alleging that defendants-prison officials had improperly interfered with his prison mail, where basis of ruling was Dist. Ct.’s belief that plaintiff had three prior dismissals of lawsuits that had been deemed frivolous. While plaintiff had two prior dismissals of frivolous lawsuits, third lawsuit, which had been dismissed on finding that Dist. Ct. lacked subject matter jurisdiction on two of three counts, did not qualify as frivolous lawsuit for purposes of applying three-strike rule under section 1915(g) of PLRA.

Dist. Ct. erred in dismissing plaintiff’s individual claim under Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, as well as plaintiff’s proposed class action, where: (1) plaintiff’s counsel appeared late at status call; (2) plaintiff’s counsel had repeatedly failed to file timely motion to certify proposed class; and (3) Dist. Ct. had previously expressed doubt as to viability of proposed class action. Dismissal of entire case was too harsh of sanction where parties had previously agreed that plaintiff’s individual claim was meritorious, and where Dist. Ct. had failed to give prior explicit warning that plaintiff’s failure to develop class action case placed plaintiff at risk of entire lawsuit being dismissed. Ct. further noted that instead of dismissal of entire case, Dist. Ct. should have entertained subject of class certification if it had serious doubts about viability of class action.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendant-tobacco manufacturer’s motion to dismiss for failure to state cause of action, plaintiffs’ unjust enrichment claim alleging that defendant knowingly concealed truth from consumers about cigarette’s addiction and health problems with tar and nicotine found in defendant’s Marlboro Lights. Plaintiffs explicitly disavowed any need to allege that they were deceived or injured by defendant’s actions, and thus could not establish unjust enrichment claim since violation of consumer’s legal right to know about product’s risks, without more, cannot support claim that manufacturer unjustly retained revenues from product’s sale to consumer’s detriment.

Dist. Ct. erred in granting on grounds of qualified immunity defendants-DCFS officials’ motion for summary judgment in section 1983 action alleging that defendants denied plaintiffs-minor and his parents their due process rights when they took minor into protective custody and retained him after need for protective custody had ceased. Although defendants had probable cause to initially place minor in protective custody where minor suffered fractured arm and had unexplained older bruise near left eye while parents gave conflicting explanation for injured arm, plaintiffs presented sufficient evidence to defeat summary judgment on issue of minor’s continued placement in protective custody where defendants retained custody of minor after medical officials had ruled out child abuse as source of fractured arm. Plaintiffs also presented sufficient evidence to support claim that DCFS investigator had no legal authority to tell parents that they could not see minor or exercise other parental rights unless they agreed to sign safety plan.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting plaintiff-state high school athletic association's motion for summary judgment in action seeking declaration that it had right to grant exclusive license to private party to broadcast/stream online high school tournament games so as to prevent defendants-private news media from streaming such games without either obtaining permission from private party or paying fee. Ct. rejected defendants' argument that First Amendment prevents state actor from entering into exclusive contracts with private parties for purpose of broadcasting entire events online since: (1) defendants were free to attend games and generate reports about said games; and (2) tournament games are plaintiff's performance products to which plaintiff has right to control.

Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant's motion for attorney fees and costs arising out of case being initially removed to federal court and then remanded after determination was made that said case did not have at stake $75,000 to meet threshold to support removal jurisdiction. Defendant was entitled to seek said fees even though defendant had initially sought removal, and while plaintiff conceded that amount in controversy was actually less than $40,000 (even though it had asserted that amount in controversy was $100,000 when case was originally filed in state court), Dist. Ct. could properly deny defendant's request for fees and costs associated for time spent while case was in federal court where defendant waited 10 months after having knowledge of actual amount in controversy figure before informing Dist. Ct. that it lacked jurisdiction over case.

Dist. Ct. did not err in denying plaintiffs' request for preliminary injunction in action alleging that defendants' failure to close down parts of Chicago Area Waterway System to avert potential invasion of Asian carp into Lake Michigan constituted public nuisance under federal common law. While Dist. Ct. erred in finding that plaintiffs had shown only minimal chance of succeeding on merits where record showed progression of carp and where plaintiffs would endure substantial likelihood of harm if carp were to gain access to Lake Michigan, denial of request for preliminary injunction was appropriate where defendants showed that balance of harms favored them where costs associated with entry of preliminary injunction were substantial, and where record showed that there was nothing that any preliminary injunction could add, apart from substantial steps already taken by defendants and others to keep Asian carp out of Lake Michigan, that would protect Great Lakes from said invasion while instant lawsuit is being adjudicated.

In action alleging that defendant's recall of defective child's toy was inadequate, Dist. Ct. did not err in denying plaintiff's motion to certify class action brought by individuals whose children were not harmed by product, and who did not seek refund. While Dist. Ct. improperly based denial on Rule 23(b)(3), after finding that defendant's recall program that allowed for full refund was superior to instant proposed class action (since recall program was not "adjudication" for purposes of applying Rule 23(b)(3)), denial was nevertheless appropriate under Rule 23(a)(4) since plaintiffs wanted relief that generally duplicated remedy already given to potential class members under recall program that otherwise did not have high transaction costs associated with proposed class action. Ct. further found that proposed nationwide class would be difficult to manage given differences in states' treatment of plaintiffs' request for punitive damages.

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants-police officials' motion for summary judgment in section 1983 action alleging that defendants lacked probable cause to make three separate arrests of plaintiff on charges of disorderly conduct, theft of lost property and criminal trespass to state-supported land. Record showed that defendants had probable cause to support all three arrests where: (1) disorderly conduct arrest arose out of plaintiff's actions in impeding tow truck driver by leaping onto plaintiff's car as it was being towed away; (2) theft of lost property arrest arose out of defendants' observation of Chicago Police Dept. ticket book on dashboard of plaintiff's vehicle; and (3) criminal trespass arrest arose out of defendants' observation of plaintiff in police parking lot looking into police cars while defendants believed that said lot had been posted with "police personnel only" sign.